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Jonathan M. Barnett† & Ted Sichelman††
Scholars and other commentators widely assert that enforcement of contractual and other limitations on labor mobility deters innovation. Based on this view,
federal and state legislators have taken, and continue to consider, actions to limit
the enforcement of covenants not to compete in employment agreements. These actions would discard the centuries-old reasonableness standard that governs the enforcement of these provisions, often termed “noncompetes,” in all but four states (notably, California). We argue that this zero-enforcement position lacks a sound basis
in theory or empirics. As a matter of theory, it overlooks the complex effects of contractual limitations on labor mobility in innovation markets. While it is frequently
asserted that noncompetes may impede knowledge spillovers that foster innovation,
it is frequently overlooked that noncompetes may encourage firms to invest in cultivating intellectual and human capital. As a matter of empirics, we show that two
commonly referenced bodies of evidence fail to support zero enforcement. First, we
revisit the conventional account of the rise of Silicon Valley and the purported fall
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of the Boston area as innovation centers, showing that this divergence cannot suitably be explained by differences in state law regarding noncompetes. Second, we show
that widely cited empirical studies fail to support a causal relationship between noncompetes, reduced labor mobility, and reduced innovation. Given these theoretical
and empirical complexities, we propose an error-cost approach that provides an economic rationale for the common law’s reasonableness approach toward contractual
constraints on the circulation of human capital.
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INTRODUCTION
On February 23, 2017, two titans of Silicon Valley went to
war in federal court: Google filed a lawsuit against Uber, accusing
it of using intellectual property allegedly stolen by one of the lead
engineers on Waymo, Google’s self-driving automotive subsidiary.1 Specifically, Google alleged that Anthony Levandowski had
misappropriated Google’s intellectual property before departing
(along with other Google engineers) to found Otto, a self-driving
car startup subsequently acquired by Uber for $680 million.2 The
legal basis for Google’s lawsuit against Uber and Levandowski
consisted of a medley of federal trade secret, patent infringement,
and state trade secret and unfair competition claims.3 Given the
high economic stakes, commentators speculated that if Google
prevailed, the ultimate damages could exceed a billion dollars.4
While the litigation was pending, the trial judge ordered
Levandowski to stop working on projects involving the technology
that had been allegedly misappropriated.5 Although Google and
Uber settled the dispute shortly after trial proceedings commenced for a mere $245 million, an arbitration panel subsequently found against Levandowski (who was fired by Uber6) and,
on an interim basis, awarded Google $127 million in damages, for
which Uber may be financially responsible under indemnification
obligations to its former employee.7
1
Complaint, Waymo LLC v Uber Technologies, Inc, No 3:17-cv-00939, *2–5 (ND Cal
filed Feb 23, 2017) (available on Westlaw at 2017 WL 726994) (Waymo Complaint) (stating
various causes of action against Uber relating to alleged actions by a former Waymo employee in connection with his departure from Waymo to Uber’s self-driving car project).
2
See id at *3–4 (describing evidence showing that Levandowski, former Waymo engineer, misappropriated information from Waymo upon departure from company).
3
Id at *2, 16, 19, 21, 27 (stating trade secret, patent infringement, and unfair competition causes of action).
4
See Aarian Marshall, Google’s Robocar Lawsuit Could Kill Uber’s Future and Send
Execs to Prison (Wired, Feb 28, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/SH8J-ZQ2H.
5
Joe Mullin, Judge’s Order Bars Uber Engineer from Lidar Work, Demands Return
of Stolen Files (Ars Technica, May 15, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/B7KC-ZD46;
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff’s Motion for Provisional Relief,
Waymo LLC v Uber Technologies, Inc, No 3:17-cv-00939, *23 (ND Cal filed May 11, 2017).
6
Aarian Marshall, Uber Fired Its Robocar Guru, but Its Legal Fight with Google
Goes On (Wired, May 30, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/YZ3K-78TV.
7
Uber Technologies, Inc, Form S-1 Registration Statement F-72, F-82 (SEC filed
Apr 11, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/Z2JE-NZBQ.
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The Google-Uber litigation, and the rich suite of legal and
economic instruments deployed to restrain the departure of a
prized employee, is a notable counterexample to the nowstandard account of unrestrained employee movement in Silicon
Valley, the world’s preeminent innovation cluster. That account
emphasizes the ease with which technical and managerial talent,
and the intellectual capital embodied in that talent, circulates
among competitors, resulting in knowledge spillovers that redound to the collective benefit of the innovation ecosystem. This
free-flowing movement of human capital is widely attributed to
cultural norms, organizational practices, and, especially among
legal scholars, California’s refusal to enforce a contractual clause
known as a “covenant not to compete” (or “noncompete”).8
A noncompete typically limits a former employee’s ability to
work for competitors in a certain industry and a certain geographic area for a certain period of time. In contemporary scholarly and policy discussions of innovation policy, the noncompete
has recently become a surprising focal point. Specifically, the literature has widely adopted the view initially espoused by Professor Ronald Gilson—albeit in a much more qualified form—that
California’s general refusal to enforce noncompetes in significant
part explains the exceptional growth of Silicon Valley since the
early 1980s while Massachusetts’s willingness to enforce noncompetes spurred the purported decline of the Route 128 area around
Boston. 9 Following this view, California has enjoyed a healthy
8
On cultural norms and organizational practices, see AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional
Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 1–9, 32–34, 44–45,
50–56 (Harvard 1996) (arguing that Silicon Valley’s comparative advantage compared to
Route 128 derived from its “network-based” system that promotes collective learning
through informal collaboration within and between firms, as compared to Route 128’s hierarchical system based on centralized and vertically integrated corporate entities). On
noncompetes, see Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 NYU L Rev
575, 602–09 (1999) (arguing that differences in the enforceability of noncompetes contributed significantly to the ascendance of Silicon Valley over Route 128 by promoting the
circulation of human and intellectual capital among competing firms).
9
For the original statement of this view, see Gilson, 74 NYU L Rev at 602–09 (cited
in note 8). In the legal literature, representative contributions that have adopted and expanded upon Gilson’s insight include: Orly Lobel, Talent Wants to Be Free: Why We Should
Learn to Love Leaks, Raids and Free Riding 67–70 (Yale 2013) (arguing that California’s
refusal to enforce noncompetes at least partly accounts for its ascendance over Route 128
and attributing this hypothesis to Ronald Gilson); Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property:
Human Capital Law and the Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 Tex L Rev 789, 825–26
(2015) (likening noncompetes to “a thick cluster of property rights that rigidifies the market and reduces the ability to move forward”); Viva R. Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 Ariz L Rev 939, 979–80 (2013) (arguing for a uniform rule of nonenforceability on the ground that noncompetes skew the balance in intellectual property policy
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circulation of human capital, while Massachusetts has been deprived of the “agglomeration economies” that promote robust innovation clusters.10 The result in California is a virtuous circle of
accelerated innovation that led to the rise of Silicon Valley; the
result in Massachusetts is a sad story of a Silicon Valley that
could have been but wasn’t.
The recent surge of interest in noncompetes is a welcome extension of innovation policy analysis. Noncompetes, and the
broader universe of contractual and economic restraints on labor
mobility, are a critical but overlooked tool in promoting robust innovation ecosystems. Scholarly discussions of innovation policy
typically focus on the extent to which intellectual property rights
such as patents or copyrights regulate the flow of informational
assets. But this misses a key component of any innovation environment—namely, the flow of intellectual capital embedded in
the human beings that innovate and commercialize new products
and services. In the business world, firms are keenly aware of the
value of human capital and use contractual and economic instruments to avoid losing their most valuable personnel to competitors. Based on a survey of 11,500 participants, a recent study
found that an estimated 18 percent of all US workers (roughly,
30 million people), and approximately one-third of workers in
professional, scientific, and technical occupations, are subject to
noncompetes.11 The extent to which the law should enforce these
contractual instruments is a matter of fundamental importance.

between protecting R&D incentives and the public domain); Viva R. Moffat, The Wrong
Tool for the Job: The IP Problem with Non-Competition Agreements, 52 Wm & Mary L Rev
873, 911–20 (2010) (arguing that noncompetes are a poor tool for protecting IP rights). In
the economics literature, see Sampsa Samila and Olav Sorenson, Noncompete Covenants:
Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to Growth, 57 Mgmt Sci 425, 436 (2011) (arguing
that empirical evidence supports relaxing enforcement of noncompetes to accelerate labor
mobility and stimulate entrepreneurship). In an important variant on this line of argument, Professor Alan Hyde agrees that labor mobility lies behind the success of Silicon
Valley but attributes this difference principally to California firms’ reluctance to bring
trade secret claims against former employees and California courts’ resistance to grant
such claims, rather than differences in the treatment of noncompetes. See Alan Hyde,
Working in Silicon Valley: Economic and Legal Analysis of a High-Velocity Labor Market
32–40 (M.E. Sharpe 2003).
10 Gilson, 74 NYU L Rev at 576, 606–07 (cited in note 8).
11 See J.J. Prescott, Norman D. Bishara, and Evan Starr, Understanding Noncompetition Agreements: The 2014 Noncompete Survey Project, 2016 Mich St L Rev 369, 461;
Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott, and Norman Bishara, Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force *16–
19 (University of Michigan Law and Economics Research Paper, Aug 2019), archived at
https://perma.cc/ZXU6-NAGU.
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In recent years, a growing number of scholars and policymakers have adopted a simple answer to this question: never.12 Following this view—popularized by the slogan, “talent wants to be
free”—the free circulation of human capital always, or usually,
promotes innovation. As such, any constraints “imposed” by employers reflect either overreaching or economic irrationality.13 As
a matter of policy, this view recommends that all states adopt
California’s purported zero-tolerance regime—a change that
would undo the common-law “reasonableness” standard currently
used by forty-six states to adjudge the enforceability of noncompetes. 14 (The current exceptions are California, North Dakota,
and Oklahoma, which bar noncompete enforcement against individuals in most circumstances;15 recently, Hawaii barred noncompetes for “technology business[es].”16) To be clear, even under the
long-standing common law doctrine (dating from an English precedent in 171117), noncompete clauses are enforceable only if they
set forth “reasonable” temporal, geographic, and scope-ofindustry limitations.18 For the “talent wants to be free” school of
12

See note 13 (noting scholars and policymakers adopting this view); Part I.C (same).
For representative sources that express this view, see Lobel, Talent Wants to Be
Free at 27–41, 201 (cited in note 9) (arguing that legal constraints, such as noncompetes,
that impede labor mobility discourage innovation by hindering employee creativity and
blocking interfirm flows of intellectual capital); Yochai Benkler, Law, Innovation and Collaboration in Networked Economy and Society, 13 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 231, 235 (2017)
(arguing that noncompetes are incompatible with a “network view,” rather than an “atomistic view,” of innovation, and citing empirical evidence that innovation thrives in network
relationships with high rates of knowledge flow); Lobel, Talent Wants to Be Free at 64
(cited in note 9) (arguing that firms that advocate for noncompete enforcement “would
likely benefit from the very movement they are attempting to limit”); Moffat, 52 Wm &
Mary L Rev at 893–97 (cited in note 9) (“[N]oncompetes are at odds with both the fair
bargaining process and efficiency underpinnings of the freedom of contract rationale.”); id
at 898–99 (arguing that the “IP justification” for noncompetes is insufficient and advocating a policy of zero enforcement); Alan Hyde, Should Noncompetes Be Enforced?, 33 Regulation 6, 9 (Winter 2010–11) (stating that losing an employee means gaining access to a
new information network, rather than losing an information asset). Ronald Gilson expresses a similar view, although he clarifies that the positive welfare effects he attributes
to California’s refusal to enforce noncompetes may be limited to that particular state at a
particular point in time in its economic trajectory. See Gilson, 74 NYU L Rev at 619–20,
627–29 (cited in note 8).
14 For a review of state laws on noncompetes, see generally J. Gregory Grisham, Beyond the Red-Blue Divide: An Overview of Current Trends in State Non-Compete Law, 18
Federalist Society Rev 42 (June 19, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/33Q7-N9JF.
15 Cal Bus & Prof Code § 16600; ND Cent Code § 9-08-06; 15 Okla Stat § 217.
16 Hawaii Rev Stat Ann § 480-4(d).
17 Mitchel v Reynolds, 24 Eng Rep 347, 347 (KB 1711) (stating that a “bond or promise to restrain oneself from trading in a particular place, if made upon a reasonable consideration, is good”).
18 See id at 348 (drawing distinction between restraints “not to exercise a trade
throughout the kingdom,” which are deemed to be void, and restraints that are “limited to
13
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thought, it seems that no limitation on the movement of talent
can ever be deemed reasonable.
These academic views now play a prominent part in ongoing
policy debates and press coverage concerning proposed laws that
would limit, or bar, the enforcement of noncompetes.19 On March 7,
2019, a bipartisan group of six Democratic and Republican US senators sent a joint letter to the Government Accountability Office
requesting that it investigate the impact of noncompetes “on
workers and on the economy as a whole.”20 Citing academic research that “California’s ban on non-compete agreements has
been a prime factor in the state’s growing economy,” three Democratic US senators introduced legislation in April 2018 to impose
a ban on noncompetes nationwide, which was re-introduced by

a particular place,” which may be deemed reasonable). For more detailed discussion of the
reasonableness standard, see Part II.A.3.b.
19 Reflecting unusual interest in the intricacies of employment contracts, The New
York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Forbes, Fortune, The Boston Globe, and other media
outlets have run stories and op-eds on the use of noncompete clauses and legislative proposals to ban these clauses. See, for example, Orly Lobel, Companies Compete but Won’t
Let Their Workers Do the Same (NY Times, May 4, 2017), archived at https://
perma.cc/LG33-EUTV (discussing states’ differences in enforcing noncompetes, federal
proposals to limit noncompetes, and the harmful effects of noncompetes on employees);
Steven Greenhouse, Noncompete Clauses Increasingly Pop Up in Array of Jobs (NY Times,
June 8, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/P575-QQCX (discussing proposed legislation
in Massachusetts limiting enforcement of noncompetes); Neil Irwin, When the Guy Making
Your Sandwich Has a Noncompete Clause (NY Times, Oct 14, 2014), archived at
https://perma.cc/FQ4X-FNKB (discussing the economic, legal, and moral issues raised by
noncompetes); Ruth Simon and Angus Loten, Litigation over Noncompete Clauses Is Rising (Wall St J, Aug 14, 2013), online at https://www.wsj.com/articles/litigation-over-non
compete-clauses-is-rising-does-entrepreneurship-suffer-1376520622 (visited Feb 17,
2020) (Perma archive unavailable) (discussing increasing litigation over, and prevalence
of, noncompete agreements); Joann S. Lublin, Companies Loosen the Handcuffs on NonCompetes (Wall St J, Aug 12, 2013), online at https://www.wsj.com/articles/companiesloosen-the-handcuffs-on-noncompetes-1376320350 (visited Feb 11, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable) (discussing cases in which employers declined to strictly enforce noncompetes
when executives departed for other large corporations); Eric Goldman, Why Congress
Should Restrict Employee Non-Compete Clauses (Forbes, June 30, 2015), archived at
https://perma.cc/52G4-KTLD (supporting federal legislation to limit enforcement of noncompetes); Claire Zillman, Are Noncompete Agreements Hurting Tech Innovation? (Fortune, July 1, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/2YRK-95G4 (discussing differing views
on enforceability of noncompetes, their impact on innovation, and proposed state legislation to limit enforceability); John McEleney, Noncompetes Hurt Workers and Their Employers (Boston Globe, June 28, 2015), online at https://www.bostonglobe.com/
opinion/2015/06/27/onshape-ceo-john-mceleney-noncompetes-hurt-workers-and-theiremployers/6NbXbI5jhZpl5wyvc28FSI/story.html (visited Feb 3, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable) (CEO of Massachusetts-based company arguing that noncompetes should “go
away altogether”).
20 Senator Christopher Murphy, et al, Letter to the Honorable Gene Dodaro, Comptroller General, US Government Accountability Office *1 (Mar 7, 2019), archived at
https://perma.cc/W38U-2YRR.
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two Democratic and Republican US senators in October 2019.21
Like these US senators, advocates for strict limitations on, or outright bans of, noncompetes explicitly refer to selected empirical
studies in arguing that these reforms would facilitate labor mobility and promote innovation.22 A leading academic opponent of
noncompetes has written: “[T]he research suggests that noncompetes should be banned for all employees, regardless of skill, industry or wage; they simply do more harm than good.”23 In 2018,
the influential Economist magazine endorsed an only slightly
more qualified position, arguing that noncompetes should be enforced only in narrow circumstances and similarly referring to academic research to support this position.24
A sizeable number of state legislatures have derived similar
conclusions. Since 2014, the legislatures of thirty-seven states
have formally considered laws that would affect the enforceability
of noncompetes in employment agreements.25 Of those proposed
21 On the April 2018 proposed legislation, see Office of Senator Ron Wyden, Press
Release, Wyden, Murphy, Warren Introduce Bill to Ban Unnecessary and Harmful NonCompete Agreements (Apr 26, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/6N2T-V6N2 (“The new
legislation would prohibit the use of non-compete agreements. . . . Many believe that
California’s ban on non-compete agreements has been a prime factor in the state’s growing
economy.”); Workforce Mobility Act of 2018, S 2782, 115th Cong, 2d Sess (Apr 26, 2018).
On the October 2019 proposed legislation, see Office of Senator Todd Young, Press Release,
Young and Murphy Introduce Bill to Limit Non-Compete Agreements, Protect Workers (Oct
17, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/PFU9-6GWW (“Research indicates that workers
trapped by non-competes are less mobile, which results in firms having difficulty hiring
workers with the right set of skills.”); Workforce Mobility Act of 2019, S 2614, 116th Cong,
1st Sess (Oct 27, 2019).
22 See, for example, Lobel, Companies Compete but Won’t Let Their Workers (cited in
note 19). Lori Ehrlich, a Massachusetts representative who introduced a bill to preclude
most noncompete enforcement, believes noncompetes have an “overall impact of stifling
innovation” and cites academic studies on her website. Lori A. Ehrlich, Fact Sheet: H. 2366
(2018), archived at https://perma.cc/6XJR-9ZY8 (discussing a “recent peer-reviewed academic paper” which shows that nearly one in five employees are bound by a noncompete).
See also Zillman, Are Noncompete Agreements Hurting Tech Innovation? (cited in note 19).
23 Lobel, Companies Compete but Won’t Let Their Workers (cited in note 19).
24 Restrain the Restraints: The Case Against Non-compete Clauses (The Economist,
May 19, 2018), online at https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/05/19/the-case-against
-non-compete-clauses (visited Feb 11, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable) (supporting a requirement for employers to demonstrate genuine harm in noncompete litigation, as well
as arguing that noncompetes should be enforced only if they apply for a short time and
they are negotiated before an employee accepts a job offer).
25 These states are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia. This includes all legislatures in which a member has formally proposed a law affecting noncompetes, whether
generally or in specific industries, since 2014, based on a search of legislative proposals in
the Westlaw and LexisNexis databases. See also Appendix.
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bills, all but six proposed to limit enforceability (up to and including outright bans). In twenty-one states, these debates have
translated into action. This includes Massachusetts, which in
2018 enacted a statute prohibiting noncompetes for certain categories of employees 26 and, in most other cases, imposes notice
obligations on employers. 27 The Appendix shows all statutory
changes to state noncompete laws during 2014–2019. Nineteen
changes reduced enforceability and six enhanced it (although one
was repealed two years later and the other was offset by other
provisions that limited enforceability). In enacting its ban on
noncompetes in the technology industry, Hawaii specifically referenced academic studies that purportedly supported this policy
action as being conducive to innovation.28 Additionally, in California,
some courts have recently adopted expansive understandings of
the state’s statutory limitation on enforcing noncompetes against
individuals, applying it to other contractual obligations that have
long been thought to lie outside the purview of the statute.29 In
26 The statute primarily captures workers who are “nonexempt under the Fair Labor
Standards Act,” Mass Gen Laws Ann, ch 149, § 24L, which generally targets salaried
workers employed on a fixed hourly basis and most likely would not target managerial
and other professional employees. See US Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division,
Fact Sheet #17A: Exemption for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Computer & Outside Sales Employees Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) (July 2008), archived
at https://perma.cc/7VDP-MURT. However, there may be ambiguities in certain cases. For
further discussion, see Stephen T. Melnick, Chris Kaczmarek, and Melissa L. McDonagh,
Frequently Asked Questions About the New Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act
(Littler, Sept 5, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/ER4R-PMZZ.
27 Mass Gen Laws Ann, ch 149, § 24L. The statute also requires that a noncompete
“must be no broader than necessary to protect . . . legitimate business interests of the employer” and must have a reasonable geographic, temporal, and industry scope, see id; however, this language simply restates Massachusetts courts’ holdings on this point. For further discussion, see notes 150–51 and accompanying text. Note further that the effect of
the Massachusetts statute is qualified in two respects: (i) the law does not apply to a noncompete provision in an employer-employee separation agreement (if there is a seven-day
period during which the employee can rescind acceptance), and (ii) Massachusetts simultaneously codified the “inevitable disclosure” doctrine, which entitles employers to seek
injunctions against departing employees in the case of “threatened misappropriation,”
Massachusetts Trade Secrets Act, Mass HR 4868, § 19, 190th Sess (July 31, 2018). For
further discussion, see note 130 and accompanying text.
28 The legislature stated: “[A]cademic studies have concluded that embracing employee mobility is a superior strategy for nurturing an innovation-based economy.” Robert
B. Milligan, Hawaii Bans Non-Compete and Non-Solicit Agreements with Technology
Workers (Seyfarth Shaw, July 6, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/TTQ3-Y9G9.
29 These decisions purport to apply the California Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in
Edwards v Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P3d 285 (Cal 2008). See, for example, Barker v
Insight Global LLC, 2019 WL 176260, *3 (ND Cal) (allowing claim that a nonsolicitation
clause was illegal under California’s noncompete ban to go forward); AMN Healthcare, Inc
v Aya Healthcare Services, Inc, 28 Cal App 5th 923, 935–37 (2018) (holding that a firm
could not enforce a nonsolicitation clause against a former recruiter employed by the firm,
on the grounds that doing so would violate California’s ban on noncompetes); Golden v
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2018, a California lower court even applied the statutory limitation to prevent businesses from entering into exclusivity agreements between themselves, which had been traditionally the purview of California’s antitrust provisions, not its statutory
prohibition against noncompetes.30 While the appellate court reversed this ruling, it is nonetheless indicative of an increasingly
dogmatic approach against the enforcement of noncompetes or
other contractual provisions deemed to have a comparable
effect.31
The vigorous political debate and ongoing legislative activity
relating to noncompetes encompasses a variety of policy concerns,
including efficiency-related economic concerns as well as noneconomic concerns involving personal autonomy and distributive justice.32 In markets for highly skilled technical and managerial labor (as distinguished from lower-income and lower-skilled
occupations, which has been the focus of some of the proposed legislative bans33), the debate on both sides has principally relied on
economic arguments. The toolkit of law-and-economics analysis is
well suited to provide a balanced analysis of efficiency-related arguments for and against proposed policy shifts with respect to

California Emergency Physicians Medical Group, 896 F3d 1018, 1024–26 (9th Cir 2018)
(refusing to uphold a litigation settlement agreement in which a physician-plaintiff agreed
not to work at any facility that is owned, managed, or contracted by the medical group
that had formerly employed the physician, but without imposing any other restrictions on
the physician’s pursuit of other employment opportunities). Note that the Barker and
AMN Healthcare decisions depart from long-standing California precedent upholding the
enforceability of postemployment nonsolicitation covenants subject to a reasonableness
standard, see Loral Corp v Moyes, 174 Cal App 3d 268, 278–79 (1985).
30 See Beckman Coulter, Inc v Quidel Corp, 2018 WL 9943513, *1–2 (Cal Super).
31 See Quidel Corp v Superior Court of San Diego County, 39 Cal App 5th 530, 533,
535–36, 544–45 (2019) (reversing lower court’s ruling based on Edwards invalidating the
exclusivity agreement, and holding that Edwards does not extend beyond the employment
context).
32 For a critique of noncompetes on distributional grounds, with an emphasis on the
lack of meaningful negotiation on the part of the employee, see Rachel S. Arnow-Richman,
Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive
Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 Or L Rev 1163, 1214–15 (2001). See also
Christopher T. Wonnell, The Contractual Disempowerment of Employees, 46 Stan L Rev
87, 106 (1993). Because our Article focuses on the effects of noncompetes on technological
innovation, we generally ignore the distributional (and autonomy-related) effects of noncompetes, though our intention is not to diminish their importance in the overall policymaking calculus.
33 See, for example, Office of Senator Marco Rubio, Press Release, Rubio Introduces
Bill to Protect Low-Wage Workers from Non-Compete Agreements (Jan 15, 2019), archived
at https://perma.cc/JM6P-QPS3 (describing a bill proposed by US Senator Marco Rubio to
ban noncompetes nationwide for employees who are eligible for protection under federal
overtime eligibility laws).
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noncompetes that apply to technical and managerial personnel in
technology markets.
In this Article, we undertake that task. Specifically, we look
closely and broadly at the economic arguments, both theoretical
and empirical, that have been advanced in support of the “talent
wants to be free” view. While the details are complex and nuanced, our conclusion is simple and modest. Neither economic
theory nor empirical evidence provides compelling support to
abandon the common law’s centuries-old reasonableness standard. Contractual restraints on labor mobility in technology markets raise complex trade-offs between employers’ training and
R&D incentives (generally favored by noncompetes) and employee mobility (generally disfavored by noncompetes). 34 While
the latter is important for innovation, so is the former, and casespecific application of the reasonableness standard arguably offers the best, albeit imperfect, mechanism for balancing those
competing considerations.
The now-popular view that innovation always or usually does
best when human capital circulates freely relies heavily on a single historical example: the divergence in economic fortunes of Silicon Valley in California and Route 128 in Massachusetts and the
different cultural norms and noncompete enforcement policies attributed to each innovation cluster. The results are surprising.
Contrary to the standard account, we show that there is little
compelling ground to attribute Silicon Valley’s ascendance over
Route 128 in the late 1980s and early 1990s to differences in the
enforceability of noncompetes.35
There are multiple reasons. First, during Silicon Valley’s ascendance, California’s policy against noncompetes was clouded by
several important exceptions. Second, California firms could significantly mimic noncompetes through trade secret and patent infringement litigation, long-term contracts, deferred compensation, and other mechanisms. Third, it is not clear that
Massachusetts law substantially restrained employee turnover
as an effective matter. Contemporary accounts of Route 128 in the
heyday of the minicomputer industry in the 1970s and 1980s describe the same type of job hopping and spin-off formation associated with Silicon Valley. Fourth, Silicon Valley’s rise over
Route 128 most likely stemmed far more from technological and

34 A potential negative secondary effect of noncompetes is to depress employee creativity and effort. We address this concern below in Part I.B.3.
35 See Part II.A.
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economic fundamentals associated with the “PC revolution,” rather than fine distinctions in noncompete enforcement. Lastly,
Route 128’s decline was relatively short lived, and it has remained a significant innovation center, especially in the life sciences and certain information technology markets.
Our original and comprehensive reexamination of the Silicon
Valley / Route 128 narrative raises doubts concerning the widely
accepted causal sequence running from prohibiting noncompetes
to increased employee mobility to increased innovation. These
doubts are intensified by a close analysis of recent empirical studies that are regularly cited as evidence that noncompetes impede
innovation. Contrary to the characterization of these studies in
much of the policy commentary by academics and governmental
agencies, 36 these studies suffer from significant methodological
limitations, deliver statistically weak results, and do not provide
compelling support for the view that banning noncompetes promotes innovation.
A fully informed policy position concerning noncompetes
must reflect the uncertain state of our empirical understanding
of the effects of these agreements in innovation markets. That is,
it must reflect the fact that available evidence can neither support
nor rebut any systematically adverse relationship between noncompetes and innovation outcomes in general. Only this measured conclusion, rather than the strongly “abolitionist” position
that scholars and policymakers have increasingly advanced, is
consistent with theoretical analysis that identifies the countervailing efficiency effects of noncompetes and other constraints on
employee mobility. The free movement of talent implies efficiency
36 See, for example, Lobel, Talent Wants to Be Free at 67–72 (cited in note 9) (describing empirical studies that purportedly have confirmed Gilson’s hypothesis attributing the
rise of Silicon Valley in part to California’s refusal to enforce noncompetes); The White
House, Non-Compete Agreements: Analysis of the Usage, Potential Issues, and State Responses *2, 5–7 (May 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/CR5Y-V8JX (discussing empirical
studies measuring the prevalence and economic effects of noncompetes on employee mobility and start-up formation); US Department of the Treasury, Office of Economic Policy,
Non-compete Contracts: Economic Effects and Policy Implications *11–13, 18–23, 26 (Mar
2016), archived at https://perma.cc/V383-QXM7 (reviewing research on use and effects of
noncompetes and concluding that economic justifications for noncompetes have weak support); Lobel, Companies Compete but Won’t Let Their Workers (cited in note 19) (same);
Lobel, 93 Tex L Rev at 827, 839–42 (cited in note 9) (describing empirical studies suggesting that noncompetes reduce employee mobility, depress employee effort, and reduce innovation); Benkler, 13 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci at 235 (cited in note 13) (describing empirical
research purporting to show that enforcing noncompetes depresses employee mobility, reduces knowledge spillovers, and undermines innovation); Hyde, 33 Regulation at 9 (cited
in note 13) (“Study after study shows how much more productive firms will be if they can
hire, free of lawsuits, someone who worked at a rival.”).
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gains from knowledge sharing and accelerated “n-mover” innovation. However, a blanket prohibition of noncompetes implies efficiency losses from uncompensated transfers of intellectual capital
to competitors—which, far from being mere efficiency-neutral
transfers, may discourage first-mover innovation and employee
training, which may depress the development of human intellectual capital in the first instance.
Complex problems deserve complex solutions. Contrary to
what is hastily becoming conventional wisdom, which is in turn
being converted into concrete policy actions, there is no one-sizefits-all solution to this trade-off as a matter of economic analysis.
Based on available evidence, there is no reason to believe that the
efficiency gains from freely circulating human capital systematically outweigh the efficiency losses from uncompensated uses of
intellectual capital. Rather, the net efficiency effect of noncompetes in any particular market depends on the interaction between multiple factors that vary across industries, firms, and
types of employees. Even if California’s zero-enforcement policy
has been locally optimal (or at least, sufficiently workable) from
an efficiency perspective, it may be suited to a particular type of
innovation economy at a particular time—an important but neglected qualification that Gilson made when he originally attributed Silicon Valley’s success to California’s refusal to enforce
noncompetes. 37 At the same time, we emphasize that neither
theory nor empirics support an unqualified freedom-of-contract
approach that enforces noncompetes in all circumstances absent
evidence of fraud or coercion. Rather, we explicitly recognize the
uncertainty involved in assessing the net efficiency effects of noncompetes. Using the error-cost approach developed in antitrust
analysis and jurisprudence,38 we embed that uncertainty in our
policy analysis, concluding that the common law’s reasonableness
standard remains the best available instrument to reflect, albeit
imperfectly, the trade-off between efficiency gains and losses inherent to limitations on employee mobility in innovation markets.

37

See Gilson, 74 NYU L Rev at 627–29 (cited in note 8).
For the leading sources, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84
Mich L Rev 1696, 1711 (1986) (“We want to hold to a minimum the sum of the costs of
harmful activity wrongly condoned and useful activity wrongly condemned (or discouraged).”); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex L Rev 1, 16 (1984) (“[W]e
should prefer the error of tolerating questionable conduct, which imposes losses over a
part of the range of output, to the error of condemning beneficial conduct, which imposes
losses over the whole range of output.”).
38
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In sum, our Article makes three important contributions to
the literature. First, it exhaustively reviews the widespread contention that noncompetes thwart innovation. 39 Our detailed
analysis shows that neither theory nor empirics supports the economic arguments commonly wielded in favor of prohibiting noncompetes.40 As a matter of theory, conventional wisdom emphasizes that noncompetes impede the circulation of intellectual
capital while overlooking that noncompetes may encourage firms
to cultivate employees’ human capital.41 As a matter of empirics,
we contest the widely accepted view that Silicon Valley surpassed
Boston because of supposed differences in noncompete enforcement, which tend to be exaggerated.42 A careful examination of
the evidence shows that the Boston area has remained a significant innovation center and that technological and economic factors better explain Silicon Valley’s exceptional trajectory.43 Second, we uncover serious factual and other deficiencies in several
widely cited empirical studies, which cast substantial doubt on
those studies’ findings and policy implications.44 Third, based on
our exhaustive review of the available evidence, we propose an
original error-cost framework to analyze noncompetes, which provides a robust economic rationale for the common law’s reasonableness standard.45
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the noncompete debate and, in particular, contrasts newly ascendant views
favoring the free circulation of human capital with older views
that recognize that reasonable contractual limitations on employee mobility may promote social welfare. Part II reexamines
the standard narrative of the rise of Silicon Valley and the decline
of Route 128, looking closely at multiple factors that may account
for Silicon Valley’s exceptional success as an innovation center.
Additionally, we review more recent empirical studies on the relationship between noncompetes, employee movement, and innovation. Part III revisits the range of policy options with respect to
noncompetes, using an error-cost approach that has not been previously applied to the enforcement of noncompetes. We briefly
conclude.

39
40
41
42
43
44
45

See Parts I and II.
See Part II.
See Part III.
See Part II.A.
See Part II.A.
See Part II.B.
See Part III.
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I. OLD AND NEW VIEWS: FROM AGNOSTICISM TO ABOLITIONISM
In this Part, we review two key stages in the intellectual history of the current debate over noncompetes and other restraints
on employee mobility, and situate that debate within a larger
body of economic thought relating to the economics of human capital. First, we review an earlier generation of law-and-economics
scholarship, which identified the social costs and gains attributable to noncompetes and generally adopted an agnostic position
concerning these restraints as a general matter. These scholars
were therefore sympathetic to the common law’s reasonableness
standard, which upholds or invalidates noncompetes on a casespecific basis. Second, we review a more recent school of thought
that takes the strong view that the social costs associated with
noncompetes typically or almost always outweigh the social
gains, and therefore supports ending noncompete enforcement
following California’s example.
A. Foundations: Becker and Marshall
Economically informed analysis of noncompetes and other
restraints on labor mobility in innovation markets stands at the
intersection of two foundational bodies of economic thought:
Gary Becker’s breakthrough work on the economics of human
capital and Alfred Marshall’s classic writings on the agglomeration economies that derive from the interchange of intellectual
capital. Contemporary discussions of the legal treatment of noncompetes has relied (sometimes implicitly) almost entirely on the
work of Marshall, which is a key reference point in the literature
on innovation policy, while devoting little attention to the insights
of Becker, widely recognized as the foundational work in the modern field of labor economics. 46 We review both contributions
briefly below and will then integrate these classic insights from
innovation policy and labor policy scholarship throughout our
analysis of noncompetes and other constraints on the mobility of
human capital.

46 On the importance of Becker’s work, see generally Yoram Weiss, Gary Becker on
Human Capital, 81 J Demographic Econ 27 (2015).
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1. Becker: Human capital as an economic asset.
Nobel Prize–winning economist Gary Becker effectively
founded the economic analysis of human capital with the publication of his landmark work, Human Capital, in 1962. 47 Becker
showed that economic analysis could be applied to the acquisition
and cultivation of human capital, whether through education,
training, or other mechanisms. From an economic point of view,
human capital acquisition involves the use of scarce resources to
maximize net expected value, as with any other costly activity. In
implementing this analysis, Becker drew a key distinction between general and firm-specific human capital assets.48 General
human capital refers to technical, managerial, and other skills
and knowledge that have value across a broad pool of firms or
industries.49 Firm-specific human capital refers to the narrower
set of technical, managerial, and other skills and knowledge that
have value (or have greater value) only at a particular firm.50 The
scholarly literature that has followed Becker’s work has identified
an intermediate form of human capital that is specific to an industry—namely, skills and knowledge that have value within an
industry but not more generally.51 As discussed below, these different types of human capital give rise to different implications
when analyzing the efficiency effects of noncompetes and other
limitations on employee mobility.
2. Marshall: Industrial districts and agglomeration
economies.
In the innovation context, economic analysis of noncompetes
and other limitations on employee mobility often makes reference
to the concept of “industrial districts,” originated by Alfred
Marshall in his landmark treatise, Principles of Economics, first

47 See generally Gary S. Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis, with Special Reference to Education (Chicago 3d ed 1993). Subsequent notes refer to this edition, unless otherwise indicated. This is an updated edition of Gary S. Becker,
Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education (National Bureau of Economic Research 1964). Some of the ideas were initially set
forth in Gary S. Becker, Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, 70 J Pol
Econ 9 (1962).
48 See Becker, Human Capital at 33–51 (cited in note 47).
49 See id at 33–34.
50 See id at 40.
51 See, for example, Derek Neal, Industry-Specific Human Capital: Evidence from
Displaced Workers, 13 J Labor Econ 653, 653 (1995) (identifying categories of skills that
are “specific to firms in a given industry or sector of the economy” and therefore do not fall
into the existing categories of firm-specific or general human capital).
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published in 1890.52 In a short passage in that work, Marshall
proposed that certain industries benefit collectively from a freeflowing exchange of ideas, even if an individual firm may periodically suffer the loss of some portion of its investment in developing an innovation.53 In Marshall’s famous words: “The mysteries
of the trade become no mysteries; but are as it were in the air.”54
The movement of R&D personnel among firms is one of the key
mechanisms by which the “mysteries of the trade” are disseminated and, according to Marshall, promote the general long-term
welfare of all members of that innovation community. This line of
reasoning is the basis for an extensive literature on the “agglomeration economies” that arise in innovation clusters in which geographically proximate firms and other entities draw from a freeflowing pool of human and intellectual capital assets to mutual
advantage.55
B. The Old View: Restricting Labor Mobility Is Good and Bad
for Innovation
The recent wave of academic interest in noncompetes is predated by scholars who had examined the efficiency of noncompete
clauses and, explicitly or by implication, other restraints on employee mobility. Generally speaking, that view identifies both efficiency gains and losses that in general could arise from the use
of noncompetes in innovation markets. Without an empirical
methodology by which to quantify those potentially offsetting effects, that literature largely concluded that the net efficiency of
noncompetes is indeterminate as a general matter.
1.

The credible commitment problem.

Earlier scholars observed that human capital markets suffer
from what economists call a credible commitment problem. Specifically, potential employees cannot provide adequate assurance
to employers who are reluctant to invest in cultivating the human
capital of employees who can simply move to another employer,

52

Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics 169 (Palgrave MacMillan 8th ed 1920).
Id at 225.
54 Id.
55 See Rainer vom Hofe and Ke Chen, Whither or Not Industrial Cluster: Conclusions
or Confusions?, 4 Indust Geographer 2, 4–8 (2006) (reviewing the literature on “agglomeration economies”).
53

970

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:953

thereby conferring an advantage on a competitor.56 When an employee leaves, the employer potentially suffers three costs: (i) it
loses its training investment, which may involve a combination of
firm-specific and general human capital; (ii) the employee may
transmit proprietary information to a competitor; and (iii) the
firm must incur costs to recruit and train a substitute employee,
which again involves the transmission of firm-specific and general human capital.57
Without the ability to block employees from moving to a competitor, and without a sufficient up-front payment from employee
to employer to cover the employer’s expected costs in the event of
the employee’s departure, an employer faces two choices. Setting
aside the possibility of various substitutes for deterring employee
movement (most notably, deferred compensation arrangements
and long-term employment contracts), the employer can (i) decline to hire the employee or (ii) hire the employee but underinvest in training (especially training that involves the cultivation
of general human capital that has positive postemployment
value) and the development and transmission of proprietary, often innovative, information.58 These concerns account for apprenticeship systems that predate modern intellectual property regimes: limiting the apprentice’s ability to switch employers
enabled the master to internalize the gains from the intellectual
capital transferred to the apprentice.59 Or, put differently, limiting the apprentice’s ability to switch employers enabled the apprentice to credibly commit against expropriating the employer’s
investment in the apprentice’s human capital.

56 See Paul H. Rubin and Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Compete, 10 J Legal Stud 93, 99–102 (1981) (arguing that employers will reduce investment in
employee training absent noncompetes); Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of
Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J Legal Stud 683, 685 (1980) (asserting that, absent
noncompetes, poaching employers will free ride on training investments by existing employers, who will in turn decline to make those investments); Harlan M. Blake, Employee
Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv L Rev 625, 647 (1960) (contending that the objective
of postemployment restraints is “to prevent competitive use, for a time, of information or
relationships which pertain peculiarly to the employer and which the employee acquired
in the course of the employment”).
57 See note 56 and accompanying text.
58 See Kitch, 9 J Legal Stud at 685 (cited in note 56).
59 See Rubin and Shedd, 10 J Legal Stud at 93–99 (cited in note 56) (arguing that
covenants not to compete do not, as earlier scholars assumed, necessarily reflect an exercise of monopoly power by employers).
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2. The noncompete solution.
Just like the apprentice contract, the noncompete clause can
result in joint efficiency gains by enabling employment transactions (and associated knowledge transfers) that otherwise would
not take place. This is beneficial not only for the employer but the
employee and the industry as a whole. This point is overlooked in
recent discussions of noncompetes that tend to emphasize how
these clauses block employment opportunities and suppress innovation.60 However, it is important not to overlook the possibility
that the absence of noncompetes can block certain other employment opportunities. Assuming the prospective employee is financially constrained and cannot post a sufficient “bond” against expropriating the employer’s training investment or R&D assets, an
otherwise efficient employment transaction—and the associated
cultivation of human capital—may not move forward. In that
case, both employer and prospective employee are made worse off.
Even if the absence of noncompetes does not entirely block
the employment relationship, it may distort the employer’s behavior during the term of employment and, as a result, sometimes
disadvantage both the firm and the employee. At least three distortions are possible. First, the inability to enforce noncompetes
may induce an employer to modify the internal allocation of team
personnel so as to mitigate informational leakage from employee
departures. For instance, Apple is famous for its secrecy practices
and separate teams that work on different projects so as to minimize information transfer between them.61 Second, the firm may
skew the allocation of training resources toward the cultivation of
firm-specific human capital so as to maximize the employee’s
value in the internal labor market but minimize the employee’s
value in the external labor market.62 Third, the firm may underinvest in R&D by reallocating resources to activities in which it is
not generating informational assets that an employee can transmit to another employer. In a world in which noncompetes are
enforceable at some reasonable cost and high probability, these
distortions are mitigated and the firm can allocate resources more
efficiently among the available set of innovation and non
innovation activities.
60

See note 9 and accompanying text.
See Adam Lashinsky, This Is How Apple Keeps the Secrets (Fortune, Jan 18, 2012),
online at https://fortune.com/2012/01/18/the-secrets-apple-keeps (visited Feb 3, 2020)
(Perma archive unavailable).
62 See Nicola Meccheri, A Note on Non-competes, Bargaining and Training by Firms,
102 Econ Letters 198, 200 (2009).
61
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3. A weak objection to noncompetes.
Some commentators argue that noncompetes may discourage
employees from cultivating their human capital (or, specifically,
general or industry-specific human capital)—which in turn may
depress employees’ effort or creative output—due to the limited
ability to access postemployment opportunities.63 This objection is
not especially persuasive. Discouraging employees from acquiring
human capital would appear to be inconsistent with rational
profit maximization. Put affirmatively, any employer has an incentive to reward employees who enhance their firm-specific human capital (or some value-maximizing combination of firmspecific, industry-specific, and general human capital) and can
therefore make a greater contribution to firm value. While there
are inherent measurement and verification difficulties in
assessing employees’ relative contributions in a team environment,64 firms clearly use a variety of compensation systems to at
least approximately reward employee performance, including
promotion, monetary bonuses, and more tailored compensation
mechanisms.65 This is unsurprising: in a competitive market, any
firm that includes noncompete clauses in its employment package
has a rational self-interest in adopting incentive structures that
correct for any underperformance effects that could arise as a result.66 Market forces reward firms who do so successfully and discipline those who do not.

63 See On Amir and Orly Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth Theory of Noncompete Law, 16 Stan Tech L Rev 833, 846 (2013) (“An employee who knows their market
opportunities are significantly reduced due to an enforceable noncompete restriction will
be less driven to perform well and to invest in his own human capital.”); Mark Garmaise,
Ties That Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment, 27 J L Econ & Org 376, 413–14 (2011) (setting forth model in which noncompete
enforcement can induce employers to invest in managers’ human capital but reduce managers’ incentives to do so, in which case the manager’s human capital may be lower relative
to a zero-enforcement regime).
64 For the classic treatment, see Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, Production,
Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am Econ Rev 777, 779 (1972) (discussing the difficulties of determining each individual’s contribution when observing a team’s
output).
65 See Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 Harv J
L & Tech 1, 38–41 (1999) (discussing the “intra-firm appropriability environment” fostered
by employee reward mechanisms).
66 Below, we criticize experimental studies that purport to confirm the depressing
effects of noncompetes on the cultivation of human capital by noting that they fail to adequately account for the large menu of employee incentive mechanisms used in the actual
market. See note 305 and accompanying text.
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4. A better objection to noncompetes.
It is certainly the case that enforcing noncompetes limits to
some extent the mobility of R&D personnel, which may impede
the agglomeration economies that arise from the regular dissemination of knowledge within an industry. To be clear, however, it
is not precise to say (as is often said) that a noncompete “binds”
an employee to a firm; rather, a noncompete requires that the employee or (more typically) a third party pay a fee demanded by the
employer to obtain a waiver of the noncompete.67 Payments exchanged for waiver of a noncompete are mere wealth transfers
without efficiency consequences from a short-term static perspective. Precisely understood, a noncompete is simply a mechanism
by which resource-constrained employees can credibly commit to
indirectly compensate their employer for training and knowledge
leakage costs in the event employees depart for a competitor.68
The employee’s commitment is made credible by providing the
employer with a contractual right that can be “sold” to the employee’s next employer.
This is not to say that there is no circumstance in which noncompetes can frustrate the efficiency gains associated with the
circulation of human capital from one firm to another. First, even
when an employer permits an employee otherwise under a noncompete to move to a new firm, the transaction costs of negotiating and executing a waiver of the noncompete generate static
costs that would not be incurred if noncompetes were wholly unenforceable. Of course, like all contracting costs, such costs are
tolerable when the social gains from contracting (here, for a noncompete) outweigh these costs.

67 For example, in 2005, Nortel paid Motorola $11.5 million to release its chief operating officer from a noncompete agreement. See Robert McMillan, Nortel Appoints ExMotorola Exec as Operations Chief (Network World, Jan 19, 2006), archived at
https://perma.cc/B4MJ-YTFC.
68 Noncompetes may also relieve an employer from having to increase existing employees’ compensation to match alternative employment opportunities, given the departure costs imposed by the noncompete. For a theoretical model reaching this result, see
Natarajan Balasubramanian, et al, Locked In? The Enforceability of Covenants Not to
Compete and the Careers of High-Tech Workers *9–11 (Ross School of Business Working
Paper No 1339, Jan 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/3SBZ-UJD8. It should be noted,
however, that available evidence is generally inconsistent with this model. The most comprehensive empirical study finds that employees who sign noncompetes earn 6.6 percent
more on average than employees who do not sign noncompetes (controlling for various
other factors), although this wage differential is limited to employees who are presented
with a noncompete prior to accepting a job offer. See Starr, Prescott, and Bishara, Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force at *28 (cited in note 11).
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Second, when the costs of negotiating and executing the
waiver of a noncompete are sufficiently great so as to impede employee turnover, this may generate long-term dynamic efficiency
losses to the extent that slowing down employee turnover impedes the transmission of intellectual capital that benefits the industry as a whole. These dynamic efficiency costs present a potential collective action problem because these costs may not be
fully internalized by an individual firm in a given industry when
that firm makes a decision whether to adopt and enforce a noncompete for a particular employee.
5. Evaluation.
The welfare effects of noncompete agreements can now be
summarized. On the one hand, noncompetes support employers’
incentives to invest in employees’ human capital and R&D projects that would otherwise be subject to expropriation by departing employees. On the other hand, noncompetes raise the transaction costs involved in the circulation of human capital, which
may impede the innovation process in the industry as a whole.
Given these offsetting effects, earlier scholars generally concluded
that economic analysis does not support a definitive position
against or in favor of enforcing noncompetes in all circumstances.69 If noncompetes enable firms to secure gains from training and R&D investments, then barring noncompetes may reduce
the common pool of technological knowledge that is available for
circulation through employee movement. A ban on noncompetes
would yield a net social gain over time only if the disincentive
effects arising from uncompensated human capital transfers were
exceeded by the agglomeration economies and other benefits associated with the unimpeded circulation of human capital. Without empirical evidence in any particular case, this analytical
framework is agnostic in general with respect to the net long-term
efficiency of those restraints. However, it does recognize a meaningful range of circumstances in which enforcing noncompetes
could make firms and employees better off by resolving the credible commitment problem that might preclude or distort employment relationships.

69

See note 56 and accompanying text.
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C. The New View: Restricting Labor Mobility is Bad for
Innovation
The traditional approach is intellectually modest in taking
the view that enforcing noncompetes may have a net positive effect on innovation. By contrast, the new view on noncompetes
tends to take the bolder view that enforcing noncompetes usually,
if not always, discourages innovation by slowing down the flow of
intellectual capital and impeding the agglomeration economies
and similar benefits that fuel the innovation process. This new
view consists of a two-part logical sequence. In step one, it claims
that barring noncompetes accelerates employee movement.
Stated precisely, this assertion reflects the assumption that noncompetes increase the transaction costs of human capital movements. In step two, the new view makes the stronger assertion
that increased circulation of R&D personnel promotes innovation
by facilitating knowledge spillovers that benefit the industry as a
whole. The normative implication is simple and clear: the law
should decline to enforce noncompetes in all circumstances.
1. Background: Saxenian and Gilson.
The new view relies on the work of AnnaLee Saxenian, a sociologist, and Ronald Gilson, a law professor, both of whom apply
the Marshallian concept of agglomeration economies to interpret
a key episode in the history of US technology markets. Both
Saxenian and Gilson contrasted Silicon Valley with Boston’s
Route 128 area to argue that institutional mechanisms—cultural
norms and organizational forms in Saxenian’s analysis70 and a legal ban on noncompetes in Gilson’s analysis71—that promote employee mobility can promote innovation by facilitating the flow of
intellectual capital among competitors. Both authors identify
these institutional differences as key factors in accounting for Silicon Valley’s rise over Route 128 as the country’s leading innovation center starting in the late 1980s.
More specifically, Gilson argued that California’s ban on noncompetes represented a solution to a collective-action problem.
While no firm individually would agree not to adopt a noncompete
and thereby expose its human and intellectual capital to competitors, it may be in all firms’ collective long-term interest to refrain
from adopting noncompetes and thereby enjoy the resulting flow

70
71

See Saxenian, Regional Advantage at 1–9, 29–30, 59–60 (cited in note 8).
See Gilson, 74 NYU L Rev at 578–79, 602–09 (cited in note 8).
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of knowledge spillovers. 72 By implication, Massachusetts firms
were caught in a collectively irrational equilibrium in which all
firms imposed noncompetes and could not enjoy the collective
gains that would result from a more fluid circulation of human
capital. Gilson cautioned that this explanation may be specific to
Silicon Valley and would not necessarily generalize to other contexts.73 Nonetheless, a significant body of commentary by legal
scholars and economists has endorsed this proposition in stronger
formulations and has made largely unqualified policy assertions
that enforcing noncompetes and other restraints on employee mobility depresses innovation.74 For these scholars, California’s approach should be the rule, not the exception.
2. An initial critique.
The new view on noncompetes reflects a coherent and
straightforward application of the standard collective-action
problem in economic analysis. However, it is incomplete in significant respects. Specifically, the new view makes little effort to address the efficiency losses inherent to a legal regime in which a
voluntary restraint on the mobility of talent is removed from the
table of contracting options. Earlier analysis of noncompetes had
recognized that an efficiency loss would arise in any circumstance
in which an employee could not credibly commit against expropriating the employer’s human capital investment and R&D assets.
The employer would respond by distorting the terms of employment to limit its training investments or the employees’ exposure
to R&D assets or by declining to enter into an employment relationship at all.

72

See id at 596.
See id at 629.
74 See Lobel, Talent Wants to Be Free at 67–72 (cited in note 9) (arguing that empirical evidence supports California’s “zero tolerance” policy for noncompetes); Lobel, Companies Compete but Won’t Let Their Workers (cited in note 19) (same); Benkler, 13 Ann
Rev L & Soc Sci at 235 (cited in note 13) (arguing that empirical evidence suggests that
contractual and other legal constraints on employee mobility undermine innovation);
Hyde, 33 Regulation at 10–11 (cited in note 13) (arguing that balance of evidence supports
adopting California’s policy of zero enforcement toward noncompetes); Moffat, 54 Ariz L
Rev at 965 (cited in note 9) (advocating for a zero-enforcement policy toward noncompetes);
Moffat, 52 Wm & Mary L Rev at 918–21 (cited in note 9) (same).
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A recent economic model formulated by Professor James
Rauch shows that this loss can extend well beyond just one employment transaction.75 Consider a sequence of transactions consisting of (i) an initial employment transaction involving a parent
firm and an individual employee, followed by (ii) a series of spinoff transactions involving employees who depart from the parent
firm to form or join a spin-off firm, and then depart from the spinoff to form a new entity, and so forth. Noncompetes may raise the
transaction costs relating to, and even frustrate, some portion, or
even all, of the potential spin-off transactions. That is the focus of
the “talent wants to be free” literature. However, it is important
not to ignore the possibility that the inability to enforce a noncompete may preclude the initial hire by restoring the credible
commitment problem, in which case the subsequent stream of
spin-off transactions could be stunted or blocked entirely.76 Moreover, if noncompetes are not enforceable, even a certain portion of
the set of spin-offs may face the same credible commitment dilemma and may be wholly precluded or move forward under distorted terms.77 If that is the case, then compared to a regime in
which noncompetes are enforced, talent may be freer but it could
well be worse off.
3. The empirical challenge.
As a theoretical matter, the new view on noncompetes, and
the accompanying policy arguments in favor of a total or neartotal ban, provide no reason to arbitrarily value the social costs
attributable to noncompetes—primarily, potentially reduced circulation of intellectual capital (the focus of Marshall’s analysis)—
more heavily than the social gains—primarily, potentially increased investment in employee training and R&D (the focus of
Becker’s analysis). Given this uncertainty, we can only make progress toward assessing the relative intellectual strength of the
new view based on empirical inquiry. Commentary by scholars
and policymakers in favor of a ban on noncompetes often asserts
that empirical data shows that noncompetes depress innovation.78

75 See James Rauch, Dynastic Entrepreneurship, Entry, and Non-Compete Enforcement *1–2, 19 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 21067, Apr
2015), archived at https://perma.cc/TP8G-3372.
76 See id at *1–2, 9–11 (showing formally that the efficiency of noncompetes depends
in part on a trade-off between these two countervailing effects on the parent firm and spinoff firms).
77 See id at *10.
78 See note 36.
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In the next Part, we look closely at that body of evidence, finding
that nearly all of these studies are badly flawed and, even so, common characterizations of their findings often dramatically overstate the policy conclusions that the data can reasonably support.
II. THE EVIDENCE AGAINST NONCOMPETES: A CLOSE LOOK
In this Part, we undertake the most comprehensive examination to date of the two principal bodies of empirical evidence that
are commonly referenced in support of the “talent wants to be
free” school of thought. First, we review in detail the explanation
provided by Saxenian and in particular, Gilson, to account for Silicon Valley’s dramatic rise over Route 128 as the world’s leading
innovation center. We find significant reason to doubt that this
fundamental shift in economic trajectories can be traced back to
relatively fine differences in the enforceability of noncompetes between California and Massachusetts. Second, we review some of
the most highly cited empirical studies that purport to show a
three-step causal link between bans on noncompetes, increased
employee turnover, and increased innovation. This exercise identifies important methodological and other limitations that cast serious doubt on the policy positions for which those studies have
been cited.
A. Reasons to Doubt the Standard Account of the Rise of
Silicon Valley
As of the mid-1970s, Silicon Valley and Route 128 were both
viewed as key centers for innovation in the electronics industry,
but with different strengths.79 Silicon Valley excelled in semiconductor chips while Route 128 excelled in minicomputers, a category situated between the supercomputer (or mainframe) segment dominated by IBM and the nascent “microcomputer” (in
today’s terms, PC) segment pioneered by Apple.80 Starting in the
79 See Willem Hulsink, Dick Manuel, and Harry Bouwman, Clustering in ICT, in
Willem Hulsink and Hans Dons, eds, Pathways to High-Tech Valleys and Research Triangles: Innovative Entrepreneurship, Knowledge Transfer and Cluster Formation in Europe
and the United States 53, 53–55 (Springer 2008) (stating that Route 128 predated the Silicon Valley technology cluster, which started growing in the 1950s and 1960s and overtook
Route 128 in the 1970s); Nancy S. Dorfman, Route 128: The Development of a Regional
High Technology Economy, 12 Rsrch Pol 299, 300, 313 (1983) (observing that, as of the
late 1970s, the Boston area and Silicon Valley had the same number of high-tech employees while the greater San Francisco Bay Area had “about 30 percent more”).
80 See Hulsink, Manuel, and Bouwman, Clustering in ICT at 59 (cited in note 79)
(describing how the “minicomputer manufacturers of Route 128 quickly lost ground to the
manufacturers of the fast-emerging PCs and workstations in Silicon Valley”).
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early 1980s, Silicon Valley overtook Route 128 and secured its
place as the world’s preeminent information technology center.
Saxenian attributes the ascendance of Silicon Valley, and the decline of Route 128, to differences in industrial organization and
cultural norms.81 The West Coast environment was characterized
by a constant flow of technical personnel among a network of
loosely connected firms, which spawned spin-offs that accelerated
the innovation process. This structure was supported by industry
norms that promoted information sharing and employee mobility.
By contrast, the East Coast environment was characterized
by a small number of vertically integrated firms and exhibited
little employee turnover. This structure was purportedly supported by industry norms that promoted loyalty to a single employer and discouraged information sharing. Building on
Saxenian’s narrative, Gilson argued that the free flow of human
capital could be attributed in part to California’s refusal to enforce noncompetes, while Massachusetts’s insistence on enforcing
noncompetes may have stagnated the flow of human capital, resulting in a slowdown in innovation.82 Put together, Saxenian and
Gilson’s work identifies certain informal and formal institutional
characteristics that purportedly set Route 128 on a path to decline, while sending Silicon Valley on an upward trajectory.
Both Saxenian’s and Gilson’s accounts of the rise of Silicon
Valley and decline of Route 128 have been widely adopted in the
academic literature.83 In the discussion below, we identify several
considerations that cast doubt on this now-standard account.
These include: (i) there were several exceptions (and other legal
causes of action) that substantially qualified California’s “ban” on
noncompetes during this period; (ii) firms could substantially
mimic the effect of a noncompete through compensation and other
mechanisms; (iii) it is not clear that differences in Massachusetts
law on noncompetes and trade secrets resulted in substantial differences in employee mobility as a practical matter; (iv) there are
fundamental technological and economic factors that more plausibly account for Silicon Valley’s ascendance; and (v) Route 128
has continued to exhibit robust innovative performance.

81

See Saxenian, Regional Advantage at 1–9 (cited in note 8).
See Gilson, 74 NYU L Rev at 602–09 (cited in note 8).
83 As of February 19, 2020, Google Scholar estimates that Saxenian’s leading contribution in the area, the book-length Regional Advantage, has been cited more than 13,200
times and Gilson’s 1999 NYU article on Silicon Valley and Route 128 has been cited more
than 900 times. See also note 9 (listing several scholarly publications that refer to and rely
on Saxenian’s or Gilson’s work).
82
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1. Did California courts really never enforce noncompetes?
Scholars have not adequately questioned whether California
courts in actuality declined to enforce noncompetes during the period in which Silicon Valley overtook Route 128. That seems to be
the case based on the California statute, which declares void
“every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a
lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind.” 84 Given that
blanket prohibition, however, it is curious that California firms
often insert noncompete clauses in executive employment agreements. Two studies that focus on adoption rates of noncompetes
in executive employment agreements at large publicly traded
firms find these clauses in 58–62 percent of agreements with
firms headquartered in California, as compared to rates of 70–
84 percent at the same types of firms headquartered in other
states (which generally enforce noncompetes subject to the reasonableness standard).85 Even more surprisingly, a broader study
involving all types of employees finds that the incidence of noncompetes in California (19 percent) is approximately the same as
observed in states that enforce noncompetes.86
This discrepancy between law and practice might be attributed to the possibility that technical personnel are unaware
84

Cal Bus & Prof Code § 16600.
Specifically, from a sample of 874 CEO employment contracts at S&P 1500 firms
executed during 1996–2010, Norman Bishara, Kenneth Martin, and Randall Thomas
found that California firms include noncompetes at a rate of 62 percent (compared to
84 percent for firms in other states). See Norman D. Bishara, Kenneth J. Martin, and
Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses and Other Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, 68 Vand L Rev 1, 34 (2015). Garmaise finds that, in a
sample of large, publicly traded firms, approximately 70 percent of firms used noncompetes, including 58 percent of California-based firms. Garmaise, 27 J L Econ & Org at 396
(cited in note 63). Garmaise does not specifically identify the rate of noncompete adoption
among firms located in the forty-eight enforcing states, although it would be expected that
that rate would be somewhat higher than the 70 percent rate reported for the full sample
of all firms in all states. See id.
86 See Starr, Prescott, and Bishara, Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force at *19 (cited
in note 11). We note two additional points concerning the methodology and findings of the
Starr, Prescott, and Bishara study. On methodology, we note that the paper carefully distinguishes in its survey methodology between noncompetes and other related provisions
such as nondisclosure or nonsolicitation covenants. This is important because it provides
confidence that the findings relate specifically to noncompetes rather than other related
provisions in employment agreements. See id at *3–4. On substance, we note that the
authors do not find any meaningful change in the incidence of noncompetes in comparing
“multi-unit” firms, which have operations in California and other states, and “single-unit”
firms, which operate only in California. See id at *19. This is a noteworthy result because
it might have been expected that large national firms in particular might include noncompete clauses as a “default” provision in their employment agreements since they
mostly operate in states that uphold noncompetes under the common-law reasonableness
standard.
85
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of California law and firms include a noncompete clause as an in
terrorem device to be used against departing employees. That explanation assumes that these personnel do not consult legal advisors, particularly a potential new employer’s legal counsel, or review publicly available information about a basic point of law.
Alternatively, one might argue that, because knowledgeable employees understand that noncompetes are generally not enforceable in California, it is not worth the transaction costs of negotiating with an employer to remove these clauses. At a minimum,
it is worth inquiring whether the standard understanding of
California law is entirely precise during the period in which
Silicon Valley overtook Route 128.
In fact, it is not. Writing in 1989, a treatise on trade secrets
law observed: “Despite the clear language of” California’s statute,
“the California courts do not regard all covenants not to compete
. . . invalid per se.” 87 Specifically, there were at least five important circumstances in which California employers could have
had some expectation of being able to enforce a noncompete during the period in which Silicon Valley overtook Route 128. While
it remains the case that California courts did not generally enforce noncompetes against individuals during this period, it is incorrect to assume that a sufficiently motivated employer would
never rationally invest resources in enforcing (and therefore could
never credibly threaten to seek) enforcement of a noncompete
against a departing employee.
a) Narrow restraints. In 1987, the Ninth Circuit held that
noncompetes were enforceable under California law if the noncompete narrowly restrained postemployment opportunities, as
distinguished from a general restraint that barred entry into an
entire profession.88 From the 1970s through the 2000s, litigants
that pursued variants of the narrow restraint exception achieved

87

See Melvin F. Jager, Trade Secrets Law § 13.01[2] (1989).
Campbell v Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 817 F2d 499,
502 (9th Cir 1987) (citing California law for the proposition that the statutory ban on noncompetes precludes only contractual restraints on entering an “entire business, trade or
profession,” as distinguished from “only a small or limited part of the business, trade or
profession”), quoting Boughton v Socony Mobil Oil Co, 231 Cal App 2d 188, 192 (1964).
The court purported to apply state law precedent, as set forth in Boughton, 231 Cal App
2d at 192, which in turn relied on King v Gerold, 240 P2d 710 (Cal App 1952). An earlier
Ninth Circuit decision had upheld a clause in a collective bargaining agreement involving
the partial forfeiture of certain pension and profit-sharing benefits in the event a retired
employee took employment with another firm in the same industry. The court’s decision
relied on the view that California law does not prohibit an alleged restraint on employee
mobility that is “limited in nature and furthers sound public policies.” See Smith v CMTAIAM Pension Trust, 654 F2d 650, 660 (9th Cir 1981).
88
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mixed results, sometimes achieving success in (mostly) federal
courts but usually not faring well in California state courts.89 In
1997 and 1999, the Ninth Circuit again applied the exception to
uphold a noncompete covenant.90 Only in 2008, well after Silicon
Valley had established its place as the world’s technology center,
did the California Supreme Court resolve this uncertainty by rejecting the narrow restraint exception.91
b) Sale of a business. Based on a statutory exception,92
both federal and state courts typically enforced (and continue to
enforce) noncompetes executed in connection with the sale of a
business. The exception applies to noncompetes entered into by
majority target shareholders and possibly other target employees
with smaller equity interests.93 This exception provides some of
the legal logic behind the now-popular “acqui-hire” transactional
structure, in which a large firm acquires a start-up firm primarily
for purposes of retaining the services of its founders and senior
managerial and technical personnel. Without a commitment from
key personnel that they will remain with or at least not compete
with the acquirer for some reasonable period of time, the transaction is not viable. This partially explains why exempting business

89 For cases recognizing the exception, see Centeno v Roseville Community Hospital,
107 Cal App 3d 62, 68–71 (1979); Latona v Aetna US Healthcare Inc, 82 F Supp 2d 1089,
1094 (CD Cal 1999); Cin-Med Associates, Inc v Hemocue, Inc, 2001 WL 1117562, *3–4 (CD
Cal). In Scott v Snelling & Snelling, Inc, 732 F Supp 1034, 1042–43 (ND Cal 1990), the
court recognized that “California courts may, in some circumstances apply a ‘rule of reason’ to only partial restrictions on competition” but declined to apply it in the case of a
noncompete that imposed postemployment geographic and temporal restrictions. For
cases rejecting the exception, see Golden State Linen Service, Inc v Vidalin, 69 Cal App 3d
1, 13 (1977); Liberty Mutual Insurance Co v Arthur J. Gallagher & Co, 1994 WL 715613,
*3 (ND Cal); Arrowhead Financial Group, Inc v Welty, 2002 WL 31661269, *6–7 (Cal App);
Jan Marini Skin Research, Inc v Allure Cosmetic USA, Inc, 2007 WL 1508686, *16 (Cal
App); Thompson v Impaxx, Inc, 113 Cal App 4th 1425, 1430–31 (2003).
90 General Commercial Packaging, Inc v TPS Package Engineering, Inc, 126 F3d
1131, 1132–33 (9th Cir 1997) (enforcing a one-year noncompete between a contractor and
subcontractor with respect to the contractor’s clients); International Business Machines
Corp v Bajorek, 191 F3d 1033, 1040–41 (9th Cir 1999) (holding that noncompete obligation
in stock option agreement did not violate the California statutory ban on noncompetes).
91 Edwards v Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P3d 285, 293 (Cal 2008).
92 Cal Bus & Prof Code § 16601.
93 It is not clear how large that equity interest must be. Rulings have been mixed.
See Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Insurance Services of Orange County, Inc v Robb, 33 Cal App
4th 1812, 1816, 1822–25 (1995) (in connection with the merger of an insurance company,
upholding a noncompete with an employee of the merged company, who had held a 35 percent ownership interest in the merged company, on ground that a sufficient transfer of
goodwill had taken place); Vacco Industries, Inc v Van Den Berg, 5 Cal App 4th 34, 48–49
(1992) (finding that a 3 percent interest, which was the ninth largest
shareholder interest, in conjunction with an officer position, constituted a substantial
shareholder).
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acquisitions from noncompete enforcement limitations, which is
the rule even in California, is likely to be, and is widely viewed
as, efficient.
c) Protection of trade secrets. Since a California Supreme
Court decision in 1958,94 California law has recognized that the
statutory bar against noncompetes does not extend to certain
postemployment restrictions—most typically, nondisclosure and
nonsolicitation covenants—that are enforced for the purpose of
protecting an employer’s trade secrets or confidential information.95 Since the 1980s, California courts have periodically applied the trade secret exception to enforce nonsolicitation and
nondisclosure obligations (and, in one recent case, even a noncompete clause “construed to bar only the use of confidential source
code, software, or techniques”96) that were found to be narrowly
tailored to protect a trade secret.97

94 Gordon v Landau, 321 P2d 456, 459 (Cal 1958) (upholding a nonsolicitation clause
because “it did not prevent defendant from” engaging in the same or similar business as
his former employer).
95 See Jager, Trade Secrets Law § 13:4 at 13-13 (cited in note 87) (observing that
California courts sometimes enforce noncompetes to protect trade secrets or other confidential information). For cases stating this principle, see Muggill v Reuben H. Donnelley
Corp, 398 P2d 147, 149 (Cal 1965) (stating that § 16600 invalidates noncompete provisions
“unless they are necessary to protect the employer’s trade secrets”); Gordon Termite
Control v Terrones, 84 Cal App 3d 176, 178 (1978) (stating that § 16600 “has been construed by the Supreme Court as invalidating contracts not to compete, except where their
enforcement is necessary to protect the trade secrets of an employer”); Loral Corp v Moyes,
174 Cal App 3d 268, 276 (1985) (stating that § 16600 “does not invalidate an employee’s
agreement not to disclose his former employer’s . . . trade secrets”); Moss Adams Co v
Shilling, 179 Cal App 3d 124, 130 (1986); American Paper & Packaging Products, Inc v
Kirgan, 183 Cal App 3d 1318, 1322 (1986) (Section 16600 invalidates noncompetes “unless
their enforcement is necessary to protect an employer’s confidential information or trade
secrets”); Scott, 732 F Supp at 1043 (recognizing a judicially created exception to § 16600
to the extent necessary to protect trade secrets).
96 Richmond Technologies, Inc v Aumtech Business Solutions, 2011 WL 2607158,
*18–19 (ND Cal) (finding the nonsolicitation clause and noninterference clauses “are likely
to be found unenforceable” because they “are more broadly drafted than necessary to protect . . . trade secrets,” but a noncompete clause and related clause barring the use of confidential information are “likely enforceable as necessary to protect . . . trade secrets”).
97 See Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co v Turley, 622 F2d 1324, 1338 (9th Cir
1980) (vacating and remanding the lower court’s invalidation of a postemployment covenants involving nondisclosure of customer lists and nonsolicitation of a former employer’s
customers); John F. Matull & Associates, Inc v Cloutier, 194 Cal App 3d 1049, 1054–55
(1987) (upholding a nonsolicitation obligation); Morlife, Inc v Perry, 56 Cal App 4th 1514
(1997) (affirming a nonsolicitation covenant against former employees); Asset Marketing
Systems, Inc v Gagnon, 542 F3d 748, 758 (9th Cir 2008) (observing that “non-competition
agreements are unenforceable [under California law] unless necessary to protect an employer’s trade secret”); Lindzy v Q-Railing USA Co, 2013 WL 4437164, *6 (Cal App) (finding a nondisclosure clause and a nonsolicitation clause valid).
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In 2008, the Supreme Court of California specifically declined
to affirm or reject the trade secret exception.98 A recent federal
court opinion summarizes the current state of California law on
this point: “Although California courts have consistently ‘condemned’ agreements that place restraints on the pursuit of a business or profession . . . ‘an equally lengthy line of cases has consistently held former employees may not misappropriate the
former employer’s trade secrets to unfairly compete with the former employer.’” 99 Simply put: Section 16600 does not preclude an
employer from preventing a departing employee via injunctive relief from joining a new employer by enforcing nondisclosure, nonsolicitation, or other similar postemployment obligations when
doing so promotes the employer’s interest in protecting its trade
secrets.
d) ERISA. A California employer can avoid the statutory
ban on noncompetes by embedding the noncompete in a deferred
compensation or severance pay arrangement governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974100 (ERISA). These
clauses operate as a forfeiture mechanism that conditions entitlement to certain benefits under the plan upon compliance with the
noncompete obligation. As observed in practitioner commentary,
this exception typically arises in litigation concerning deferred
benefit plans for highly compensated executives.101 In 1981 and
1987, the Ninth Circuit held that ERISA preempts state law, specifically including noncompete restrictions. 102 California state
courts have adopted the same position.103 This enforcement strategy is limited only by the ERISA requirement that a noncompete

98

Edwards, 189 P3d at 289 n 4.
Richmond Technologies, 2011 WL 2607158 at *18 (internal brackets omitted), citing Edwards, 189 P3d at 290–91 and Retirement Group v Galante, 176 Cal App 4th 1226,
1237 (2009).
100 Pub L No 93-406, 88 Stat 829, codified as amended in various sections of Title 26
and Title 29.
101 See Amy L. Blaisdell and Wendy S. Menghini, Pulling Tricks Out of a Top Hat:
Preemption of Non-Compete Laws Applicable to “Top Hat” Plans *1 (DRI: The Voice of the
Defense Bar, Dec 29, 2010), archived at https://perma.cc/4SYD-PEAV.
102 See Clark v Lauren Young Tire Center Profit Sharing Trust, 816 F2d 480, 481 (9th
Cir 1987) (involving a noncompete under Oregon law); Lojek v Thomas, 716 F2d 675, 678,
679–80 (9th Cir 1983) (involving a noncompete under Idaho law). Gilson cites a 1965
California Supreme Court decision that invalidated this type of forfeiture provision in a
retirement plan. See Gilson, 74 NYU L Rev at 607 n 100 (cited in note 8), citing Muggill,
398 P2d at 149. However, Muggill would not appear to survive the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of ERISA, which was enacted in 1974.
103 See, for example, Weinfurther v Source Services Corp Employees Profit Sharing
Plan and Trust, 759 F Supp 599, 602 (ND Cal 1991).
99
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forfeiture clause cannot be applied to deprive the employee of benefits accrued after ten years of service.104
e) Choice-of-forum clauses. California courts will not enforce a noncompete entered into under the law of another state
that generally enforces noncompetes. However, prior to 2017, if
an employer and former employee were subject to the jurisdiction
of an out-of-state court that enforces noncompetes, and the decision was final in that state before any decision in a parallel
California action, then a noncompete agreement was typically enforceable within California. In general, the two key factors at issue in such situations were whether (1) the agreement selected
another state’s courts as the forum for disputes; and (2) whether
the employee is now a California resident employed by a
California employer. Although California courts will generally
not enforce an out-of-state choice-of-law clause, especially if the
defendant-employee is a California resident employed by a
California firm,105 prior to 2017, they often respected an out-ofstate choice-of-forum clause, even if the other state potentially
applied its own law.106 In practice, this meant that California employees employed by a firm with corporate headquarters out of
state—or out-of-state employees moving to California—could be
subject to enforceable noncompete restrictions under a properly
drafted agreement prior to 2017.107

104

29 USC § 1053(a)(2)(A).
See Application Group, Inc v Hunter Group, Inc, 61 Cal App 4th 881, 894–905 (1998).
106 Compare Davis v Advanced Care Technologies, Inc, 2007 WL 2288298, *4–9 (ED
Cal) (finding California law applicable to the case despite a Connecticut choice-of-law provision because California had a materially greater interest; the employee was a California
resident, the former employer was based in Connecticut, and the new employer was a
California-based employer), with Universal Operations Risk Management, LLC v Global
Rescue LLC, 2012 WL 2792444, *6–7 (ND Cal) (enforcing a forum selection clause despite
the strong possibility that the forum state would uphold the covenant not to compete).
107 See, for example, Meyer v Howmedica Osteonics Corp, 2015 WL 728631, *11–12
(SD Cal) (ordering a transfer of forum to New Jersey consistent with the forum selection
clause, when there was also a choice of law provision for New Jersey law), citing Swenson
v T–Mobile USA, Inc, 415 F Supp 2d 1101 (SD Cal 2006) (dismissing a California declaratory relief action in the presence of forum selection clause when the previous action was
pending out-of-state); Universal Operations Risk Management, LLC, 2012 WL 2792444 at
*6–7; Advanced Bionics Corp v Medtronic, Inc, 59 P3d 231, 232–34 (Cal 2002) (vacating a
lower court’s issuance of a temporary restraining order that had blocked the former employer from pursuing a noncompete action it had filed out of state); Biosense Webster, Inc
v Superior Court, 135 Cal App 4th 827, 830 (2006) (extending the holding of Advanced
Bionics to circumstances in which no previous action had been filed out of state); Google,
Inc v Microsoft Corp, 415 F Supp 2d 1018, 1021–22, 1026 (ND Cal 2005) (staying noncompete proceedings pending those in Washington in order to prevent forum shopping). But
see Manchester v Arista Records, Inc, 1981 US Dist LEXIS 18642, *13–17 (CD Cal) (upholding a choice-of-forum clause in a case involving Cal Labor Code § 2855, which limits
105
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2. Substitutes for noncompetes.
In addition to the five exceptions described above, California
firms could elect (and still can elect) from a large menu of substitute legal and economic instruments to deter employee mobility.
To illustrate these alternatives concretely, we can return to the
case involving the former Google engineer who took a new position with Uber. As noted previously, the employee had been involved in developing Google’s autonomous driving technologies.108
Under California law, Google would appear to be powerless to prevent the employee from working for Uber. Even assuming that
Google cannot wield a noncompete covenant, however, Google has
several other credible legal threats at its disposal. Given the existence of these additional legal instruments, any marginal preclusive effect that can be reasonably attributed to noncompetes
appears to be significantly attenuated, and would need to at least
be accounted for in any empirical analysis comparing the differential effects of noncompetes on innovation between California
and out-of-state firms.
a) Patents. A firm may use patents to protect against
knowledge leakage resulting from employee movement. Although
a patent may not cover tacit knowledge per se, it may cover a
product or method incorporating that tacit knowledge. Assuming
the firm can bear the anticipated enforcement costs, the expropriation risk posed by a departing employee would then be limited
to informational assets that fall outside the firm’s patent portfolio. A patenting strategy makes any departing employee less attractive to competitors, which implies that the employee will receive fewer or lower offers from other firms and is less likely to
leave the current employer. Hence, even in a jurisdiction that is
hostile to noncompetes, there may be significant patent-based obstacles that discourage employee movement. Consistent with
these expectations, a 2009 empirical study found a deterrent effect on labor mobility in the US semiconductor industry proportional to a firm’s propensity to bring patent infringement suits.109
Another study finds that, while the likelihood of an acquisition
increases when a target’s employees are subject to noncompetes,
that effect weakens in the case of targets that hold strong patent
personal service employment contracts to a term of seven years, because the court determined that § 2855 did not apply to the contracts at issue).
108 See notes 1 and 4.
109 See Rajshree Agarwal, Martin Ganco, and Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Reputations for
Toughness in Patent Enforcement: Implications for Knowledge Spillovers via Inventor Mobility, 30 Strategic Mgmt J 1349, 1366–67 (2009).
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portfolios, suggesting that patents substitute in part for noncompetes as a device for protecting against knowledge leakage after
consummation of the acquisition.110
b) Breach of contract. If the employee had signed a nondisclosure agreement (NDA) and then took a position with a competing enterprise, Google could potentially bring (or threaten to
bring) a breach of contract claim against the employee. As noted
earlier, there is no plausible legal challenge under § 16600 to the
enforcement of an NDA so long as it is sufficiently tailored to promote the employer’s interest in protecting its trade secrets.111 The
credibility of Google’s threat to sue to enforce an NDA would depend on the negotiated scope of the definition of “confidential information” in the NDA and the ease with which Google could
demonstrate that the employee had actually breached the NDA’s
confidentiality provisions at his or her new position. In certain
jurisdictions, courts are willing to enforce NDAs that encompass
information that would not otherwise qualify as a trade secret;112
in other jurisdictions (including California), Google may be required to show that enforcement of the NDA targets only nonpublic information that would be protected under trade secret law.113
Alternatively, Google could bring (or threaten to bring) a
breach-of-contract claim if it had entered into a long-term employment contract or a shorter-term employment contract with periodic renewal at the employer’s option. (The former option may be
unattractive to both employers and employees because it locks
each party into a potentially unwanted long-term commitment
that is difficult to mitigate even through the most carefully

110 See Kenneth A. Younge, Tony W. Tong, and Lee Fleming, How Anticipated Employee Mobility Affects Acquisition Likelihood: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 36
Strategic Mgmt J 686, 691–92 (2015).
111 See Part II.A.1.c.
112 See Richard F. Dole Jr, The Contract Exception to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
and Its Implications for the Federal Defend Trade Secrets Act, 34 Santa Clara High Tech
L J 362, 377 n 80 (2018) (observing that courts in some jurisdictions will enforce NDAs
that encompass information that would not qualify as a trade secret, subject to a reasonableness standard); Bishara, Martin, and Thomas, 68 Vand L Rev at 21–23 (cited in note
85) (stating that courts will sometimes enforce an NDA that applies to information that
might not otherwise be protected under trade secret law, so long as the NDA is limited in
time).
113 See, for example, Richmond Technologies, 2011 WL 2607158 at *19 (noting that a
“clause prohibiting use of confidential information is likely enforceable to the extent that
the claimed information is protectable as a trade secret”). On this point with respect to
California law in particular, see Charles T. Graves, Nonpublic Information and California
Tort Law: A Proposal for Harmonizing California’s Employee Mobility and Intellectual
Property Regimes Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 2006 UCLA J L & Tech 1, 37–43.
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crafted provisions for early separation under certain circumstances.) In yet another variation, Google could bring a tortious
interference with contract claim against Uber, on the ground that
Uber was aware of the long-term contract to which the departing
engineer was then bound.114
c) Invention assignment agreements. In the technology industries, it is typical for employees to enter into invention assignment agreements, under which an employee agrees in advance
that all “inventions” (as defined in the governing agreement) developed by the employee during the course of his or her employment are deemed to belong to the employer. 115 Under such an
agreement, Google could bring a claim against the departing employee if the employee is using an “invention” that the employee
made while employed by Google. As long as Google’s claim could
at least survive a motion to dismiss, it could credibly threaten
to impose significant discovery and other litigation costs on the
employee-defendant (or, more typically, the new employer who
may have agreed to indemnify the employee-defendant). In a
widely followed litigation over ownership of the “Bratz” line of
dolls, involving Mattel (as plaintiff), Mattel’s former employee (as
codefendant), and a smaller toy manufacturer (as codefendant),
an invention assignment agreement provided the basis for several
years of protracted litigation that burdened the defendant with
substantial legal fees.116
Alternatively, Google and its former employee may have entered into an invention assignment agreement with a “trailer”
clause, which would grant Google ownership over any inventions
that the former employee developed within a certain amount of
time following termination.117 That too may limit the employee’s
attractiveness to any potential outside employer. The doctrine of
assignor estoppel can have a similar effect in a departing employee scenario. Under that doctrine, some courts have held that
114 In the actual litigation between Google and Uber, this would not have been a feasible claim because Google and the departing employee were apparently not parties to a
long-term contract.
115 See Victoria Lee and Mark Lehberg, Employee Proprietary Information and Inventions Assignment Agreements: What They Do, and What Could Happen Without Them
(DLA Piper, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/J5QD-3FXX.
116 See Mattel, Inc v MGA Entertainment, Inc, 616 F3d 904, 909 (9th Cir 2010) (observing that Mattel’s ownership interest in the Bratz line of dolls “turns on the interpretation of Bryant’s [the former employee’s] 1999 employment agreement,” which included
an invention assignment clause). For a summary of the litigation, see Barbie and Bratz:
The Feud Continues (WIPO Magazine, Aug 2011), archived at https://perma.cc/6RM2
-W45Y.
117 For discussion, see Merges, 13 Harv J L & Tech at 52–53 (cited in note 65).
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not only is the employee precluded from arguing against the validity of a patent that the employee assigned to the former employer, but also any new employer of the employee is similarly
precluded from doing so. The practical consequence: if the old employer brings a patent infringement suit against the new employer, the latter may be unable to argue in defense that the underlying patent is invalid. Like a trailer clause, this expansive
understanding of the assignor estoppel doctrine may limit the attractiveness of an employee to any potential new employer.118
d) Trade secret misappropriation. Google could (and did)
bring a trade secret misappropriation claim against the employee
and Uber as the new employer, alleging that the employee or
Uber had used or disclosed trade secrets belonging to Google.119
In certain states (although not California today), even absent evidence of use or disclosure, Google could seek an injunction to prevent its former employee from joining Uber if the court found that
the employee would inevitably disclose the employer’s trade secrets in his new position.120 Trade secret litigation in a departing
employee scenario is not an uncommon occurrence in Silicon Valley. Intel, Broadcom, Cisco, Apple, and other Silicon Valley companies have been involved in prominent trade secret disputes involving former employees.121 Depending on the credibility of any
118 See Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Assignor Estoppel, 54 Houston L Rev 513, 537
(2016) (“[T]he doctrine of assignor estoppel serves effectively as a partial noncompete
agreement, preventing inventors from starting new companies or moving to competitors
in many circumstances and at least raising the costs of doing so.”).
119 Waymo Complaint at *2–5 (cited in note 1).
120 Based on a survey of twenty-four states (current as of 2012), courts in only a handful of states explicitly reject the doctrine while the remainder either explicitly recognize
the doctrine or, more commonly, apply it occasionally. See Ryan M. Wiesner, A State-byState Analysis of Inevitable Disclosure: A Need for Uniformity and a Workable Standard,
16 Marq Intell Prop L Rev 211, 217–28 (2012). See also M. Claire Flowers, Facing the
Inevitable: The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016,
75 Wash & Lee L Rev 2207, 2223 (2018) (finding that not all states bar application of
inevitable disclosure doctrine entirely; only those in the Eighth Circuit, California,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, and Massachusetts expressly refused to adopt the
doctrine). During the period in which Silicon Valley overtook Route 128 as a technology
center, it was uncertain whether a California court could issue injunctive relief under the
inevitable disclosure doctrine. See Part II.A.3.
121 These headline disputes include: Cisco’s lawsuit against Arista, a company
founded by departing Cisco employees, see Rachael King, Cisco’s Feud with Former Star
Executive Turns Personal—and Costly (Wall St J, Aug 17, 2017), online at https://
www.wsj.com/articles/ciscos-feud-with-former-star-executive-turns-personaland-costly
-1502980362 (visited Feb 17, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable); Intel’s suit against
Broadcom involving the departure of former Intel employees, see Karen Alexander, Intel,
Broadcom Settle Suit over Trade Secrets (LA Times, Nov 22, 2000), archived at https://
perma.cc/MQ9J-KEZA; and Apple’s suit against Steve Jobs and Next, see Andrew Pollack,
Steven Jobs Settles Suit Filed by Apple (NY Times, Jan 18, 1986), archived at

990

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:953

such legal threat, and the potential injunction, damages, and litigation costs to which the employee and future employer could be
exposed,122 Google may be able to dissuade Uber from hiring its
employee. This effectively occurred in the Google-Uber litigation:
first, Levandowski was barred by court order from working on
certain projects at Uber; and, second, Uber fired Levandowski in
connection with Google’s litigation and related allegations of
trade-secret theft.123 Effectively, this approaches the result that
would have been achieved if Google had been able to enforce a
noncompete covenant against a departing employee.
Aside from these clearly legal mechanisms, Google and Uber
might enter into a mutual “no-hire” (also known as antipoaching)
agreement. Beginning in 2005, Apple, Google, and other Silicon
Valley–based companies reportedly entered into unwritten “nohire” agreements to protect their trade secrets and to suppress
wage competition among one another.124 Although these arrangements were ultimately dissolved following a settlement with the
Department of Justice for alleged antitrust violations,125 they illustrate how firms that are precluded from using noncompetes

https://perma.cc/5LRN-VK4T. For discussion of other trade secret suits involving departing employees, see Everett M. Rogers and Judith K. Larsen, Silicon Valley Fever: Growth
of High-Technology Culture 91–94 (Basic Books 1984).
122 Gilson argues that trade secrecy claims are difficult to win (outside of blatant misappropriation) and, as a result, are not typically effective substitutes for noncompetes.
Gilson, 74 NYU L Rev at 597–601 (cited in note 8). We feel this understates certain practical and legal realities. Although trade secrecy claims are certainly not as strong as an
absolute bar on postemployment opportunities at competitors, they have considerable legal and in terrorem force (as Gilson acknowledges to some extent, see id at 600), especially
given that, at least during 1984–2002, California law enabled courts to award relief in
trade secret cases even in cases of merely “threatened” (rather than actual) misappropriation. See notes 132–34 and accompanying text. For similar views on the potency of
California trade secret suits in certain circumstances, see Michael Risch, Comments on
Trade Secret Sharing in High Velocity Labor Markets, 12 Empl Rts & Empl Pol J 339,
340–42 (2009) (arguing that California trade secret law provides a potent remedy in cases
involving the misappropriation of “core” informational assets).
123 Mullin, Judge’s Order Bars Uber Engineer from Lidar Work (cited in note 5);
Marshall, Uber Fired Its Robocar Guru (cited in note 6).
124 See Lobel, 93 Tex L Rev at 831–35 (cited in note 9) (describing antipoaching cartels
entered into by leading Silicon Valley technology firms); Jeff Elder, Silicon Valley Companies Agree to Pay $415 Million to Settle Wage Case (Wall St J, Jan 15, 2015), online at
https://www.wsj.com/articles/silicon-valley-companies-agree-to-pay-415-million-to-settle
-wage-case-1421363288 (visited Feb 17, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable) (describing settlement of class-action antitrust lawsuit against major technology companies alleging “antipoaching” agreements).
125 US Department of Justice, Press Release, Justice Department Requires Six High
Tech Companies to Stop Entering into Anticompetitive Employee Solicitation Agreements:
Settlement Preserves Competition for High-Tech Employees (Sept 24, 2010), archived at
https://perma.cc/RYG6-VEE5.
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may have strong incentives to use other mechanisms to dampen
labor mobility.
e) Economic alternatives to noncompetes. Even in the absence of any alternative legal instrument, employers have another potent mechanism by which to discourage employee movement: they can use deferred compensation mechanisms to
encourage employees to remain with the firm.126 There are multiple methods. Employers can set the vesting schedules of deferred
equity compensation (often a substantial portion of an employee’s
compensation at high-tech firms) so that departing employees
suffer an implicit financial penalty by departing prior to the date
on which all their options to acquire stock in the company have
been triggered. Cisco, a Silicon Valley incumbent and repeat acquirer of startups, typically requires that a target’s employees
waive vesting rights (in the target’s stock) that accelerate upon
an acquisition and adopt a new graduated vesting schedule (in
Cisco’s stock), precisely in order to deter departures by the target’s key employees for a certain period of time following the acquisition.127 Alternatively, an acquisition agreement can skew the
division of deal consideration such that a small portion is allocated to the up-front purchase price and the remainder is allocated to a future postacquisition date, contingent on the founders
and certain other employees remaining with the acquiror postclosing for a certain period of time.128 In yet another variation, a
recent empirical study shows that S&P 500 firms often pay severance to California-based executives in discretionary installments following separation (as contrasted with lump-sum
amounts that the same firms usually pay to non-California-based
executives immediately upon separation), subject to compliance
126 See Richard A. Booth, Give Me Equity or Give Me Death—the Role of Competition
and Compensation in Building Silicon Valley, 1 Entrepreneurial Bus L J 265, 271 (2006)
(arguing that deferred equity compensation is used as a replacement for noncompete
agreements for purposes of retaining employees). For empirical evidence that stock options
promote employee retention, see Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, Why Do Some Firms Give
Stock Options to All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories, 76 J
Fin Econ 99, 109–10, 131–32 (2005) (based on data on firms’ stock option grants to middle
managers, finding that this practice is primarily used for purposes of retaining employees
and “sorting” between higher- and lower-quality employees).
127 See David Mayer and Martin Kenney, Economic Action Does Not Take Place in a
Vacuum: Understanding Cisco’s Acquisition and Development Strategy, 11 Indust & Innovation 299, 312 (2004).
128 See Marita A. Makinen, David B. Haber, and Anthony W. Raymundo, Acqui-Hires
for Growth: Planning for Success *35 (Lowenstein Sandler PC, 2012), archived at
https://perma.cc/5XBD-2Q76 (noting that certain acquisitions allocate more than 40 percent of the deal consideration to “incentive pool payments” and “equity grant roll overs . . .
contingent on key employees staying with the buyer post-closing”).
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with noncompete provisions in the executives’ employment agreements that are not directly enforceable through breach-ofcontract suits.129
3. Was Massachusetts’s noncompete and trade secret law
significantly different from California’s?
The traditional narrative relies on a significant difference in
legal treatment between Massachusetts and California with respect to the enforcement of noncompetes and related doctrines
that impact employee mobility. Below we look more carefully at
comparative differences between Massachusetts and California
law in the enforcement of noncompetes and trade secret law. We
do not discern any meaningful differences with respect to trade
secret claims. Although we do not contest that there were material differences in the enforceability of noncompetes between the
two states during the historical period in question, the comparison is more nuanced than commonly explained, especially taking
into account the above-noted exceptions to California’s oftdescribed “ban” on noncompetes.
a) Trade secrets; inevitable disclosure. In general, there
are few substantial differences in the trade secret doctrines followed by California and Massachusetts courts.130 Where there are
fine differences, these do not necessarily support the conventional
expectation that Massachusetts provides stronger trade secret
protections. To illustrate these tendencies, we look more closely
at the inevitable disclosure doctrine and its evolution in California
and Massachusetts during the period in which Silicon Valley rose
to preeminence. Under this doctrine, a court can enjoin an individual from working for a new employer on the ground that the
individual will inevitably disclose trade secrets belonging to the
former employer. 131 This represents a plaintiff-favorable extension of trade secret law, which typically requires that the plaintiff
show that the defendant has actually used or disclosed the trade
secret after having misappropriated it.
129 See Sarath Sanga, Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Approach, 34 J L Econ &
Org 650, 654, 670–77 (2018) (using a data sample consisting of 852 executive contracts
disclosed in SEC filings during 1996–2016 by 75 S&P 500 firms that had employees in
California and at least one state other than California).
130 See Gilson, 74 NYU L Rev at 602 (cited in note 8) (stating that “[t]he scope of
protection provided by trade secret law in California and Massachusetts appears to be
roughly the same”). See also Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine
in Search of Justification, 86 Cal L Rev 241, 247 (1998) (“Although trade secret doctrine
varies from state to state, the general rules are substantially similar in all jurisdictions.”).
131 See Flowers, 75 Wash & Lee L Rev at 2217 (cited in note 120).
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As of the late 1970s and early 1980s, we are not aware of any
indication in California or Massachusetts case or statutory law
that either jurisdiction had explicitly recognized or rejected the
inevitable disclosure doctrine or any equivalent under trade secret
law. In 1984, however, it was California—not Massachusetts—that
signaled openness to the inevitable disclosure doctrine by adopting the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), which became effective the following year. California’s version of the UTSA, the
California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA), follows the language of the model statute and provides that a plaintiff can obtain
injunctive relief under trade secret law if the court finds there is
“threatened misappropriation.”132 Those two words mattered: in
1996, AMD, a leading California semiconductor manufacturer,
successfully relied on the inevitable disclosure doctrine to secure
a preliminary injunction preventing more than twelve of its former employees from taking certain positions at their new employer, Hyundai.133 Given the language in the CUTSA, and the
outcome in the AMD-Hyundai litigation, it can be understood why
a Silicon Valley practitioner observed in 1997 that it was unclear
whether the inevitable disclosure remedy was available under
California law.134
In 1998, the author of a leading treatise on trade secret law
observed that California law authorized courts generally to intervene to protect against “threatened harm” and concluded:
“California has never rejected the fundamental idea that underlies the [inevitable disclosure] doctrine.”135 In 1999, a California
intermediate appellate court even explicitly adopted the doctrine
(although it ruled against the trade secret claimant and the
court’s opinion was subsequently “depublished” by the California
Supreme Court).136 Commentators observed that the court’s opinion reflected the actual law on the ground in some California

132

Cal Civ Code § 3426.2.
See Benjamin A. Emmert, Keeping Confidence with Former Employees: California
Court Apply the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine to California Trade Secret Law, 40 Santa
Clara L Rev 1171, 1192–95. The case subsequently settled. See AMD, Hyundai Unit Settle
Trade-Secrets Case (LA Times, Nov 19, 1996), archived at https://perma.cc/45XY-GMP8.
134 Terrence P. McMahon, Gary E. Weiss, and Sean A. Lincoln, Inevitable Disclosure:
Not So Sure in the West, Natl L J C35–36 (May 12, 1997).
135 James Pooley, When It Comes to Trade Secrets and Employee Mobility, a Little
Inevitable Disclosure Is Not Such a Bad Thing, The Recorder 41 (Nov 1998).
136 See generally Electro Optical Industries, Inc v White, 90 Cal Rptr 2d 680 (Cal App
1999), ordered not to be officially published, 2000 Cal LEXIS 3536 (Cal). Specifically, the
Court of Appeal stated: “Although no California court has yet adopted it, the inevitable
disclosure rule is rooted in common sense and calls for a fact specific inquiry. We adopt
the rule here.” 90 Cal Rptr 2d at 684.
133
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lower courts: “The . . . decision now makes explicit what many
trade secret practitioners have known for years: California courts
will grant narrowly tailored injunctions in appropriate circumstances to prevent a former employee from performing certain
tasks for a new employer to minimize the threat to a former employer’s trade secrets.”137
In the immediately ensuing years, the case law shifted in a
more defendant-friendly direction, as several federal district
courts applying California law138—and, in 2002, a California intermediate appellate court—rejected the inevitable disclosure
remedy,139 specifically distinguishing in the latter case between
“inevitable disclosure” and the “threatened misappropriation”
language in the CUTSA.140 Nonetheless, a contemporary observer
wrote that it remained uncertain whether a California court
might apply the inevitable disclosure doctrine, given that the
2002 case was a ruling by an intermediate appellate court.141 Reflecting this lingering uncertainty, a California court in 2008 recognized the continuing possibility of bringing a trade secret claim
based on the “threatened misappropriation” language in the
CUTSA.142 Although it is almost certain today that the inevitable
disclosure doctrine is no longer viable in California in view of
Edwards v Arthur Andersen LLP, 143 during the ascendance of
Silicon Valley in the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s, this was not
the case.
During approximately the same period, the development of
the law in Massachusetts concerning the inevitable disclosure
137 Gary E. Weiss and Sean A. Lincoln, Accepting the Inevitable: The California Court
of Appeal Has Finally Adopted the Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure (Supplement to the
Recorder, Feb 2000).
138 GlobeSpan, Inc v O’Neill, 151 F Supp 2d 1229, 1229 (CD Cal 2001); Danjaq, LLC
v Sony Corp, 1999 WL 317629, *1 n 1 (CD Cal); Computer Sciences Corp v Computer Associates International, Inc, 1999 WL 675446, *5 (CD Cal); Bayer Corp v Roche Molecular
Systems, Inc, 72 F Supp 2d 1111, 1119–20 (ND Cal 1999).
139 Whyte v Schlage Lock Co, 101 Cal App 4th 1443, 1462–64 (2002).
140 See id.
141 See Hyde, Working in Silicon Valley at 33–35 (cited in note 9).
142 See Central Valley General Hospital v Smith, 162 Cal App 4th 501, 524–26 (2008)
(stating that the rejection of the inevitable disclosure doctrine in Whyte does not imply
rejection of trade secret claims based on threatened misappropriation, given that the
California code explicitly recognizes such claims).
143 189 P3d 285 (Cal 2008). Reflecting the post-Edwards approach toward noncompetes and employee mobility more generally, a California court in 2009 awarded attorneys’
fees as sanctions against a party that sought an injunction based on the inevitable disclosure doctrine (together with other evidence of bad faith). See FLIR Systems, Inc v Parrish,
174 Cal App 4th 1270, 1273–74, 1277 (2009). For further discussion, see Charles T. Graves,
Is There an Empirical Basis for Predictions of Inevitable Disclosure?, 18 Wake Forest J
Bus & Intell Prop L 190, 194–96 (2018).
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doctrine followed a remarkably similar trajectory, with the only
potential difference being that Massachusetts common law provided an even weaker basis for asserting the inevitable disclosure
doctrine. Given that Massachusetts (unlike California) had not
adopted the UTSA and therefore required that a trade secret
claimant show actual use or disclosure by the defendant, there
was arguably no basis under Massachusetts common law to issue
injunctive relief under a theory of inevitable disclosure. In 1995,
a federal district court (applying Massachusetts law) found that
it was “inevitable” that a software developer would use his former
employer’s information in his new position; however, the case involved a noncompete agreement and therefore it was not necessary for the court to address the inevitable disclosure doctrine.144
In 2002, a federal district court did address the doctrine directly
and rejected it, stating: “Massachusetts law provides no basis for
an injunction without a showing of actual disclosure.” 145 As of
2003, a commentator summed up the state of the law by observing
that “no Massachusetts appellate court has ruled on the viability
of the inevitable disclosure doctrine, and the few Massachusetts
trial court decisions dealing with the doctrine have been decidedly
lukewarm about it.”146
Consistent with our general view stated at the outset of this
discussion, with respect to the inevitable disclosure doctrine, it
was actually California that was more protective of trade secret
holders. Any current differences can be dated either to 2008, the
year of the Edwards v Arthur Andersen LLP decision (insofar as
it signaled California courts’ likely rejection of any effort by plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief under the inevitable disclosure doctrine), or 2018, when the Massachusetts legislature adopted its
version of the UTSA. This gave rise to the same uncertainty that
arose following California’s adoption of the UTSA in 1984. Following the model statute, the Massachusetts version refers to
“threatened misappropriation,”147 which could provide a basis for
Massachusetts courts to adopt the inevitable disclosure doctrine,
although they may adopt California courts’ now-prevailing understanding that the “threatened misappropriation” language does

144

Marcam Corp v Orchard, 885 F Supp 294, 296–97 (D Mass 1995).
Safety-Kleen Systems, Inc v McGinn, 233 F Supp 2d 121, 124 (D Mass 2002).
146 See Laurence H. Reece III, Employee Noncompetition Agreements: Recent Developments and Trends, 88 Mass L Rev 24, 36 (2003).
147 Massachusetts Trade Secrets Act, Mass HR 4868, § 19 (cited in note 27) (providing
that “threatened misappropriation may be enjoined upon principles of equity, including
but not limited to consideration of prior party conduct and circumstances of potential use”).
145
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not imply endorsement of the inevitable disclosure doctrine. 148
While that particular point remains unresolved today, it is notable that practitioners have commented that acceptance by
Massachusetts courts of the inevitable disclosure doctrine would
run counter to those courts’ historical tendency to reject or at least
resist application of the doctrine.149
b) Noncompetes. During the time in which Silicon Valley
overtook Route 128, and continuing through the present, it is certainly the case that Massachusetts law, as compared to California
law, provided employers with a higher level of confidence in the
enforceability of noncompetes. But the differences should not be
exaggerated nor should it be assumed that Massachusetts employers have had unfettered ability to enforce noncompetes without constraint. Like almost all states, Massachusetts applies the
common-law reasonableness standard. This standard limits the
enforceable scope of a noncompete by duration, scope and geography, provided in all cases that the noncompete is deemed necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate business interests.150 For
this purpose, Massachusetts courts have defined the employer’s
legitimate interest narrowly. In a trilogy of cases decided in 1974,
the Massachusetts Supreme Court emphasized that noncompetes
were enforceable only to the extent required to protect the employer’s goodwill, trade secrets, or confidential information. 151
Massachusetts courts apparently took these constraints seriously: writing in 1991, a leading practitioner of trade secret law
observed that “Massachusetts courts have often refused to enforce
non-competition agreements on the ground that no trade secrets
or confidential business information were involved” and that “[i]n

148 For discussion, see Yekaterina Reyzis, One Step Away from Uniform: Taking a
Closer Look at Massachusetts’ New Trade Secrets Law (JDSupra, Nov 21, 2018), archived
at https://perma.cc/M472-MVPY.
149 See id (noting that Massachusetts courts “have long held that the inevitable disclosure doctrine hurts employer mobility and competition”); Andrew T. O’Connor, New
Massachusetts Trade Secret Laws Effective October 1, 2018 (In-House, Sept 12, 2018),
archived at https://perma.cc/834P-GUAN (noting that Massachusetts courts “were considered to have effectively rejected (or at least discredited) the ‘inevitable disclosure’
doctrine”).
150 Alexander & Alexander, Inc v Danahy, 488 NE2d 22, 29–30 (Mass App 1986); New
England Canteen Service, Inc v Ashley, 363 NE2d 526, 528 (Mass 1977); Analogic Corp v
Data Translation, Inc, 358 NE2d 804, 807 (Mass 1976); Marine Contractors Co, Inc v
Hurley, 310 NE2d 915, 920–21 (Mass 1974).
151 See All Stainless Inc v Colby, 308 NE2d 481, 485–86 (Mass 1974); Marine Contractors Co, 310 NE2d at 920; National Hearing Aid Centers, Inc v Avers, 311 NE2d 573, 576–
77 (Mass App 1974).
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numerous cases, Massachusetts courts have cut back restrictions
to make them reasonable.”152
Other obstacles stood in the way of a Massachusetts employer
who sought to enforce a noncompete. Since 1968, Massachusetts
courts have recognized the material change doctrine, which bars
enforcement of noncompetes if the employee’s position and salary
changed significantly since starting employment.153 In 1979 and
1982, the Massachusetts courts extended the reasonableness
standard to employment contracts that required employees to forfeit certain deferred compensation upon termination, on the
ground that these provisions implicitly operated as noncompetes.154 Additionally, Massachusetts courts have held that noncompete agreements are to be construed strictly in favor of the
employee and, relatedly, have declined to enforce noncompetes if
the contractual language has been deemed to be excessively ambiguous. 155 Contrary to the standard narrative, Massachusetts
courts during the decline of Route 128 were far from enthusiastic
about noncompetes and applied the common-law reasonableness
standard to limit their enforceability.
4. Did weak enforcement of noncompetes really cause the
Valley to rise?
The standard narrative correctly observes that Massachusetts
was an early pioneer of technological innovation. Ironically, the
Boston area essentially originated what is now viewed as the
Silicon Valley model consisting of a strong academic research
complex coupled with a robust venture capital community and
substantial movement of human capital among academia,
startups, and large firms. In 1946, a Boston firm (the American

152 Laurence H. Reece III, Employee Non-Competition Agreements and Related Restrictive Covenants: A Review and Analysis of Massachusetts Law, 76 Mass L Rev 2, 11–
12 (1991), citing National Hearing Aid Centers, 311 NE2d at 576–77 (denying injunctive
relief on ground that employee had not used any confidential information belonging to the
employer); Richmond Brothers, Inc v Westinghouse Broadcasting Co, Inc, 256 NE2d 304,
305–06 (Mass 1970) (declining to enforce noncompete on ground that employee’s success
was not attributable to employer’s trade secrets or confidential information).
153 F.A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co v Barrington, 233 NE2d 756, 758 (Mass 1968).
154 Kroeger v Stop & Shop Companies, Inc, 432 NE2d 566, 568, 571–72 (Mass App
1982); Cheney v Automatic Sprinkler Corp of America, 385 NE2d 961, 965 & n 7
(Mass 1979).
155 See, for example, Lanier Services, Inc v Ricci, 192 F3d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir 1999) (finding
that the term, “facilities management services,” was ambiguous as a matter of law, interpreting the phrase against the former employer as the drafting party, and declining to
enforce the noncompete). For discussion of additional cases during 1999–2002, see Reece,
88 Mass L Rev at 26 (cited in note 146).
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Research and Development Corporation, or ARD) established the
first major successful venture capital enterprise.156 Supported by
federal defense funding and local VC investors, MIT and Harvard
University labs spawned hundreds of spin-offs throughout the
1960s and 1970s.157 Those spin-offs included firms that later pioneered the “minicomputer”158 market such as Digital Equipment
Corporation (DEC) (founded in 1957 as a MIT startup with funding from ARD), Wang (founded by a Harvard physicist in the
1950s), Data General (founded in 1968 by ex-DEC engineers), and
Prime (founded in 1972 by engineers from Honeywell).159
Contrary to Saxenian’s account of cultural norms, Paul
Ceruzzi describes the most important Route 128 firm, DEC, as
having been characterized by a nonhierarchical engineer-driven
culture that dispensed with the formalities and bureaucracy of
incumbents such as IBM. 160 Certainly, as DEC and other large
Route 128 firms grew, they tended to adopt vertically integrated
structures.161 But it would be inaccurate to describe the Route 128
environment in its heyday as a monolithic industry consisting of
156

Saxenian, Regional Advantage at 15 (cited in note 8).
See id at 16–17; Martin Kenney and Urs von Burg, Technology, Entrepreneurship
and Path Dependence: Industrial Clustering in Silicon Valley and Route 128, 8 Indust &
Corp Change 67, 85–87 (1999); Edward B. Roberts, A Basic Study of Innovators; How to
Keep and Capitalize on Their Talents, 11 Rsrch Mgmt 249, 254–55 (1968).
158 The minicomputer refers to a class of computing devices that delivered computing
power at a significantly reduced cost (and physical size) relative to the mainframe market
(dominated by IBM). Advances in miniaturization and the development of the microprocessor yielded the “microcomputer” (equivalent to the modern PC), which delivered substantial computer power with a small physical “footprint,” thereby rendering obsolete the
minicomputer category. For discussion, see Paul E. Ceruzzi, A History of Modern Computing 124–26 (MIT 2d ed 2003).
159 See id at 127 (noting that DEC was founded in 1957 by former MIT researchers
with funding from ARD); id at 195 (stating that Data General was founded in 1968 by
three former DEC engineers); Saxenian, Regional Advantage at 18–19 (cited in note 8)
(noting that in 1951, An Wang, a scientist at Harvard, founded Wang Laboratories; in
1957, three scientists left Lincoln Labs to found DEC; in 1968, Edson DeCastro left DEC
to found Data General; in 1972, William Poduska left Honeywell to found Prime); Kenney
and von Burg, 8 Indust & Corp Change at 85–86 (cited in note 157) (noting that in 1957,
Kenneth Olsen, a former MIT researcher, founded DEC with a capital investment from
ARD); Lynn E. Browne and Steven Sass, The Transition from a Mill-Based to a KnowledgeBased Economy: New England, 1940–2000, in Peter Temin, ed, Engines of Enterprise: An
Economic History of New England 211–12 (Harvard 2000).
160 See Ceruzzi, A History of Modern Computing at 138 (cited in note 158) (“DEC represented everything that was liberating about computers, while IBM, with its dress code
and above all its punched card, represented everything that had gone wrong.”).
161 See Kenney and von Burg, 8 Indust & Corp Change at 86–87 (cited in note 157)
(stating that many minicomputer pioneers in the Route 128 area integrated vertically in
order to reduce turnaround time and protect chip designs); Sarah Kuhn, Computer Manufacturing in New England: Structure, Location and Labor in a Growing Industry 29–33
(Joint Center for Urban Studies of MIT and Harvard University 1982).
157
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a handful of vertically integrated incumbents. Although DEC and
three other Route 128 firms (plus IBM) dominated the minicomputer segment in the late 1970s and early 1980s,162 observers and
studies systematically documented that those firms spawned a
continuing flow of small-firm spin-offs. 163 An interview-based
study of twenty-two Massachusetts-based computer firms between 1965 and 1975 found that half of the firms’ products “were
the result of direct technology transfer from previous employers
and another quarter indirect transfer.”164 A study of patent coauthoring patterns found similarly that Boston innovators were regularly involved in information exchange networks that were comparable in robustness (but not size) to those in Silicon Valley.165
In a manner akin to accounts of Silicon Valley, qualitative
histories observe that Route 128 spin-offs could procure necessary inputs from a disaggregated network of small- to mediumsize component producers and suppliers, assemblers, and distributors.166 A history of the period concludes: “[C]ompanies spinning

162 See Nancy S. Dorfman, Massachusetts’ High Technology Boom in Perspective: An
Investigation of Its Dimensions, Causes and of the Role of New Firms 2–4 (MIT Center for
Policy Alternatives 1982).
163 See Michael H. Best, The New Competitive Advantage: The Renewal of American
Industry 129–30 (Oxford 2001) (describing “genealogies” of firm spin-offs from entrepreneurial “parent” firms in various technology segments of the Route 128 area); Susan
Rosegrant and David R. Lampe, Route 128: Lessons from Boston’s High-Tech Community
153–57 (Basic Books 1992); Dorfman, 12 Rsrch Pol at 310–11 (cited in note 79) (noting
that DEC, the leading technology firm in the Boston area, had spawned multiple spin-offs,
and that most new technology firms in the Boston area were founded by former employees
of other firms or research laboratories); Elaine Romanelli, New Venture Strategies in the
Minicomputer Industry, 30 Cal Mgmt Rev 160, 167 (1987) (observing that, during the
1960s and 1970s, almost sixty new minicomputer firms were formed, principally by engineers who had worked for DEC and other major minicomputer manufacturers); Roberts,
11 Rsrch Mgmt at 252 (cited in note 157) (observing that thirty-nine companies had been
formed during the 1960s by forty-four former employees of one Boston area electronics firm).
164 See Dorfman, 12 Rsrch Pol at 310, 316 n 40 (cited in note 79) (describing a 1977
study by the MIT Center for Policy Alternatives).
165 See Lee Fleming, et al, Why the Valley Went First: Agglomeration and Emergence
in Regional Inventor Networks *29–30 (working paper, Feb 2003), archived at https://
perma.cc/4MA2-KZ5U.
166 See Franz Tödtling, Regional Networks of High-Technology Firms—The Case of
the Greater Boston Region, 14 Technovation 323, 330 (1994) (describing regional network
in Boston area comprising electronics, component and software firms, some of which act
as “suppliers or subcontractors to the [large] minicomputer firms”); AnnaLee Saxenian, In
Search of Power: The Organization of Business Interests in Silicon Valley and Route 128,
18 Econ & Society 25, 45 (1989) (stating that “research laboratories and firms producing
components and services for each other co-located, and cross-fertilizations between the
academic world, the federal government and local industry fuelled an ongoing expansion
of technologically innovative activity in the [Route 128] region”); Dorfman, 12 Rsrch Pol
at 306 (cited in note 79) (stating that the Boston area provides technology firms with access to a network of parts and components suppliers, “all particularly critical to new
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off from other companies were at the very heart of the monumental growth that the Route 128 area experienced from the 1960s
through the 1980s.”167
On the West Coast, Silicon Valley pioneered innovations in
the semiconductor field and, by the late 1970s, was the recognized
leader.168 Historical accounts of Silicon Valley’s semiconductor industry typically attribute its origins to the departure in 1957 of
leading engineers from Shockley Transistors to form Fairchild
Semiconductor, which generated a sequence of leading semiconductor firms.169 Semiconductor chips are a critical component in a
wide array of computing and electronics products and operated as
a launching pad for Silicon Valley to achieve dominance in information technology more generally.170 Even after lower-cost Japanese producers in the 1980s undermined the local memory chip
production industry, Silicon Valley adapted by shifting resources
to the design and development of customized chips 171 and developing strengths in hardware and software markets. By contrast,
the Massachusetts minicomputer industry did not recover as
quickly from the entry of lower-cost workstations and personal
computers.172 Massachusetts had bet on the wrong horse and was
unable to recover the lead.
Unlike the legal literature, the economic history and business
management literature shows no consensus view as to the factors
that best explain why Silicon Valley overtook Route 128 as an information technology center. Starting with Gilson, the legal literature has focused on the explanation advocated by Saxenian, who

start-ups that are developing prototypes and to manufacturers of customized equipment
for small markets”).
167 See Rosegrant and Lampe, Route 128 at 154 (cited in note 163).
168 See Kenney and von Burg, 8 Indust & Corp Change at 68, 80–85 (cited in note 157).
169 See Ceruzzi, A History of Modern Computing at 198 (cited in note 158).
170 See Kenney and von Burg, 8 Indust & Corp Change at 78 (cited in note 157) (“In
the postwar electronics industry, transistors and then integrated circuits were an enabling
technology for nearly every important electronic innovation.”).
171 See AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional Networks and the Resurgence of Silicon Valley,
33 Cal Mgmt Rev 89, 89–95 (1990) (describing how firms that specialize in the design of
customized chips and outsource production enabled Silicon Valley to recover after Japanese firms entered the general-purpose semiconductor markets).
172 See Ceruzzi, A History of Modern Computing at 304–06 (cited in note 158) (describing how minicomputer companies based in the Boston area failed to adapt to the PC
revolution); Kenney and von Burg, 8 Indust & Corp Change at 87 (cited in note 157) (stating that the minicomputer industry could not compete with “workstations” that offered
comparable computing power at a substantially lower price); Richard N. Langlois, Organizing the Electronic Century, in Giovanni Dosi and Louis Galambos, eds, The Third Industrial Revolution in Global Business 119, 155 (Cambridge 2013) (same).
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attributed this development to cultural norms and vertically integrated structures that constrained the flow of intellectual capital.173 However, the business management and economic history
literature is far less monolithic and identifies other salient reasons why Silicon Valley may have overtaken Massachusetts. Most
commonly, these scholars identify factors such as the draw of
warm weather, luck (in particular, Shockley Transistors’ choice
to locate in the Bay Area, which then gave rise to the Fairchild
spin-off),174 and, most compellingly, the fact that Silicon Valley
had achieved leadership in a general-purpose technology
(namely, the microprocessor pioneered by Intel in the 1970s) that
could be applied to a wide variety of industrial, business, and consumer markets.175 By contrast, the leading Massachusetts firms
in the late 1970s and early 1980s had focused on developing specialized minicomputer and other technologies targeted for technical and industrial users.176 Hence, once-pioneering Massachusetts
firms such as DEC tended to focus on technologies that would service existing markets for technical and industrial users, rather
than developing innovations—such as the personal computer—
that would open up new and much larger markets in the corporate, small business, and home segments.177
This is not to say that East Coast firms were innovation laggards as compared to their West Coast counterparts. After all, it
was IBM, headquartered in New York State, that in 1981
launched the personal computer, which precipitated the movement from closed “end-to-end” hardware systems to modular

173

See note 8.
In the words of Intel’s cofounder: “[L]uck played a role in nearly every component
of this story of semiconductors and the birth of Silicon Valley.” See Gordon Moore and
Kevin Davis, Learning the Silicon Valley Way, in Timothy Bresnahan and Alfonso
Gambardella, eds, Building High-Tech Clusters: Silicon Valley and Beyond 7, 36
(Cambridge 2004).
175 See Kenney and von Burg, 8 Indust & Corp Change at 80 (cited in note 157) (noting
that “the semiconductor found a far greater variety of applications than did the minicomputer” and “the semiconductor was important because it made so many other products
possible”).
176 See id (noting that Route 128 specialized in the minicomputer, which was a finished product, rather than a component that could be used to assemble other products);
Dorfman, Massachusetts’ High Technology Boom in Perspective at 2–4 (cited in note 162).
177 See Kenney and von Burg, 8 Indust & Corp Change at 87 (cited in note 157) (noting
the common observation that Route 128 firms such as DEC failed to appreciate the threat
posed by workstations and microcomputers, the precursors to the desktop personal computer); Ceruzzi, A History of Modern Computing at 243–45 (cited in note 158) (noting
DEC’s choice to focus on high-performance and larger computers rather than smaller and
less expensive personal computers).
174
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“plug-and-play” hardware systems as the standard product architecture in the computing market.178 That East Coast innovation
in turn led to the aforementioned decline of DEC, Wang, and
other leading Massachusetts minicomputer firms that operated
under closed models in which customers purchased all components from a single firm.179 IBM’s success is attributable in part
to its then-novel decision to outsource design and production of
many of the PC’s components—most notably, the operating system (to Microsoft) and the microprocessor (to Intel)—as well as
its inadvertent commoditization of the PC’s hardware. 180 But
these were strategies that could have been taken by a firm like
DEC, which had previously made pioneering contributions to
computing technology. In fact, DEC attempted to do just that. In
1988, IBM and DEC collaborated to establish the Open Software
Foundation, an effort to develop OS/2, a nonproprietary operating
system intended to challenge Microsoft’s Windows system.181 Similarly, some of DEC’s Route 128 peers responded (albeit, somewhat belatedly) to the decline of the minicomputer by adopting
alternative organizational structures.182 Moreover, two Route 128
firms launched the first commercially successful spreadsheet applications (Visicalc, released in 1979, and Lotus 1-2-3, released in
1984),183 which are recognized as key factors in the widespread
adoption of the Mac and PC, respectively.184 Hence, there does not
seem to be any compelling reason to attribute the decline of DEC
and other leading Massachusetts firms substantially to cultural
norms or vertically integrated forms of industrial organization.
A similar observation complicates Gilson’s argument that
Massachusetts’s willingness to enforce noncompetes suppressed
labor mobility, which hindered the region’s innovative performance. Critically, this argument fails to contemplate that
178

See Langlois, Organizing the Electronic Century at 153–54 (cited in note 172).
See Best, The New Competitive Advantage at 122 (cited in note 163) (observing
that dominant Route 128 firms such as DEC and Wang offered “closed architecture” systems). See also Kenney and von Burg, 8 Indust & Corp Change at 87 (cited in note 157)
(noting that Wang had dismissed the commercial importance of personal computers).
180 See Ceruzzi, A History of Modern Computing at 277–78 (cited in note 158); Kenney
and von Burg, 8 Indust & Corp Change at 96 (cited in note 157).
181 See Glenn Rifkin and George Harrar, The Ultimate Entrepreneur: The Story of Ken
Olsen and Digital Equipment Corporation chs 24–25 (Contemporary Books 1988); John
Steffens, Newgames: Strategic Competition in the PC Revolution 183–84, 222–23
(Pergamon 1994).
182 See Tödtling, 14 Technovation at 332 (cited in note 166).
183 See M. Mitchell Waldrop, The Origins of Personal Computing, 285 Scientific Am
84, 90 (Dec 2001).
184 See James A. Sena, The PC Evolution and Diaspora, CrossTalk 23 (Mar/Apr 2012);
Langlois, Organizing the Electronic Century at 152 (cited in note 172).
179
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Route 128 firms could have chosen not to request or enforce
noncompetes if competitive pressures in the labor market drove
them to do so. Gilson argues that collective-action pressures precluded that possibility.185 But there is compelling evidence that
Route 128 firms sometimes, if not typically, elected to forgo adoption and enforcement of noncompetes. Contemporary accounts in
the early 1980s observed that Route 128 was characterized by frequent spin-offs,186 talented engineers often left their employees to
form start-ups, and large incumbents were typically parents of
multiple spin-off firms. 187 One observer records that Route 128
firms tolerated or even welcomed the movement of technical personnel because they “value[d] the knowledge they obtain[ed] by
hiring employees from other firms more than they fear[ed] the
loss of proprietary information,”188 and that entrepreneurs often
conceived of ideas “in the lab of an employer.” 189 That same
observer noted that “[n]ew and expanding firms hire[d] their
‘know how’ by bidding experienced employees away from competing firms.”190
These accounts make no mention of the use of noncompetes
to restrain employee turnover. Rather, firms attempted to retain
valued employees by offering superior terms and more interesting
work191—something that would have been unnecessary if noncompetes were legally potent. The lesson seems clear: when technical

185

See Gilson, 74 NYU L Rev at 596 (cited in note 8).
See David A. Garvin, Spin-Offs and the New Firm Formation Process, 25 Cal Mgmt
Rev 3, 3 (1983) (observing that, as of the early 1980s, in both Silicon Valley and Route 128,
new firms are continuously being formed through “spin-offs” founded by “individuals leaving an existing firm in the same industry”).
187 See Rosegrant and Lampe, Route 128 at 29, 153–57 (cited in note 163); Dorfman,
Massachusetts’ High Technology Boom in Perspective at 69 (cited in note 162). Professor
Sarah Kuhn observes as follows: (i) “[s]ome firms prefer to hire away employees of other
computer manufacturing firms,” Kuhn, Computer Manufacturing in New England at 72
(cited in note 161); (ii) Route 128 has “an unusually high turnover rate among its technical
employees, see id at 124–25, and (iii) Route 128 firms provided survey responses indicating heavy reliance on hiring employees from competitors, see id at 125. Similarly, Nancy
Dorfman remarks that the Route 128 area is characterized by a start-up entrepreneurial
culture in which firms bid away experienced employees from competitors. See Dorfman,
12 Rsrch Pol at 308 (cited in note 79). She further observed that “scientists repeatedly
leave their employers to commercialize and market new products whose concepts they
helped to develop in the laboratory of a former employer” and it is a “challenge to find new
enterprises whose founders did not come from an academic laboratory or another high tech
firm.” See id at 310.
188 See Dorfman, Massachusetts’ High Technology Boom in Perspective at 9 (cited in
note 162).
189 See id at 69.
190 See Dorfman, 12 Rsrch Pol at 308 (cited in note 79).
191 See Kuhn, Computer Manufacturing in New England at 125 (cited in note 161).
186
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talent is scarce and market demand for that talent is high, bargaining leverage shifts to employees and differences in the enforceability of noncompetes make little practical difference. Any
employer who sought to enforce a noncompete would be punished
in the labor market.192
To be certain, there is no comprehensive quantitative evidence on noncompete usage and enforcement during this historical period. However, in more recent times—notably, after California
substantially ratcheted up its aversion to noncompetes in 2008 in
Edwards—Massachusetts and California have exhibited similar
rates of employee noncompete usage, even among wholly in-state
firms, according to the most comprehensive survey conducted to
date.193 Thus, it seems unlikely that during the historical period
in question—when Massachusetts and California noncompete
law were more similar than today—that the rate of noncompete
usage and enforcement between the two states substantially
differed.
There may be an additional material factor behind Silicon
Valley’s ascendance, which existing scholarship has overlooked.
In 1979, the Department of Labor modified the “prudence rule” to
permit pension fund trustees to invest in venture capital.194 Based
on this signal from federal regulators, state pension fund trustees
took the view that it would be consistent with their fiduciary obligations to invest an appropriate portion of a fund’s assets in venture capital and other high-risk “alternative” investments.195 This
change triggered a dramatic inflow of capital into VC investments

192 Of course, monopsonistic labor markets exist, and assuming the predicate conditions for firm coordination in this context are satisfied—small number of employers with
large market share, comparable employment positions, observable compensation, and a
credible mechanism to punish defections—employers can credibly impose and enforce noncompetes. For discussion, see Todd v Exxon Corp, 275 F3d 191, 201–02, 207–14 (2d Cir
2001). However, we have no reason to believe that these challenging conditions were satisfied in the labor markets for highly skilled technical workers in the Route 128 area during this historical period, especially given evidence that this area was characterized by
frequent spin-offs during this period. See notes 163–67 and accompanying text.
193 Starr, Prescott, and Bishara, Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force at *45 fig 8
(cited in note 11).
194 Department of Labor, Rules and Regulations for Fiduciary Responsibility; Investment of Plan Assets Under the “Prudence” Rule, 44 Fed Reg 37221–22 (1979), amending
29 CFR § 2550.404a-1.
195 See Paul A. Gompers and Josh Lerner, What Drives Venture Capital Fundraising?
155 (Brookings Institution 1998).
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and, by the late 1980s, the emergence of pension funds as the single largest investor class in VC funds.196 Presumably, the same is
true of California pension funds’ increase in VC investment at
approximately the same time, given that CalPERS, the principal
California state pension fund, followed the lead of the
Department of Labor and directed assets toward venture capital
funds, formally establishing an Alternative Investment Management program for this purpose in 1990.197 Like other state pension
funds (including Massachusetts), California state pension funds
exhibit a significant in-state bias in their investments in VC and
private equity funds.198 VC funds in turn exhibit an in-state bias
in the selection of portfolio firms.199 The much larger size of the
California pension system, combined with the in-state biases of
California state pension fund managers and California VC principals, implies that Silicon Valley startups likely had access to a
much larger pool of capital than Boston-based startups.200

196 See id at 155–56, 163–66 (observing that change in the Department of Labor’s
“prudent man rule” led to investment in venture capital funds by pension funds, which
became the primary source of capital for these funds).
197 See CalPERS Private Equity Investments Infuse Billions into California Businesses; Portfolio Is Positioned to Capitalize on Buying Opportunities (Business Wire, Oct
17, 2003), archived at https://perma.cc/4C74-L6R5 (noting the establishment by CalPERS
of Alternative Investment Management Program in 1990 as a vehicle for investing in private equity).
198 See Yael V. Hochberg and Joshua D. Rauh, Local Overweighting and Underperformance: Evidence from Limited Partner Private Equity Investments, 26 Rev Fin Stud
403, 414–25 (2013).
199 See Adam Lichtenstein, Home-State Investment Bias in Venture Capital Funds,
62 Fin Analysts J 22, 23–24 (2006). For further evidence that venture capital funds favor
investments in geographically proximate regions, see Claudia B. Schoonhoven and
Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Regions as Industrial Incubators, in Edwin S. Mills and John F.
McDonald, eds, Sources of Metropolitan Growth 210, 244–45 (Transaction 2012).
200 Although data is not available from the time period in question, to get a sense of
the sums involved, consider that, during 2007–2014, CalPERS has held between 8.5 percent and 13.5 percent of its private equity investments in California-based firms. In 2014,
it held $31.5 billion of private equity investments, of which 11.5 percent was invested in
California-based firms. See CalPERS, CALPERS Comprehensive Annual Financial Report
*52, 100 (FY 2014); CalPERS, CALPERS Comprehensive Annual Financial Report *92
(FY 2010); California State Controller’s Office, CALPERS Comprehensive Annual Financial Report *83 (FY 2009); CalPERS, CALPERS Comprehensive Annual Financial Report
*86, 89 (FY 2008). Private equity includes VC investments as well as other investments
in firms that are not publicly traded. The Massachusetts Pension Reserves Investment
Trust Fund, which manages private equity investments on behalf of the Massachusetts
state pension system, reported that, as of June 2014, it held $6.9 billion in investments in
private equity, of which $1.4 billion was invested in venture capital. See Massachusetts
Pension Reserves Investment Trust Fund, Comprehensive Annual Financial Report *35
(2014). The report does not disclose what portion of those funds were allocated to
Massachusetts-based investment funds, although it does indicate that 27 percent of its
private equity investments were made outside the US. See id at *84. Hence, it is extremely

1006

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:953

5. Did Massachusetts really decline?
The traditional narrative relies both on the rise of Silicon Valley as a center of innovation in the electronics industry and the
decline of Route 128. While it is correct that Silicon Valley has
achieved a uniquely preeminent position, this narrative overstates both Massachusetts’s relative historical prominence as a
technology center and its relative retreat from that position in
more recent decades.
While Route 128 was an historical pioneer in the IT industry
since World War II, the period during which it was clearly a dominant center was a short period limited to the height of the minicomputer market during the late 1970s and early 1980s.201 Even
during that time, there was no single, overwhelmingly dominant
innovation center akin to Silicon Valley’s place today. Relative to
the Boston area’s important, but less than preeminent, position
as of the early 1980s, it does not appear to have suffered a permanent decline in innovative performance since the collapse of the
minicomputer industry.202 Rather, the Boston area has recovered
its place as a leading regional innovation center, even if it no
longer rivals Silicon Valley in the IT market. Multiple innovation
metrics provide suggestive evidence in support of this view. During 1985–2013, the Bay Area held and expanded its lead in the
volume of VC investments while the New England region consistently occupied the second- or third-place position.203 From 1987
through 2011, Massachusetts maintained consistently high levels
of business-funded R&D intensity (defined as R&D funded by
businesses as a percentage of “gross state product”) in a range of
approximately 3–4 percent, outperforming California in all years
but one.204 From 1997 through 2016, California and Massachusetts

unlikely that Massachusetts pension fund managers invested more capital in Massachusetts-based VC firms, as compared to CalPERS’s investments in California-based VC
firms.
201 See Best, The New Competitive Advantage at 120 (cited in note 163).
202 See id at 126–27.
203 National Venture Capital Association, Yearbook *35–37 fig 3.08–09 (Thomson
Reuters, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/Y5G3-6DJA.
204 Authors’ calculations, based on (i) data on state-level R&D expenditures extracted
on an alternating year basis from the National Center for Science and Engineering
Statistics, Industrial Research and Development Information System (National Science
Foundation, July 2011), archived at https://perma.cc/82ZP-4YS2, and (ii) data on “gross
state product” available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Comprehensive Revision
of Gross State Product, 1977–2002, and Accelerated GSP Estimates for 2003 (US
Department of Commerce, Dec 15, 2004), archived at https://perma.cc/28C3-RCTV. With
respect to item (i), we excluded federal R&D expenditures in order to avoid reflecting any
federal subsidies that might understate regional markets’ ability to sustain innovation.
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have appeared every year among the top three states in terms of
business-performed R&D intensity (defined as R&D performed by
businesses as a percentage of “private-industry output”).205 After
the San Francisco area, the Boston area is the second-most popular location in the US that companies select for their primary
R&D center (selected by 230 firms as of 2011, compared to 380
firms for San Francisco).206
The Boston area has preserved or regained a significant presence in biotechnology and the life sciences, computer systems design, telecommunications equipment, data storage, technical instruments, and industry-oriented software tools. 207 In fact, the
success of the Boston area as a technology cluster since the collapse of the minicomputer industry has now lasted longer than
the period during which DEC and its peers were dominant.208 Notwithstanding Massachusetts’s formal tolerance of noncompetes,
multiple leading firms in various information technology sectors
have spawned a steady flow of new firms providing complementary products and services.209 In the life sciences (including biotechnology) and medical devices sector in particular, the Boston
area is especially prominent (in 2015, biotech firms based in New
England raised approximately $10.6 billion from outside investors, while biotech firms based in the San Francisco Bay Area
raised approximately $6.5 billion). 210 Trade and scholarly commentary typically situates the Boston area among a triplet of

205 National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, Industrial Research and
Development Information System (cited in note 204).
206 Raymond Wolfe and Brandon Shackelford, 2011 Data Show U.S. Business R&D
Highly Concentrated by State and Metropolitan Location (National Science Foundation,
Aug 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/NJC9-TAJU.
207 See Best, The New Competitive Advantage at 126, 127–48, 154, 157 (cited in note
163) (describing “resurgence” of Route 128 area as the local technology industry transitioned from vertically integrated to an “open system . . . model of industrial organization”);
Michael Best, Albert Paquin, and Hao Xie, Discovering Regional Competitive Advantage:
Massachusetts High-Tech, 2 Bus & Econ Hist On-Line 1, 2, 7–21 (2004), archived at
https://perma.cc/C6X4-7HAN (describing “resurgence” of the Boston area as an innovation
center in the 1990s and providing extensive data showing that the Boston area continues
to excel in its historical strengths in complex systems software and engineering); Jason S.
Wood, A Comparison of the Enforceability of Covenants Not To Compete and Recent Economic Histories of Four High-Technology Regions, 5 Va J L & Tech 14, ¶ 38 (2000) (noting
that, contrary to “Gilson’s dark portrait of Massachusetts’ lack of knowledge spillover effects, the greater Boston area, including Route 128, has recovered nicely from the dark
days of the 1980s and early 1990s, and has been a leader in the technology revolution of
the mid and late-1990s”).
208 See Best, The New Competitive Advantage at 121 (cited in note 163).
209 See id at 129–30.
210 See Beyond Borders 2016: Biotech Financing *15 (Ernst & Young, 2016), archived
at https://perma.cc/C3SS-4CZZ.
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leading biotechnology clusters along with the Bay Area and San
Diego,211 in some cases ranking it as the leader among those three
locations.212 As of 2015, the Massachusetts Biotechnology Council
stated that Massachusetts employed more personnel in biotechnology R&D than any other state and an MIT report found that,
on a per capita basis, Massachusetts received significantly more
funding ($351 per capita) from the National Institutes of Health
than California ($88 per capita).213 During 2012–2014, San Francisco firms received each quarter approximately 30–50 percent of
funding in the national life sciences industry, while Boston firms
received each quarter approximately 20–40 percent of funding.214
On a state-to-state level comparison, it may be surprising to
learn that Massachusetts and California do not materially differ
by multiple measures of innovative health. The State Technology
and Science Index, which ranks states’ innovation capacities by
various objective measures, has ranked Massachusetts in first
place since the index was inaugurated in 2002 and through its
latest release in 2018.215 In 2018, California ranked fourth, after
having held fourth, third, and third places in 2016, 2014, and
2012, respectively.216 According to the State New Economy Index,
both California and Massachusetts are among the country’s leading states on multiple innovation measures (reflecting data as of
the years 2012 through 2016), including:
(i)

industry-funded R&D as a percentage of total state GDP (CA:
2.5 percent (ranked third); MA: 2.1 percent (ranked fourth));

211 See Shiri M. Breznitz and William P. Anderson, Boston Metropolitan Area Biotechnology Cluster, 28 Can J Regional Sci 249, 249 (2005) (noting that Boston, San Diego, and
the San Francisco Bay Area “account for a disproportionately high share of total employment and investment” in the US biotechnology industry); Toby Stuart and Olav Sorenson,
The Geography of Opportunity: Spatial Heterogeneity in Founding Rates and the Performance of Biotechnology Firms, 32 Rsrch Pol 229, 236–37, 249 (2003) (showing that for the
period 1983–1995, the Boston area, Southern California, and Northern California exhibited the largest number of new biotechnology firms).
212 Clusterluck: Boston’s Biotech Hub Is Surviving the Challenge from Silicon Valley
(The Economist, Jan 16, 2016), online at https://www.economist.com/business/2016/
01/16/clusterluck (visited Feb 17, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable).
213 See id.
214 See Biotech Funding Surges *6 fig 13 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Feb 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/23MW-BQEK.
215 Massachusetts: State Technology and Science Index (Milken Institute, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/WYZ4-AVL6.
216 See 2018 State Technology and Science Index: State Overall Ranking (Milken
Institute, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/7Z7D-EQX5.

2020]

The Case for Noncompetes

1009

(ii) patents awarded to companies per one thousand privatesector workers (CA: 14.6 (ranked thirteenth); MA: 15.7
(ranked ninth));
(iii) venture capital invested as a percentage of state GDP
(CA: 1.28 percent (ranked first); MA: 1.27 percent (ranked
second)); and
(iv) employment in high-technology industries as a percentage
of total private-sector employment (CA: 6.8 percent
(ranked fifth); MA: 7.9 percent (ranked first)).217
B. Empirical Studies: Noncompetes, Mobility, and Innovation
Even if the Silicon Valley / Route 128 narrative were more
robust, it would be imprudent to base any policy conclusions on a
single historical example. While Japan was once widely viewed as
a model of a successful innovation economy, a regime characterized by lifetime job security and oligopolistic market structures
would hardly be viewed today as an attractive innovation ecosystem. 218 Recently, empirical and experimental researchers have
sought to move beyond the Silicon Valley example and, in doing
so, have produced a sizeable body of studies concerning the effect
of noncompetes on labor mobility and, in some cases, innovation.
Unlike the literature that relies on the Silicon Valley / Route 128
narrative, these studies usefully apply formal methods to a broad
sample of state jurisdictions, seeking to exploit interstate differences, or intrastate changes in, the legal treatment of noncompetes to identify the effects of such differences and changes on
employee turnover and certain innovation indicators.
These studies fall into two categories. The larger category addresses only or principally whether noncompetes (or specifically,
the enforceability of noncompetes) reduce labor mobility. In a
companion paper, we review these studies comprehensively and
provide a detailed discussion of the contributions and limitations
of the most widely cited studies.219 In that review, we describe significant methodological limitations and identify factual errors
217 The 2017 State New Economy Index *10, 44, 47, 50 (Information Technology &
Innovation Foundation, Nov 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/B8R7-CXAV.
218 On the folly of these once-popular views, see Brink Lindsey and Aaron Lukas, Revisiting the “Revisionists”: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese Economic Model (Cato Institute, July 31, 1998), archived at https://perma.cc/3GZN-SDGH.
219 See Jonathan M. Barnett and Ted Sichelman, Revisiting Labor Mobility in Innovation Markets *12–29 (USC Gould School of Law Center for Law and Social Science Research Paper Series No CLASS16-13, May 26, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/V2T9-6UGC.
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concerning important points of state law. These shortcomings
cast serious doubt on these studies’ claims purporting to show a
broad causal relationship between the enforcement of noncompetes and reduced labor mobility. For purposes of the review below, however, we will accept as given the findings of this first category of studies—that is, we will assume that the enforceability
of noncompetes has some significant incremental effect on labor
mobility. This assumption will enable us to focus our review below
on a second and smaller group of studies that address the more
fundamental question whether the enforceability of noncompetes
has a detrimental effect on innovation.
1. Nonexperimental studies.
Several empirical studies have sought to test for a relationship between noncompetes, employee mobility, and innovation.
Here, we address in detail four of the studies that scholars and
policymakers have most heavily cited and relied upon. First, a
2003 study by Professors Toby Stuart and Olav Sorenson (the
“Stuart and Sorenson study”) examined biotechnology startups
founded in the wake of an initial public offering (IPO) or acquisition of a previous company, finding a significant inverse relationship between in-state noncompete enforceability and overall
startup formation. Specifically, in the absence of state-level fixed
effects, the authors find that “states with weak non-compete regimes realize 217 percent higher founding rates than those that
enforce non-compete covenants.” 220 Additionally, taking account
for state-fixed effects, Stuart and Sorenson find that the median
IPO “occurring in . . . a weak enforcement state increases the
founding rate [of new biotech firms] . . . by 26 percent.”221 Second,
a 2011 study by Professor Mark Garmaise (the “Garmaise study”)
found that stronger noncompete enforceability, interacted with a
measure of in-state competition, tends to suppress R&D spending
and that increased enforceability reduces capital investment per
Our analysis in that paper focuses on the most widely cited studies, which include: Matt
Marx, Jasjit Singh, and Lee Fleming, Regional Disadvantage? Employee Non-compete
Agreements and Brain Drain, 44 Rsrch Pol 394 (2015); Garmaise, 27 J L Econ & Org 376
(cited in note 63); Matt Marx, Deborah Strumsky, and Lee Fleming, Mobility, Skills, and
the Michigan Non-compete Experiment, 55 Mgmt Sci 875 (2009); Bruce Fallick, Charles A.
Fleischman, and James B. Rebitzer, Job-Hopping in Silicon Valley: Some Evidence
Concerning the Microfoundations of a High-Technology Cluster, 88 Rev Econ & Stat
472 (2006).
220 See Toby Stuart and Olav Sorenson, Liquidity Events and the Geographic Distribution of Entrepreneurial Activity, 48 Admin Sci Q 175, 193 (2003).
221 Id at 195.
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employee. 222 Third, a 2011 study by Professors Sampsa Samila
and Olav Sorenson (the “Samila and Sorenson study”) found that
states that enforce noncompetes dampen the effects of venture
capital investment on firm formation and patenting rates. 223
Based on these findings, Samila and Sorenson conclude that the
enforceability of noncompetes “significantly impedes entrepreneurship and employment growth.” 224 Fourth, a 2015 study by
Professors Matt Marx, Jasjit Singh, and Lee Fleming (the “Marx
et al. study”) found a “brain drain” of inventors from Michigan to
states that do not enforce noncompetes after 1985, the year in
which Michigan law restored the enforceability of noncompetes.225
Moreover, the Marx et al. study found that this effect was strongest for more highly skilled inventors.226 We now address substantial limitations and, in some cases, outright flaws of these studies.
Although we do not have space to address every study examining
the relationship between noncompetes and innovation, our critique applies to the vast majority of lesser-cited studies on the
issue.
a) Improper characterization of how strongly states enforce
noncompetes. First, all four of these studies, as well as many
other studies, oversimplify and largely misjudge the variation in
the strength of state-by-state enforcement of noncompetes. Specifically, these studies classify strength of enforcement either
(1) in a binary fashion as “enforcing” or “non-enforcing” states,
developed from the study by Stuart and Sorenson; or (2) according
to a twelve-factor scale developed by Garmaise.227
Specifically, Stuart and Sorenson classify each state as “nonenforcing” or “enforcing.”228 They identify six states that, during
the period 1985–1996, purportedly “preclude[d] the enforcement
of all noncompete agreements” and five states that “only
enforce[d] non-compete covenants under very specific circumstances.”229 These eleven states are considered nonenforcing.230 In

222

See Garmaise, 27 J L Econ & Org at 408–10 (cited in note 63).
See Samila and Sorenson, 57 Mgmt Sci at 432, 436 (cited in note 9).
224 See id at 425.
225 See Marx, Singh, and Fleming, 44 Rsrch Pol at 397 (cited in note 219).
226 See id at 402. Inventive skill is measured by the number of citations to an inventor’s patents.
227 See Garmaise, 27 J L Econ & Org at 421–22 (cited in note 63); Stuart and
Sorenson, 48 Admin Sci Q at 190 (cited in note 220).
228 Stuart and Sorenson, 48 Admin Sci Q at 190 (cited in note 220).
229 Id (emphasis added).
230 Id.
223
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contrast, they identify twenty-six enforcing states that purportedly placed “no restrictions” on the enforcement of noncompetes,
as well as thirteen other nonenforcing states that followed a “reasonable[ness]” approach or enforced noncompetes limited in time
or space.231 The Samila and Sorenson study as well as the Marx
et al. study both rely on Stuart and Sorenson’s classification system for their analyses.232
This binary approach is inherently inaccurate—all states enforce some noncompete provisions and no states enforce all noncompete provisions. Other than California, North Dakota, and
Oklahoma (until 1989), all states during that time period essentially adopted a reasonableness approach to the enforcement of
noncompetes, subject to variation in application.233
Even if one were to draw an arbitrary line between states, it
would result in at most two nonenforcing states during this time
period. Consistent with both Professor Norman Bishara’s comprehensive state-by-state review234 and our own independent review,
we find that during the relevant time periods, other than California
and North Dakota, none of the purported nonenforcing states in
the Stuart and Sorenson study—namely, Alaska, Connecticut,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma, Washington,
and West Virginia—can plausibly be classified in this manner.
It appears that Stuart and Sorenson primarily examined the
language of specific state statutes as reproduced in the 1996 edition of the Malsberger treatise on state enforcement of covenants
not to compete,235 without carefully reviewing the descriptions of
actual case law in the same treatise. Critically, any state’s effective noncompete regime cannot be accurately described without
taking into account both applicable statutes and judicial interpretation of those statutes. Montana is a case in point. Apparently
on the basis of the Montana statute voiding “contracts in restraint

231

Id (emphasis added).
Samila and Sorenson, 57 Mgmt Sci at 430 (cited in note 9); Marx, Singh, and
Fleming, 44 Rsrch Pol at 396 n 2 (cited in note 219).
233 See Brian Malsberger, Covenants Not to Compete: A State-by-State Survey xxv
(BNA Books 2004) (“Malsberger 2004”); Brian Malsberger, Covenants Not to Compete: A
State-by-State Survey xxiii (BNA Books 1996) (“Malsberger 1996”); Norman D. Bishara,
Fifty Ways to Leave Your Employer: Relative Enforcement of Covenants Not to Compete,
Trends, and Implications for Employee Mobility Policy, 13 U Pa J Bus L 751, 757 (2011)
(“While the majority of states provide some enforcement of noncompete agreements . . .
there are only two extreme outliers in terms of restrictions on any noncompete enforceability: California and North Dakota.”).
234 See Bishara, 13 U Pa J Bus L at 767, 771–81, 786–87 (cited in note 233).
235 See Stuart and Sorenson, 48 Admin Sci Q at 190 (cited in note 220).
232
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of trade,”236 which has common origins with California’s statute,
Stuart and Sorenson classify it as a state that “precludes the enforcement of all noncompete agreements.”237 Yet, the Malsberger
treatise expressly states that “[d]espite subsection 703, Montana
courts have upheld restrictive covenants in employment contracts” under a general reasonableness standard.238
For states without statutes, Stuart and Sorenson’s summary
of the Malsberger treatise is also inaccurate. Our detailed review
of the treatise, including cases cited therein, shows that all of
their study’s supposed nonenforcing states lacking statutes—
Alaska, Connecticut, Minnesota, and Washington—are misclassified. 239 Again, these states essentially enforce noncompetes
under a reasonableness standard. Indeed, Bishara—completely
contrary to Stuart and Sorenson—classifies Connecticut and
Washington as the fourth and eighth strongest enforcing states in
1991, respectively.240
In response to an earlier draft of this Article, Sorenson ran
robustness checks to the main estimates in the initial study with
Stuart using the Bishara measure of enforceability as well as a
separate binary coding scheme in which North Dakota and
California are the only nonenforcing states. 241 In these revised
models, the results are substantially similar to, and in some cases
stronger than, Stuart and Sorenson’s initial results.242
We are heartened by the fact that Sorenson—unlike Marx et
al. or Garmaise—chose to revise his study’s initial model to take
into account our criticisms. However, even these new results are
subject to substantial limitations. First, the major result—that
the states with weak noncompete enforcement regimes experience higher absolute founding rates than states with strong
regimes that abstract away from state fixed effects—is not determinative because other regional factors may correlate between

236

Mont Code Ann §§ 28-2-703 to -704.
See Stuart and Sorenson, 48 Admin Sci Q at 190 (emphasis added) (cited in note 220).
238 See Malsberger 1996 at 674–75 (cited in note 233). See also Dobbins, DeGuire &
Tucker, PC v Rutherford, MacDonald & Olson, 708 P2d 577, 580 (Mont 1985) (adopting a
three-part reasonableness test to determine whether to enforce a noncompete).
239 Specifically, we reviewed Malsberger 1996 at 98–99, 192–94, 604–05, 1136 (cited
in note 233).
240 See Bishara, 13 U Pa J Bus L at 786–87 (cited in note 233) (reviewing Richey and
Malsberger’s 1991 treatise on noncompete covenants).
241 See E-mail from Olav Sorenson to Ted Sichelman (Oct 19, 2016) (on file with
authors).
242 See id.
237
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the weak regime and the level of new firm foundings in the region.243 Second, for the models that take into account state fixed
effects by examining new firm foundings following IPOs and acquisitions, the effects with the greatest magnitude are centered
in California.244 This may reflect the fact that California operates
in a unique environment not applicable to other states. Third,
even though weak enforcement states other than California
showed significant declines in new firm foundings following IPOs
and interindustry acquisitions, this does not account for the quality of the new firms.245 As we note below, a more recent study by
Starr and others finds that firms founded in strong enforcement
states are of higher quality than those in weak enforcement
states.246 Fourth, even the Bishara scale faces significant methodological limitations and has not been independently verified.247
The Garmaise study replaces the oversimplified binary approach of Stuart and Sorenson with a graduated twelve-point
scale that assigns equal weight (one or zero) to the answers (yes
or no) to twelve questions based on those in a later version of the
Malsberger treatise248 regarding the strength and scope of noncompete law in various states.249 While this is an improvement,
this scale is still problematic because there is no legitimate legal
or other basis to equally weight each of the twelve factors. Comparing two of the factors as an example, it is arguably much more
important how a plaintiff must prove the existence of an enforceable covenant not to compete than what counts as sufficient
postemployment consideration in considering the strength of a
state’s noncompete regime.
There are other problems with the Garmaise scale.250 Garmaise’s
initial factor—whether the state has a statute bearing on the enforceability of noncompetes (as opposed to mere common law)—
does not strike us as indicative one way or the other as to whether
the state more strongly enforces noncompete law. 251 Although
some very strict states (for example, California and North Dakota)

243 See Stuart and Sorenson, 48 Admin Sci Q at 193–94 (cited in note 220) (“[A] number of omitted regional factors might correlate with both the weak non-compete enforcement dummy and the level of entrepreneurial activity in the region.”).
244 See Sorenson E-mail (cited in note 241).
245 See note 312 and accompanying text.
246 See id.
247 See note 296 and accompanying text.
248 See Malsberger 2004 at xvii–xviii (cited in note 233).
249 See Garmaise, 27 J L Econ & Org at 420–22 (cited in note 63).
250 See id.
251 See id.
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have adopted statutes, so have some states following the flexible,
common law reasonableness standard (for example, North
Carolina and Ohio).
Next, arbitrary thresholds—such as whether a state has upheld a statewide three-year restriction versus only a two-year
one—are not particularly meaningful in the overall scheme of
noncompete enforcement. The Malsberger treatise does not of
course catalog all the noncompete opinions in a given state—thus,
Garmaise could not even answer correctly whether “3-year
statewide restrictions have [ever] been upheld” in a particular
state.252 For instance, the applicable Malsberger treatise lists no
cases in Wisconsin in which a three-year statewide noncompete
was upheld;253 rather, the treatise cites only a case in Wisconsin
for which a three-year noncompete was found unreasonable. 254
But, contrary to Garmaise’s scoring, Wisconsin courts in fact had
upheld a six-year noncompete and suggested that a three-year
noncompete would be reasonable.255
Last, for perhaps the most important question—“What is an
employer’s protectable interest and how is it defined?”—instead
of examining the full range of protectable interests, Garmaise curiously focuses on whether an “employer can prevent the employee from future independent dealings with all the firm’s customers, not merely with the customers with whom the employee
had direct contact.”256 Besides omitting important protectable interests—such as trade secrets, training and development, and ordinary competition—customer relationships are not the type of
interest that would typically be of great concern to the top executives at the large, publicly traded firms examined in Garmaise’s
study. Rather, customer relationships and list restrictions—at
least at a large public firm—are more likely to apply to sales personnel, who have direct relationships with the firm’s customers,
but these personnel were not examined by Garmaise. Variation

252

Id at 422. See Malsberger 2004 at 3332–37 (cited in note 233).
See Malsberger 2004 at 3332–37 (cited in note 233).
254 See id at 3336, citing Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Co v Brass, 625 NW2d
648 (Wis App 2001).
255 See Reiman Associates, Inc v R/A Advertising, Inc, 306 NW2d 292, 296 (Wis App
1981) (upholding a six-year noncompete as reasonable); Fullerton Lumber Co v Torborg,
70 NW2d 585, 589–92 (Wis 1955) (remanding for determination of the extent of time as to
which a noncompete covenant is reasonable, and suggesting that a minimum period of
three years would be supported by the evidence).
256 See Garmaise, 27 J L Econ & Org at 421 (cited in note 63).
253
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among states in a factor not relevant to the examined class of employees may of course—like Stuart and Sorenson’s scale—produce
spurious results.
Ultimately, the ideal metric for evaluating a state’s noncompete regime is the probability that a typical employee move that
would be allowed in a hypothetical nonenforcing state would not
be allowed in any given state. Although it is clearly impossible to
achieve such accuracy, neither Stuart and Sorenson nor
Garmaise provide sufficient verification for the legitimacy of their
indices, such as an empirical analysis of actual cases. Such untested and rough assessments do not make for valid studies.257
This concern is confirmed by examining the correlations between the available enforcement scales. The correlation between
the Stuart and Sorenson binary scale and the Garmaise twelvepoint scale is only 0.43. Bishara constructs an alternate scale258—
using seven of the twelve questions in the 1991 Richey and
Malsberger treatise and the 2009 Malsberger treatise259—which,
although it raises similar issues as the Garmaise scale, in our
opinion is somewhat more likely to be accurate because it uses a
graduated scale (unlike Stuart and Sorenson) and differentially
weights different factors in the scale (unlike Garmaise). The correlation between the Bishara and Garmaise scales is 0.66, and
the correlation between the Bishara and Stuart and Sorenson
scales is 0.42.260
We recognize that some type of quantitative ranking is a necessary precondition to undertake systematic analysis of the economic effects of noncompete laws. However, given the clear errors
in categorization and relatively low correlations among different
scales, we are doubtful that the results of studies using the Stuart

257 Garmaise additionally examines individual changes in law in three states by using
time-series estimations, see Garmaise, 27 J L Econ & Org at 390–93 (cited in note 63), the
limitations of which we address in Barnett and Sichelman, Revisiting Labor Mobility in
Innovation Markets at *24, Part 3.2.7 (cited in note 219).
258 See Bishara, 13 U Pa J Bus L at 771, 786–87 (cited in note 233). For an alternate
scale modeled on the Bishara scale, see Evan Starr, Natarajan Balasubramanian, and
Mariko Sakakibara, Screening Spinouts? How Noncompete Enforceability Affects the Creation, Growth, and Survival of New Firms, 64 Mgmt Sci 552, 558 (2018). The Starr and
Bishara scales are correlated at 0.94; hence, we ignore the Starr scale.
259 See Brian Malsberger, Covenants Not to Compete: A State-by-State Survey xvii–
xviii (BNA Books 2009) (“Malsberger 2009”); P. Jerome Richey and Brian M. Malsberger,
Covenants Not to Compete: A State-by-State Survey xvi–xvii (BNA 1991).
260 We thank Norman Bishara for providing the data underlying his scale.
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and Sorenson 261 or Garmaise 262 scales to measure the effects of
noncompetes on labor mobility can be properly relied upon for empirical study.263
A better approach to construct an enforcement scale in our
view would be to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the
actual extent and conditions in which courts enforce (or not) noncompetes. A large number of actual cases should be randomly selected in each state across a time period of interest. The assessment would identify the outcome in the case along with key
factors in each case, including occupation, at-will vs. contract employee, employer- vs. employee-driven termination, industry,
term of the noncompete, geographic scope of the noncompete, and
other key circumstances, such as whether trade secrets, sale of a
business, dissolution of a partnership, choice of law or forum, and
substantial employee training were present. Multivariate, logistic
regressions could then be constructed to compare how different
factors affect outcomes across states. These results could then be
substituted, where appropriate, for factors like those in Bishara
to construct more accurate scales.
b) Failure to properly reflect cross-border enforcement of
noncompetes. Garmaise and Marx et al. include cross-state border job changes in their datasets.264 The Marx et al. study focuses
on the supposed “brain drain” from Michigan to “non-enforcing”
states following its decision to enforce noncompetes.265 Such crossborder moves are complex from a legal perspective, because, as

261 Studies that rely on the Stuart and Sorenson scale include: Kenneth A. Younge
and Matt Marx, The Value of Employee Retention: Evidence from a Natural Experiment,
25 J Econ & Mgmt Strategy 652, 658–70 (2016); Younge, Tong, and Fleming, 36 Strategic
Mgmt J at 692 (cited in note 110).
262 Studies that rely on the Garmaise scale include: I.P.L. Png and Sampsa Samila,
Trade Secrets Law and Mobility: Evidence from “Inevitable Disclosure” *20 appx 2 (working paper, Feb 14, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/MH8D-VWYS; Raffaele Conti, Do
Non-competition Agreements Lead Firms to Pursue Risky R&D Projects?, 35 Strategic
Mgmt J 1230, 1234–35 (2014); Bill Francis, et al, When Finding a New Job Is Not Easy:
The Influence of the State Law of Non-Competition Agreements on the Characteristics of
M&As *9 (working paper, Dec 2007), archived at https://perma.cc/U7JW-3V7A; Sharon
Belenzon and Mark Schankerman, Spreading the Word: Geography, Policy, and
Knowledge Spillovers, 95 Rev Econ & Stat 884, 895 (2013).
263 Even Sorenson’s revised results are subject to substantial qualifications. See notes
241–47 and accompanying text. Nor, as far we know, have these revised results been published in any form.
264 See Marx, Singh, and Fleming, 44 Rsrch Pol at 394–95 (cited in note 219);
Garmaise, 27 J L Econ & Org at 396–97 (cited in note 63).
265 See Marx, Singh, and Fleming, 44 Rsrch Pol at 394 (cited in note 219).
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Garmaise properly notes, the law of the state of the former employer will sometimes apply and, in other instances, the law of
the state of the new employer will apply.266
Marx et al., however, overlook this complexity and erroneously assume that nonenforcing states always apply their own
law so as to void a noncompete agreement that falls under the law
of another state.267 Even assuming that Marx et al.’s list of ten
“nonenforcing” states is correct—which it is not, as we discussed
above—the only nonenforcing states that generally refuse to
enforce out-of-state noncompetes on public policy grounds are
California and North Dakota.268 Yet, even California does not always void out-of-state noncompete agreements. California courts
sometimes transfer cases to another state or stay proceedings so
those in another state can proceed, particularly when the employment agreement selects that other state’s law and courts.269
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, all states—including California—will generally enforce a prior judgment of another state that afforded the parties a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the matter. Thus, if an employee is subject to jurisdiction
in the state of the former employer, which often will be the case,
then the former employer can sue the employee in its home state.
If the employee is not subject to an exclusive choice-of-forum
clause, the employee may then sue for a declaratory judgment in

266 The law of the state of the former employer may either be the state in which the
employee was located or some other state, to the extent the employer uses a choice-of-law
provision specifying the law of a different state (for example, its state of incorporation or
headquarters). See Garmaise, 27 J L Econ & Org at 390 n 9 (cited in note 63); Gillian
Lester and Elizabeth Ryan, Choice of Law and Employee Restrictive Covenants: An American Perspective, 31 Comp Labor L & Pol J 389, 396–97 (2009) (discussing the situation in
which the choice-of-law clauses select the employer’s place of incorporation).
267 See Marx, Singh, and Fleming, 44 Rsrch Pol at 395, 403 (cited in note 219).
268 We use the 1996 Malsberger treatise to make this determination, see Malsberger
1996 at 102, 136–37, 156–57, 201–02, 618, 684, 719, 857–58, 907, 1147, 1160 (cited in note
233) (citing various cases), as the 2015 Marx, Singh, and Fleming study relies on the same
treatise to classify state enforcement regimes. See Marx, Singh, and Fleming, 44 Rsrch
Pol at 396 n 2 (cited in note 219), citing Stuart and Sorenson, 48 Admin Sci Q at 190 (cited
in note 220) (relying on the 1996 Malsberger treatise for data on states that do not enforce
noncompetes).
269 California substantially restricted the situations in which it will enforce out-ofstate noncompetes starting in 2017, but during the time periods in question of these studies, California courts were sometimes amenable to enforcing, directly or indirectly, out-ofstate noncompetes. See notes 105–06 and accompanying text.
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the state of the new employer. Although there are important nuances, essentially, whichever court enforces judgment first will
typically bind the employee.270
The simplification of these doctrinal complexities in the Marx
et al. study renders that study’s key assumption—namely, that
nonenforcing states always apply their own law—flawed, and
thus confounds its causal identification strategy. As we explain
below, given the small number of annual employee moves out of
Michigan to nonenforcing states measured in the Marx et al.
study, this flaw could lead to substantial overestimates of the
measured effects of noncompetes.
The Garmaise study also suffers from difficulties relating to
the treatment of out-of-state moves. Specifically, Garmaise includes within his analysis out-of-state moves, and, unlike the
Marx et al. study, assumes for simplicity that these moves are
always governed by the law of the state of the former employer.271
Because Garmaise’s dataset contains only a little over six hundred within-industry transfers (out-of-industry transfers would
generally not be governed by noncompetes), it is essential to know
what percentage of those transfers were out-of-state (and
Garmaise does not disclose as much). If the percentage is large,
then some results in the Garmaise study may not be accurate.
c) No data on actual usage of noncompete agreements by
state. Even if one believes these studies accurately categorize
strength of enforcement, no study—other than Garmaise’s—provides any measure of the actual usage of noncompete agreements
within their sample set or how often employers actually enforce
noncompetes. Available evidence suggests widely varying use of
noncompete agreements among various executive and technical
employee groups, 272 and while there is new evidence regarding
270 See Lester and Ryan, 31 Comp Labor L & Pol J at 405–20 (cited in note 266);
Timothy P. Glynn, Interjurisdictional Competition in Enforcing Noncompetition Agreements: Regulatory Risk Management and the Race to the Bottom, 65 Wash & Lee L Rev
1381, 1385–86, 1418–28 (2008).
271 See Garmaise, 27 J L Econ & Org at 396 n 15 (cited in note 63).
272 Based on a sample of top-level executives, Garmaise finds a roughly 70 percent
usage rate, see Garmaise, 27 J L Econ & Org at 396 (cited in note 63). Based on a sample
of CEOs at S&P 1500 companies, Bishara, Martin, and Thomas, 68 Vand L Rev at 2 (cited
in note 85), find an 80 percent rate. Based on a sample of founders of VC-backed firms,
Professors Steven Kaplan and Per Strömberg find a roughly 70 percent rate. Steven N.
Kaplan and Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 Rev Econ Stud 281, 289 (2003). An IEEE
study of engineers reports a 47 percent rate. See Matt Marx, The Firm Strikes Back: Noncompete Agreements and the Mobility of Technical Professionals, 76 Am Sociological Rev
695, 702 (2011). A 2015 study finds lower usage rates, reporting about 30 percent for managers and about 35 percent in the engineering, computer, and mathematical fields, see
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noncompete usage (which we discuss below), 273 there is no evidence to our knowledge of the rate of enforcement across states.
This inability to differentiate firm-level usage and enforcement
behavior among states introduces the possibility that the observed variation in mobility is not the result of differing statelevel enforcement regimes but rather unobserved variation of
firm-level usage and enforcement of noncompete agreements and
substitutes for noncompetes, such as trade secret actions. 274 If
firms in different states substantially vary in their propensity to
use and enforce noncompetes and noncompete substitutes, and
this variance is not highly correlated with enforcement strength,
regressing on enforcement indices may yield spurious results.
Relatedly, none of these studies attempted to control for the
variation in state-level enforceability, much less usage and enforcement of noncompete substitutes, such as patents, trade secrets, stock options, long-term contracts, invention assignments,
and the like, which we described earlier.275 This omission alone
can substantially confound any possible causal link between results and noncompete enforceability, usage, and enforcement.276
d) Measurement errors are exacerbated by small data sets.
The previous criticisms are especially salient for the Marx et al.
study (as well as a previous study performed by Marx and others
in 2009) given the relatively small incremental decrease in absolute terms in labor mobility in Michigan identified in the 2009
and 2015 Marx et al. studies. The 2009 Marx et al. study considers 98,468 inventors and 27,478 inventor moves within Michigan

Starr, Prescott, and Bishara, Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force at *43 fig 4 (cited in
note 11). These differences are arguably explained by the different datasets—the studies
by Kaplan and Strömberg; Garmaise; and Bishara, Martin, and Thomas focus on the most
sophisticated companies, while Starr, Prescott, and Bishara’s findings are likely more reflective of firms as a whole. Additionally, Garmaise and Bishara, Martin, and Thomas
focus on top-level executives.
273 See Part III.C.
274 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Leaky Covenants-Not-to-Compete as the Legal Infrastructure for Innovation, 49 UC Davis L Rev 251, 256–57, 277–80 (2015) (arguing that
Washington technology firms rarely enforce noncompetes); Risch, 12 Empl Rts & Empl Pol
J at 346 (cited in note 122) (acknowledging Gilson’s theory that trade secret actions might
be substitutes for noncompete actions for firms).
275 See Part II.A.2. Although some of these instruments fall under federal law, there
remains effective variation in state-level enforcement of these instruments due to differing
applications of the law at a regional level. See, for example, Mark A. Lemley, Where to File
Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q J 1, 28–37 (2010).
276 See Part II.A.2 (noting that any empirical study examining the marginal effects of
noncompetes would need to take into account these substitute mechanisms).
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over the period 1963–2006.277 Labor mobility actually increased
following the enactment of the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act278
(MARA) over the full time period from 7.18 percent to 8.98 percent, whereas in other nonenforcing states there was a larger increase, from 7.95 percent to 10.80 percent.279
While the Marx et al. studies never report these differences
in absolute numbers, they are easy to calculate. Specifically, the
difference of in-state mobility in Michigan versus nonenforcing
states in absolute terms was roughly 1 percent, equating to an
absolute difference of about 100–200 moves per year purportedly
lost within Michigan due to the enforcement of noncompetes. For
inventors moving out of Michigan, the numbers are much lower—
the purported difference of inventors moving out of Michigan to
nonenforcing states pre- and post-MARA is in the range of merely
twenty to twenty-five inventor moves per year. Given the very
small number of job changes upon which the results of these studies are premised, the potentially negating effects of the shortcomings identified above cannot be easily dismissed.280
e) Unique problems of the Michigan studies. The 2009 and
2015 Marx et al. studies281 have attracted particular attention because they exploit an apparently exogenous change to the legal
treatment of noncompetes in a particular jurisdiction, which
therefore provides an opportunity to study the effect of noncompete enforceability on inventor mobility and, potentially, innovation. As noted earlier, the legal change was effected by enactment
of MARA, which restored the enforceability of noncompetes under
Michigan law.

277 See Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming, 55 Mgmt Sci at 880 (cited in note 219). The
2015 Marx, Singh, and Fleming study examines the period 1975–2005. See Marx, Singh,
and Fleming, 44 Rsrch Pol at 396 (cited in note 219).
278 Michigan Antitrust Reform Act § 4a (1987), codified at Mich Comp Laws
§ 445.774a.
279 See Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming, 55 Mgmt Sci at 884 (cited in note 219).
280 Moreover, the Marx et al. studies track the mobility of employees to any firm, rather than mobility to competing firms. No state enforces noncompetes that purport to proscribe employment at noncompeting firms. Thus, in order to isolate the effects of noncompetes, it is essential to track labor mobility solely among competing firms. In empirical
terms, an employee who makes an out-of-industry move to a noncompeting firm is, contrary to the implicit assumption of the Marx et al. study, not effectively subject to a noncompete restriction, and hence should not be classified within a “treatment” group. Thus,
the number of inventor “moves” of interest to these studies is even lower than the numbers
we calculate in the text.
281 Marx, Singh, and Fleming, 44 Rsrch Pol 394 (cited in note 219); Marx, Strumsky,
and Fleming, 55 Mgmt Sci 875 (cited in note 219).
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The striking results of the Marx studies—a state restores the
enforceability of dormant noncompete provisions, inventor mobility slows down, and inventors flee the jurisdiction for states without enforceable noncompetes (essentially, California)—are commonly cited, including in federal government reports, 282 to
support the view that noncompetes are unwise public policy for
jurisdictions that seek to cultivate the next Silicon Valley.
However, beyond the serious shortcomings we have already
described in these studies, the Marx et al. studies make an erroneous assumption that wholly undermines their identification
methodology and hence, their results. Specifically, both the 2009
and 2015 studies assume that, following Michigan’s regime
change in 1985, preexisting noncompete provisions automatically
became enforceable.283 This is not the case. The study authors appear to overlook that MARA included a savings clause providing
that the statute repealed by MARA would “remain in force for the
purpose” of enforcing any liability under the repealed act.284 Consistent with this saving clause, Michigan courts declined to enforce noncompetes that were entered into prior to MARA.285
In other words, no existing employee with noncompete
clauses in employment agreements governed by Michigan law became bound by those clauses following MARA. Rather, any employer seeking to bind an existing employee would need to have
that employee sign a new agreement or affirmatively assent to a
prior agreement, which would generally result in employers incurring transaction costs and possibly providing additional compensation. As a result, one would expect that the number of employees in Michigan actually subject to enforceable noncompetes
282 See, for example, Office of Economic Policy, Non-compete Contracts at *18 (cited
in note 36); White House, Non-Compete Agreements at *7 (cited in note 36). While relying
on the Marx et al. “Michigan” studies to support the view that noncompetes depress “labor
market dynamism,” the White House report did mention that “other authors dispute these
findings.” White House, Non-Compete Agreements at *7 (cited in note 36). This is most
likely a somewhat oblique reference to our companion paper on noncompetes. See generally Barnett and Sichelman, Revisiting Labor Mobility (cited in note 219).
283 For instance, the Marx et al. 2015 study states: “Given that the repeal of Public
Act No. 05 merely removed the ban and did not stipulate any governing timeframe, all
such contracts [i.e., preexisting noncompetes] would have become immediately enforceable.” Marx, Singh, and Fleming, 44 Rsrch Pol at 396 (cited in note 219).
284 Michigan Antitrust Reform Act § 18 (1985), codified at Mich Comp Laws § 445.788.
For a detailed description of the history leading up to the passage of MARA, see Bristol
Window and Door, Inc v Hoogenstyn, 650 NW2d 670, 673–79 (Mich App 2002).
285 See, for example, Compton v Joseph Lepak, DDS, PC, 397 NW2d 311, 316 (Mich
App 1986) (“When an agreement or contract is entered into in violation of the statute,
repeal of that statute does not make the agreement valid because the Legislature cannot
validate a contract which never had a legal existence.”).
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would be quite low for a considerable period following MARA’s
passage.
During this transition period, one cannot legitimately consider all Michigan inventors as being subject to enforceable noncompetes—a critical assumption in both papers. The true regime
change (that is, taking into account both nominal and effective
changes to noncompete enforceability) most likely took considerable time to impact contracting behavior in the market. As a result, the number of inventors who were immediately affected by
MARA was small (which impacts the statistical force of the studies’ results),286 and a sizable portion of the studies’ results are unlikely to be causally linked to the legal change effected by MARA.
Yet, the 2009 Marx et al. study finds the exact opposite of the
effects one would expect from a gradual adoption of noncompetes
after the enactment of the MARA statute, stating that “the effect
of the policy reversal remained strong for several years and then
weakened, both in terms of the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficient on the interaction variable.”287 Thus, it is
extremely likely in our view that factors unrelated to the change
in noncompete law in Michigan explain the results, if they are at
all correct, of the 2009 study. At a bare minimum, the factual misunderstanding of the nonretroactive effect of the MARA change
casts great doubt on the reliability of using the Marx et al. studies
as a basis for substantive policy recommendations.
f) Correlation, not causality. Even if the results in these
studies were somehow correct, none of these studies can show
causation between noncompete enforcement and their findings of
reduced innovation (as indicated by various proxy measures).
Other than the Marx et al. study, they are all cross-sectional regressions and cannot rule out omitted variables to explain the observed variation. Additionally, Stuart and Sorenson’s major finding (including, as noted earlier, Sorenson’s revised major finding)
abstracts away from state-level fixed effects, and they properly
note that they “must interpret this result cautiously, as a number
of omitted regional factors might correlate with both the weak
non-compete enforcement dummy and the level of entrepreneurial activity in the region.”288 Stuart and Sorenson’s models that
take account of state-level fixed effects do not account for unique

286 For further discussion, see Barnett and Sichelman, Revisiting Labor Mobility at
*22 (cited in note 219).
287 See Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming, 55 Mgmt Sci at 883 (cited in note 219).
288 See Stuart and Sorenson, 48 Admin Sci Q at 194 (cited in note 220).
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within-state, regional omitted variables that may explain the observed patterns, plus are subject to a number of additional limitations.289 The Samila and Sorenson study is subject to similar
limitations, as well as another endogeneity concern. Specifically,
this study uses the number of patents to measure innovative
output, but patenting is in part a substitute for noncompete enforcement. 290 Thus, finding increased patenting in states with
weak nonenforcement, such as California, is not necessarily
meaningful. The Marx et al. study, despite the fact that it examines a seemingly exogenous shock to Michigan law, also suffers
from causality concerns because—as explained in the previous
Section—the regime change did not apply retroactively.
Aside from causality, some of the studies use rough proxies
for innovative activity. Stuart and Sorenson merely examine the
relationship of noncompetes to the absolute number of spin-offs
following IPOs and acquisitions. Studies on patent value have indicated that a small number of high-quality innovations disproportionately account for the total value of all innovations; in other
words, not all innovations—and, hence, not all innovative companies—are created equally.291 Thus, it is not surprising that a more
recent study finds that, while noncompetes may depress the absolute number of same-industry spin-offs, increased enforcement
is associated with the founding of higher quality firms, particularly ones that began and continued with more employees and
survived for longer periods. 292 Relatedly, another recent study
finds that, while noncompetes reduce employee mobility and depress certain indicators of entrepreneurship, increased enforceability is associated with an increase in capital investment
at existing “knowledge-intensive” firms, 293 suggesting that noncompetes sometimes support investment incentives consistent
with theoretical expectations.

289

See notes 241–47 and accompanying text.
Samila and Sorenson, 57 Mgmt Sci at 430 (cited in note 9). As noted previously,
Agarwal and coauthors found that aggressive patent litigation by US semiconductor firms
discourages labor mobility (presumably, because potential new employers fear litigation
and elect not to hire from those firms). See note 109 and accompanying text.
291 See John R. Allison, et al, Valuable Patents, 92 Georgetown L J 435, 448–65 (2004).
292 See Starr, Balasubramanian, and Sakakibara, 64 Mgmt Sci at 567 (cited in
note 258). Although this Starr study does not compare the total innovative activity of the
startups in nonenforcing and enforcing states, a smaller number of highly innovative
startups in enforcing states could outweigh the innovative activity of a larger number of
less innovative startups in nonenforcing states.
293 See Jessica S. Jeffers, The Impact of Restricting Labor Mobility on Corporate Investment and Entrepreneurship *3–5, 20–21 (working paper, Jan 3, 2018), archived at
https://perma.cc/9EQX-GDTU.
290

2020]

The Case for Noncompetes

1025

g) Why the limitations of these studies likely affect the validity of their results. To be certain, the limitations we have discussed above do not mandate that the results in these studies are
incorrect. It may be the case that some studies suffer from ordinary measurement error, which would underestimate the size of
the effects found in those studies, or the errors we have identified
are too minor to plausibly change these studies’ results. However,
there are strong reasons to doubt that the limitations described
above are ordinary measurement errors or essentially trivial, implying that they are likely to alter these studies’ results—either
their size or significance, or even the direction and nature of the
effects measured.
First, and perhaps most importantly, the Stuart and
Sorenson scale misclassifies eight of ten states as “nonenforcing”
but does not misclassify any of the “enforcing” states.294 Such misclassification is not random, but rather is a one-way systemic error. Stuart and Sorenson’s misclassification of “enforcing” and
“nonenforcing” states lies at the heart of the empirical instruments in the Marx et al. studies used to measure worker mobility
and the potential effects on innovative activity.295
Although Garmaise’s scale appears to suffer more from random error than systemic error—because in our view, there is no
scale, even Bishara’s scale, 296 that has been definitively validated—it may be the case that Garmaise’s results are subject to
the same limitations as the Marx et al. studies. So while the results set forth in the Garmaise study and the Marx et al. studies
may be statistically significant, they are not necessarily meaningful when determining the role noncompetes play in suppressing
innovative activity.
Second, the failure to properly take account of the nonretroactivity of Michigan’s change in law via MARA also casts considerable doubt on the reliability of the differences-in-differences
methodology employed by the Marx et al. studies. Specifically, it
confounds these studies’ claims to causal identification, because
the only Michigan employees not entering entirely new jobs subject to enforceable noncompetes post-MARA were those selected
by their employers for “treatment,” in other words, the signing of
a noncompete provision. Such selection would not be random, but
instead would turn on factors such as whether the employee was
294

See Stuart and Sorenson, 48 Admin Sci Q at 190 (cited in note 220).
See Marx, Singh, and Fleming, 44 Rsrch Pol at 396 n 2, 396–97 (cited in note 219);
Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming, 55 Mgmt Sci at 880 (cited in note 219).
296 See Bishara, 13 U Pa J Bus L at 786–87 (cited in note 233).
295
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at-will, had knowledge of company trade secrets, was highly
skilled, and the like.
Third, the failure of the Garmaise study and the Marx et al.
studies to properly take account of cross-border moves, as we note
above, may systematically overestimate the effects of noncompetes on labor mobility because in some situations these moves
would have been governed by a contrary set of laws than assumed
in the empirical approaches in these studies.
Fourth, even if these studies’ findings are nominally correct,
because of various implicit assumptions about the law and external factors that are certainly or very likely inaccurate, one cannot
casually attribute decreases in labor mobility wholly to noncompete enforcement trends. For instance, one or more of these studies wrongly assumes that noncompetes govern moves outside of
an industry, that firm-level usage and enforcement of noncompetes is constant across states, that high-level executives’ mobility would be prone to court decisions regarding the role of customer lists, and that nonretroactive changes in certain laws were
exogenous “shocks.”
In sum, of the four major nonexperimental studies examining
the effects of noncompetes on innovation that we reviewed in detail, all suffer from multiple infirmities. In our view, these infirmities cast substantial doubt on the validity of the findings in
these studies. In other words, there is a strong possibility that
these errors would reduce the size of the effects in these studies,
result in opposite effects, or potentially eliminate statistically significant effects entirely. Although Sorenson’s revision of his earlier study nominally confirmed his earlier results, it remains subject to substantial limitations.297 As such, none of these studies
can be relied upon for a general assessment of the role noncompetes play in the innovative process.
All of the additional studies we could locate that find a negative effect on innovation from noncompetes appear to suffer from
one or more of these limitations.298 Given the theoretical reasons
to doubt that noncompetes always have a negative effect on innovation, we believe that there is little to no empirical evidence that
noncompetes necessarily retard innovation. 299 Rather, as explained later in the Article, noncompetes will sometimes hinder
and sometimes foster innovative activity depending on a variety
of contextual circumstances.
297
298
299

See notes 241–47 and accompanying text.
See notes 261–62 (listing studies relying on flawed scales).
See Barnett and Sichelman, Revisiting Labor Mobility at *29 (cited in note 219).
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2. Experimental studies.
Professors On Amir and Orly Lobel conducted an experimental study that found that participants in simulated noncompete treatment groups exerted less effort and made more errors
than a restriction-free control group.300 The study’s experimental
design abstracts away from the limitations of the empirical studies but introduces its own concerns that cast serious doubt on its
applicability to any actual technology environment.
In the experimental setup, participants are informed that
they will potentially complete two rounds of a given task. Each
participant is paid $0.50 for the completion of each task plus a
potential bonus. However, individuals in the “full noncompete”
group are told they cannot participate in the second round. Individuals in the “partial noncompete” group are told they will receive 20 percent less payment in the second round. Individuals in
the “no noncompete” group are given no restrictions. Participants
either perform a creative, word association task or an effortbased, matrix addition task. Each participant performs only the
first round.301 Amir and Lobel find a large negative effect on completing the first round of tasks in the full noncompete group, but
not the partial noncompete group, for both the creative and effortbased tasks. Additionally, they find a significantly larger error
rate on the effort-based task for the full and partial noncompete
group.
Based on this experimental result, Amir and Lobel conclude
that “[o]ur behavioral experiment demonstrates that certain
postemployment contractual restrictions may negatively impact
motivation and performance, as evidenced by the greater rates at
which individuals abandon tasks.”302 Although we agree that noncompetes may provide some incentives for employees to underinvest in their own human capital, Amir and Lobel’s experimental
setup does not take into account important real-world mechanisms to offset these effects.
First, as we discussed earlier, one of the major reasons for the
use of noncompetes is to provide incentives for firms to invest in
the human capital of their employees. 303 Consistent with that
theoretical expectation, a study by Starr finds that stronger
noncompete enforcement regimes are associated with increased

300
301
302
303

See Amir and Lobel, 16 Stan Tech L Rev at 866 (cited in note 63).
See id at 852–53, 870–74.
Id at 863.
See Part I.B.2.
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employee training.304 Amir and Lobel’s setup does not allow for
any firm-sponsored training.
Second, the flat payment scheme of $0.50 per task plus a bonus in Amir and Lobel abstracts away from the numerous other
performance incentive mechanisms we discussed above—such as
vesting options, deferred compensation, and the simple ability for
star employees to renegotiate—that are present in a typical employment situation.305
Third, contrary to Amir and Lobel’s setup, a noncompete
agreement never means that there is no second round of performance. Employees are engaged in a repeat-play game with employers, who rationally reward high-performing employees and
penalize low-performing employees. Simultaneously, employees
are engaged in a repeat-play game with potential outside employers. Given the discipline imposed by the common-law reasonableness constraint and competitive labor markets, noncompetes are
always limited in duration, geography, and industry scope. As a
result, employees may port their industry-specific skills to competitors after a certain amount of time and may port their nonindustry-specific skills to noncompetitors at any time. Even during the term of a noncompete, an employee can move to any firm
that is willing to pay the price demanded by the existing employer
to waive the noncompete.
These three reasons are likely to substantially dampen, if not
eliminate, any incentives that noncompetes might otherwise create for employees to underinvest in their own human capital. Indeed, a more recent experimental study performed a similar experiment but found that those in the noncompete group exerted
no less effort than those in the control group.306 Using a more realistic setup, this experiment paid the noncompete group more to
compensate for any disincentives created in the noncompete
treatment—which is precisely what would be expected to occur in
any rational employer-employee bargaining situation.

304 See Evan Starr, Consider This: Training, Wages and the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete, 72 Indust & Labor Rel Rev 783, 785, 814 (2019).
305 See Norman D. Bishara and Evan Starr, The Incomplete Non-compete Picture, 20
Lewis & Clark L Rev 497, 522–23 (2015).
306 See Guido Bünstorf, et al, Win Shift Lose Stay—An Experimental Test of NonCompete Clauses *18–19 (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Preprint
No 2013/17, Sept 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/K2NM-4L4V.
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3. Evaluation.
In current policy discussions concerning noncompetes, it is
common to find statements referring to empirical studies “showing” that noncompetes depress inventor mobility and, as a result,
reduce innovation in general. This interpretation is simply not
supported by a close examination of the methodologies and substance of the empirical studies upon which these statements typically rely. 307 Even assuming without further examination that
noncompetes have some appreciable marginal effect on inventor
mobility—a proposition as to which there is considerable
doubt308—there is no compelling basis to conclude that any such
effect results in reduced innovation compared to a legal environment in which noncompetes had no legal force.
The most recent empirical research on the effects of noncompetes provides even more ground to doubt the conventional characterization of the evidence. That research has reached more
nuanced results that are consistent with the older law-andeconomics analysis that, as discussed earlier, had emphasized
how noncompetes have the potential both to impede employee mobility and enhance firms’ incentives to invest in cultivating employee capital.309 In particular, these recent studies have found
that the ability to enforce noncompetes can increase incentives at
medical practices to make intrafirm client referrals (and thereby increase overall returns),310 increase capital investment at knowledgeintensive firms while reducing the entry of new firms,311 and result in the establishment of fewer but higher quality spin-offs
from parent firms.312 Another study finds that legal limitations on
307 For a similar view, see Bishara and Starr, 20 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 498–502,
534–40 (cited in note 305) (finding that existing empirical literature suffers from methodological imperfections and cannot currently support policy actions to impose limitations or
outright bans on the use of noncompetes).
308 See Barnett and Sichelman, Revisiting Labor Mobility at *29 (cited in note 219)
(stating that, due to methodological and other shortcomings, no existing empirical study
can “be relied upon for a general assessment of the role noncompetes play in restricting
labor mobility”).
309 See Part I.B.
310 See Kurt Lavetti, Carol Simon, and William D. White, The Impacts of Restricting
Mobility of Skilled Service Workers: Evidence from Physicians *21, 34 (working paper,
June 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/4CU3-LZE5. Specifically, the authors find that
practices that used noncompetes for physicians enjoyed greater overall returns, even controlling for physician quality and other potentially relevant factors, which the authors
attribute to stronger incentives to invest in advertising and making intrafirm client referrals (given the reduced risk of losing clients in the event of a physician departure).
311 See Jeffers, The Impact of Restricting Labor Mobility at *22–23 (cited in note 293).
312 See Starr, Balasubramanian, and Sakakibara, 64 Mgmt Sci at 563 (cited in
note 258).
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worker mobility can increase investment at firms that rely on
higher-skill workers.313 While we do not separately review these
more recent studies, it would not be surprising if the empirical
literature on noncompetes ultimately established that they result
in a mixed bag of welfare effects that vary across firms and industries. That would be fully consistent with theoretical expectations
that noncompetes can both promote and dampen overall innovation, and it is therefore indeterminate as to which effect will dominate in any particular case.
III. MAKING NONCOMPETE POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY
The substantial theoretical and empirical literature on noncompetes (and, by implication, other restraints on employee mobility in innovation markets) appears to arrive at a dead end.
Even if it were conceded that noncompetes have some marginal
effect on labor mobility, neither the canonical Silicon
Valley / Route 128 narrative nor the empirical literature provides
support for then drawing an adverse connection between noncompetes and innovation outcomes in general. As a practical matter,
however, the law cannot be neutral: it must take some position on
whether noncompetes should be enforced. In this Part, we offer
some tentative conclusions concerning the appropriate legal
treatment of noncompetes, applying the error-cost approach from
antitrust law that explicitly embeds uncertainty into policy
analysis and the adjudicative process.314
In the course of this exercise, we identify certain variables
that may impact the use and efficiency effects of noncompetes
across different industries, firms, and even employee types. While
this analysis is preliminary, it conforms to evidence on the rates
of use of noncompetes, which suggests that markets tailor the use
of noncompetes across employee categories, rather than chronically overusing them as assumed in the collective-action problem
that drives Gilson’s and the follow-on literature’s laudatory characterization of California’s noncompete policy. Given that this
critical assumption appears to have a limited scope of application
as an empirical matter, and in light of the material uncertainties
that we identified in the empirical studies that are routinely cited

313 See Ali Sanati, How Does Labor Mobility Affect Corporate Leverage and Investment? *3–4 (working paper, Mar 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/NU6M-6DNR.
314 For the leading statements of this approach in the antitrust literature, see note 38.

2020]

The Case for Noncompetes

1031

in support of precluding noncompetes more broadly (and, by implication, other constraints on employee mobility), 315 we ultimately conclude that the reasonableness standard, applied on a
case-specific basis through common law adjudication, is likely the
best approach of all.
A. Policy Continuum
Throughout our discussion, we keep in mind three categories
of policy options. As shown in the graphic below, these options can
be located on a continuum extending from full enforcement (Option I), which we call the “per se legal” option, to zero enforcement
(Option III), which we call the “per se illegal” option. Note that
Option II, which corresponds to the common law’s reasonableness
standard, encompasses in practical terms a range of more and
less stringent variants, which push the option closer toward the
full- or zero-enforcement poles of the policy continuum. In practical terms, this intermediate range could encompass a number of
different principles under which courts could adjudicate the enforceability of a particular noncompete provision and, in doing so,
reflect the complex policy trade-off implicated by the enforcement
of these provisions. To take just one example, a state may elect to
enforce noncompetes subject to a reasonableness limitation but
apply that limitation so that noncompetes are enforced only when
the plaintiff shows that the noncompete promoted either the protection of trade secrets or the recovery of a training investment.316
Such an approach would tend to push the law closer toward zero
enforcement (at least in the case of noncompetes that do not generate any offsetting social advantage in the form of increased
R&D or training incentives). Alternatively, a state may elect to
enforce noncompetes subject to a “blue pencil” rule, according to
which a court can “rescue” an otherwise invalid noncompete
clause by restricting its durational, geographic or industry scope
so that it falls within the boundaries of what the court determines
to be reasonable.317 Such an approach would tend to push the law
closer toward full enforcement.

315

See Part II.B.
For example, New York courts will enforce a noncompete if it “(1) is no greater
than is required for the protection of the legitimate interest of the employer, (2) does not
impose undue hardship on the employee, and (3) is not injurious to the public.” BDO
Seidman v Hirshberg, 712 NE2d 1220, 1223 (NY 1999).
317 See, for example, Coates v Heat Wagons, Inc, 942 NE2d 905, 914–15 (Ind App 2011)
(endorsing the blue pencil doctrine).
316
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FIGURE 1: POLICY CONTINUUM OF NONCOMPETE ENFORCEMENT

Option III:
Per Se Illegal

Option I:
Per Se Legal
Option II: Conditionally Legal
“Reasonableness”

B. The “Free Contracting” Baseline
From an economic point of view, a noncompete is a voluntary
transaction involving a human capital asset being exchanged for
some form of monetary or other compensation. As such, any efficiency analysis must start from the free contracting baseline—
that is, the well-established view that voluntary exchanges result
in mutual welfare gains for the contracting parties, absent evidence of market failure, such as fraud, coercion, or information
asymmetries. Those private welfare gains represent social welfare gains so long as the parties’ exchange transaction does not
generate negative third-party externalities. The presumptive efficiency of voluntary exchange transactions accounts for the common law’s traditional indifference to the substantive fairness of
contracts; rather, courts generally determine enforceability based
on whether an agreement meets certain formal procedural criteria. 318 While there are limited exceptions to this principle (for
example, the unconscionability doctrine, although courts rarely
accept it as a defense319), it holds true across contract law as a
general matter.320
From this starting point, the per se legal option is the default
policy approach, and California’s refusal to enforce the noncompete clause demands justification from an efficiency or other perspective. In fact, based on the free contracting benchmark, even
318 See Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract
Law, 113 Yale L J 541, 546, 556 (2003) (arguing that “efficiency is the only institutionally
feasible and normatively attractive goal for a contract law that regulates deals between
firms”); id at 555 (rejecting the “externality objection” to restricting commercial contract
law to the pursuit of welfare-maximization, on the ground that “most commercial contracts
affect only the parties to them”).
319 See Colleen McCullough, Unconscionability as a Coherent Legal Concept, 164 U
Pa L Rev 779, 785–87 (2016).
320 See Schwartz and Scott, 113 Yale L J at 555 (cited in note 318) (noting that contract law rarely creates “systematic distributional benefits for particular classes of
parties”).
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the reasonableness principle used by the common law to assess
the enforceability of noncompetes is suspect. Ignoring circumstances involving fraud, coercion, information asymmetries, or
similar market defects, any economic justification for even qualified enforcement of noncompete clauses—let alone a blanket refusal to enforce—must identify significant third-party externalities that are not reflected in the terms of the noncompete clause
and the broader employment agreement of which it is typically a
part. Efficiency-based arguments for California’s aversion toward
enforcing noncompetes therefore rely on the reduction in
knowledge spillovers, and collective reduction in innovative vigor
in general, that would potentially result if noncompetes were enforced. This was precisely the basis for Gilson’s characterization
of California’s refusal to enforce noncompetes as an efficient legal
solution to a collective-action problem.
As we have discussed in detail, it is not clear that this theory
has a sound basis in fact. Specifically, the extent to which noncompetes actually impede efficient human capital transfers and
associated knowledge spillovers is empirically contestable and depends on the transaction costs involved in negotiating waivers of
noncompetes, the extent to which noncompetes are actually enforced, and the availability of alternative mechanisms to regulate
human capital flows. At a minimum, however, it is at least reasonable to assume that noncompetes impose some incremental
transaction-cost burden relative to a zero-enforcement regime
and thereby may have some incremental adverse effect on impeding the agglomeration economies and similar benefits that can
promote innovation activity. Additionally, noneconomic considerations of personal autonomy and distributive justice that play an
important role in real-world policy debates over noncompetes
strongly disfavor a rule of per se legality. Consequently, we set
aside per se legal as a policy option and consider the remaining
possibilities that efficiency would be maximized by treating noncompetes as either (i) per se illegal (Option III) or (ii) conditionally legal subject to the reasonableness standard (Option II).
C. Is There Really a Collective Action Problem?
Any argument in favor of zero enforcement must rest on
Gilson’s justification for California’s general refusal to enforce the
noncompete clause (the closest real-world approximation of the
per se illegal policy option), taking note that Gilson himself cautioned against reflexive application of the California model to all
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states and industries. 321 Recall that this argument supposes a
world in which all (or at least most) firms would be better off if
noncompetes were deemed unenforceable. Without coordination,
it is in each firm’s individual interest to include a noncompete
clause (since it would otherwise unilaterally forfeit human capital
assets to its competitors), which ultimately operates to all firms’
collective detriment by impeding the flow of human capital and
the innovation process in general. Under those assumptions, abolishing noncompetes saves firms from this collectively irrational
outcome, which in turn enhances knowledge spillovers, fosters agglomeration economies, and accelerates innovation in the industry as a whole.
This line of argument relies heavily on a single assumption:
namely, that when the law enforces noncompetes, firms widely, if
not universally, adopt noncompetes, resulting in socially excessive constraints on the circulation of human capital. That is a theoretically plausible but empirically untested assumption, especially given the fact that almost all empirical studies compare
mobility and innovation outcomes as a function of noncompete enforceability rather than use. Fortunately, recent empirical work
has supplied data that can provide some insight into actual use of
noncompetes in real-world technology markets.
Available data on the actual use of noncompetes in employment agreements demonstrate significant variation across different subsets of the labor market. As noted previously, two studies
that survey CEOs and other top-level executives find usage rates
ranging from 70–84 percent. 322 Another study finds comparable
usage rates among venture capital-backed firms: in a sample of
213 venture capital investments in 119 firms during 1987–1999,
founders were subject to noncompetes in 70.4 percent (or
73.5 percent excluding California firms) of total investments.323
Those figures are compatible with the assumption that underlies
the efficiency argument against noncompetes: without legal intervention, markets tend toward high, and potentially excessive, use
of noncompetes. However, a survey study of engineers in the
information technology industry report a lower rate of
almost 47 percent.324 A recent and much larger study by Professor
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See Gilson, 74 NYU L Rev at 629 (cited in note 8).
See note 85 and accompanying text.
323 Kaplan and Strömberg, 70 Rev Fin Stud at 289 (cited in note 272).
324 See Marx, 76 Am Sociological Rev at 702 (cited in note 272). The sample consisted
of 1,029 technical personnel (all members of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers) from a variety of industries.
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Evan Starr and colleagues that surveys 11,505 workers across a
broader range of industries finds even lower usage rates, reporting usage rates ranging from 31–36 percent in engineering positions, computer and mathematical positions, information industries, and professional and scientific industries.325 The Starr et al.
study further finds significant variation based on the relevant
business interest that the employer may have in a noncompete
with respect to a particular employee. For example, about onethird of employees subject to noncompetes work with trade secrets, as compared to about 15 percent of employees who only
“work with clients or who have client-specific information.”326
These data have been cited by scholars and policymakers who
argue that significant numbers of employees are encumbered by
these provisions.327 One scholar claims that employees are now
stuck in a “thicket” and that “[n]oncompete agreements are now
required in almost every industry and position.”328 We interpret
the data differently. The variation in reported usage rates across
occupational and industry categories raises serious doubt as to
whether it is reasonable to assume that, when noncompetes are
enforceable, employers blindly use them in all circumstances.
Consider the finding above that approximately one-third of technical personnel are subject to noncompetes. While that is a significant percentage, it means that approximately two-thirds of that
work force is not subject to any such constraint. Even the high
usage rates among top-level executives imply that about one-third
of the relevant labor pool did not agree to a noncompete. Additionally, it is important to keep in mind that effective use of noncompetes almost certainly falls well below nominal use. A recent
study finds that, in the state of Washington, which enforces noncompetes subject to the reasonableness standard, technology
firms cultivate a reputation for nonenforcement 329 —meaning,
that the actual use of noncompetes is far less common than the
nominal use of noncompetes. That finding is consistent with prior
reports (as discussed earlier) that firms in the Route 128 area
widely tolerated employee departures and spin-offs during the

325 See Starr, Prescott, and Bishara, Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force at *43–44
(cited in note 11).
326 See id at *19.
327 See, for example, Lobel, Companies Compete but Won’t Let Their Workers (cited in
note 19); White House, Non-Compete Agreements at *5–7 (cited in note 36); Office of Economic Policy, Non-compete Contracts at *11–13 (cited in note 36).
328 Lobel, 93 Tex L Rev at 791 (cited in note 9).
329 See Gomulkiewicz, 49 UC Davis L Rev at 256–57, 277–80 (cited in note 274).
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economic heyday (and, presumably, competitive market for technical talent) of the 1970s and 1980s, even though Massachusetts
law nominally tolerated enforcement subject to the reasonableness standard. 330 Rather than being driven toward widespread
use of noncompetes to constrain the outflow of human capital to
competitors, actual market behavior shows that firms sometimes
or usually decline to use or enforce noncompetes.
D. Why Employers Decline to Use Noncompetes
Significant variation in the use and enforcement of noncompetes does not favor the thesis that markets are prone to suffer
from a collective-action problem resulting in inefficient overuse of
noncompetes. Rather, it is more consistent with a standard competitive market model in which employers bid for managerial and
technical talent by offering different packages of price and
nonprice terms. Under competitive conditions, firms seek to
attract the most highly valued labor by offering different types
of employment agreements, some with and some without
noncompetes.
It is entirely plausible that an employer may prefer to offer
an employment package without a noncompete. The reason is
simple: noncompetes are costly to employers and will not always
be worth the price. Prospective employees anticipate that noncompetes will limit postemployment opportunities, which means
that employees may be unable to access more lucrative outside
employment options during the term of the noncompete and, as a
result, will have reduced capacity to renegotiate the terms of employment with the employer in the future. The prospective employee may further anticipate that, given a limited set of outside
employment options, the employer could hold up the employee
and unilaterally degrade the terms of employment. 331 Based on
these expectations, the prospective employee will demand either
compensation up-front or, more plausibly, credible assurance that
the firm will allocate internal rewards for strong performance
that mimic the rewards that would be allocated in the external
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See notes 186–90 and accompanying text.
See Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm, in
Margaret M. Blair and Mark J. Roe, eds, Employees and Corporate Governance 58, 64–65,
72 (Brookings Institution 1999). Professor Oliver Williamson, the originator of the holdup concept in the institutional economics literature, makes the same observation but argues that repeat-play forces would typically dissuade employers from engaging in this behavior. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economic Institutions of Capitalism 248–49, 259–60
(Free Press 1985).
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labor market.332 If the employer is unwilling to pay the required
up-front compensation, cannot credibly commit to reward employees’ relative contributions to the firms’ team product, or has other
mechanisms by which to regulate human capital outflow or protect against knowledge leakage in the event of an employee departure, then, in any of those cases, it may decline to “purchase”
a noncompete obligation from the employee.
The “talent wants to be free” school implicitly assumes a
world in which employers unilaterally impose or dictate noncompetes and therefore the law must intervene. But that implausibly
assumes that employers always or typically are price-setters in
the labor market. In most markets, that would typically not be
the case and, in technology markets in particular, the very opposite is more likely given the widespread observations that, in
many technology market segments, skilled technical labor is
scarce and employers bid aggressively to recruit them.333 Absent
market power, we should therefore expect to observe variation in
the mix of postemployment constraints as employers compete
over a limited talent pool.
More specifically, any such variation in the use of noncompetes will reflect different values placed by employers and employees on two variables:
(i)

Gf: the firm’s net expected future gains from employee
training and knowledge internalization attributable to a
noncompete; and

(ii) Ge: the employee’s net expected future gains from
postemployment opportunities at competitors within the
typical duration of a noncompete.334
The value of Gf and Ge impacts the firm’s and the employee’s
respective negotiating positions: as the value of Gf rises, the firm
332 See Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital at 66, 72–73 (cited in note 331). As Blair
notes, the latter solution is more plausible because full up-front compensation would induce shirking on the part of the employee. See id at 62, 73. Note that assurance of an
internal compensation system would be credible only if an employer entered into a contractual commitment to do so or, in the absence of a contract, pledged reputational capital
to support any such assurance.
333 For a review of the evidence, see National Science Board, Revisiting the STEM
Workforce *9 (Feb 4, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/S9GE-S5WA.
334 In some situations, the employee may prefer a noncompete because gains to the
employee’s human capital from training—which could not occur absent a financing commitment—outweigh anticipated losses from foreclosing potential postemployment opportunities. See Rubin and Shedd, 10 J Legal Stud at 96–97 (cited in note 56). Indeed, a recent
study finds that noncompetes are associated with a 5.5 percent increase in the likelihood
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is willing to pay a higher price for a noncompete; as the value of
Ge rises, the employee will demand a higher price for agreeing to
a noncompete. The interaction between these two variables influences the likelihood that any given employer-employee negotiation is likely to yield a noncompete. As the value of Gf rises in
value relative to Ge, we would expect to see greater adoption of
noncompetes since employers value the noncompete highly and
employees are willing to “sell” it at a low price; as that ratio is
reversed, we would expect to see the opposite outcome. When the
values of Gf and Ge are both high (or low), results are likely to be
mixed.
We recognize that this model is inherently stylized and, in
particular, is vulnerable to the objection that employers and employees in real-world contracting environments do not engage in
customized negotiation—rather, employers sometimes include
noncompetes in a “take-it-or-leave-it” employment package that
does not facilitate term-specific negotiation.335 This is especially
so if the employer demands a noncompete not in the original
employment agreement or terms, but only after the employee begins work.336
While some evidence supports the view that, in certain market segments, noncompete clauses are not typically negotiated,337
it should not be automatically concluded that rational negotiation
models have no descriptive force in this setting or, equivalently,
that employers are free to “impose” noncompetes without paying
any price for doing so. First, in the case of top-level executives,
the full negotiation assumption almost always holds true as these

of receiving training on the job. Starr, Prescott, and Bishara, Noncompetes in the U.S.
Labor Force at *3 (cited in note 11). In order to address the strongest argument made
against noncompetes, we nevertheless assume here that there is a net cost to the employee
from agreeing to the noncompete.
335 See White House, Non-Compete Agreements at *9–10 (cited in note 36); Office of
Economic Policy, Non-compete Contracts at *12–13, 24 (cited in note 36); Marx, 76 Am
Sociological Rev at 696 (cited in note 272).
336 See, for example, Starr, Prescott, and Bishara, Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor
Force at *52 (cited in note 11) (indicating that only 6.3 percent of survey respondents who
reported being asked to sign a noncompete after accepting their job offers attempted to
negotiate the noncompete’s terms, while this percentage was nearly twice as high for those
who had received the noncompete before accepting their job offers).
337 See Starr, Prescott, and Bishara, Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force at *21 (cited
in note 11) (finding that only 10 percent of noncompete signers attempt to negotiate the
noncompete); Marx, 76 Am Sociological Rev at 706 tbl 4 (cited in note 272) (finding that
31 percent of surveyed employees received the noncompete request with the job offer,
22 percent received the request after the offer was accepted but prior to the start of work,
24 percent received the request on the first day of work, and 23 percent sometime after
the starting work).
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agreements are typically entered into with the advice of highly
sophisticated counsel specialized in executive compensation matters.338 Second, in the case of lower-level technical and managerial
talent who may well not have the opportunity to negotiate customized terms of employment, the competitive model still has descriptive force even in the absence of transaction-specific negotiation over noncompetes, so long as at least some portion of the
market observes employer behavior and disseminates information concerning the terms of employment.339 Assuming competitive market conditions, that monitoring function may be filled by
other employers who have a rational incentive to monitor the use
or enforcement of noncompetes by competitors and offer prospective employees an employment package without such restrictions
or a demonstrated enforcement record that tolerates employee departures notwithstanding a noncompete.
1. Variation in use of noncompetes across employee types.
While further theoretical refinement and empirical inquiry is
warranted, this competitive bidding model anticipates the variation observed in available data on the use of noncompetes among
executive and technical personnel populations. In particular, it
explains the significantly higher usage of noncompetes among
top-level executives as compared to lower-level technical personnel. The most comprehensive empirical study on the use of noncompetes finds a correlation between income (which often correlates with higher-skilled occupations) and the incidence of
noncompetes. More specifically, that study finds that, whereas
37 percent of employees earning over $100,000 a year are subject

338 Statement made based on one of the authors’ personal experiences as a practicing
transactional attorney.
339 For the original version of this argument, made in the debate over the efficiency
of contracts of adhesion, see Alan Schwartz and Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on
the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U Pa L Rev 630,
637–38 (1979) (arguing that the presence of consumers who engage in “moderate search”
can protect consumers who engage in no search from “overreaching firms”). For an application to related debates in copyright-related settings, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Contract
and Copyright, 42 Houston L Rev 953, 969–70 (2005). As Judge Easterbrook observes, the
fact that a particular attribute of a product or service is not routinely negotiated on a
transaction-specific basis does not imply that that attribute is being dictated by the supplier. Rather, that question is more profitably analyzed by asking whether the supplier
possesses sufficient market power to be in a position to dictate any such term. Nonetheless
we recognize that, in the noncompete context, this argument is predicated on the assumption that information is being disseminated in the market concerning a specific employer’s
noncompete policy, which we recognize may vary from case to case.
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to a noncompete, this is only true of 14 percent of employees earning up to $40,000.340 These findings conform to the expectations of
rational bargaining between employers and employees. In the
case of a higher-level executive, the employer most likely assigns
a high value to Gf—that is, the firm prioritizes internalizing the
valuable knowledge assets to which a top-level executive would
be exposed and is therefore typically prepared to pay a substantial price for obtaining that concession from the employee. By contrast, a lower-level employee may not have comparable exposure
to the highest-value knowledge assets, in which case the firm assigns a low value to Gf and is typically willing to forego the noncompete (or, what is functionally equivalent, foregoes enforcement even if a noncompete clause appears in the employment
package).
2. Variation in the use of noncompetes across
industry types.
The competitive bidding model not only anticipates variation
in the use and enforcement of noncompetes across employee
types, but also across industries. Using this framework, we can
roughly anticipate the expected use of noncompetes in different
industry types (a research path that may prove fruitful in future
empirical inquiries). Industries that exhibit some or all of the following characteristics are less likely to adopt noncompetes: (i) low
capital requirements; (ii) short product development times;
(iii) rapid product obsolescence; (iv) strong intellectual property
protection (including patents, copyrights, and trade secrets);
(v) robust complementary assets (such as strong marketing or
manufacturing capabilities); and (vi) high levels of industryspecific product interoperability.341
Under those conditions, the employer assigns a low value to
Gf. A firm in industries with these characteristics is less likely to
prioritize maintaining control over its knowledge assets because
those assets are not particularly costly to develop, even successful
340 See Starr, Prescott, and Bishara, Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force at *17–18
(cited in note 11).
341 In industries involving high levels of interoperability, presumably there is substantial information sharing among firms, which is either protected by patents and other
forms of intellectual property rights or not at all, at least within the circle of relevant
competitors. Either way the gains from internalizing R&D via noncompetes are reduced
in this situation. Additionally, interoperability implies that training results in industryspecific capital, which makes the value of intra-industry postemployment opportunities
more valuable for employees. Thus, on balance, industries characterized by high levels of
interoperability will, all other factors equal, typically fall into this category.
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products have short lifetimes, and, in some cases, the product is
embedded in a portfolio of IP assets and/or supported by complementary production and distribution assets that are difficult to
replicate. For the same reason, employees in this setting are
likely to place a high value on Ge. In a fast-paced market segment
characterized by short product-development times and rapid
product obsolescence, employees are likely to demand a high price
for accepting noncompetes due to the expectation that a current
employer’s project is likely to conclude rapidly, in which case the
employee may be compelled to seek employment elsewhere. Employment contracts in that type of industry are less likely to include a noncompete clause, and if they do, employers are unlikely
to enforce them vigorously given the potential adverse
consequences in the ability to recruit talent in the future. The
software industry, particularly the Internet-based sector, tends to
fit this mold.
Noncompetes are more likely to be selected in markets that
exhibit the opposite characteristics. In the biopharmaceutical sector, capital requirements are enormous (approaching or exceeding
$1 billion in the case of an FDA-approved drug342), product development is long (about ten years on average), product obsolescence
is slow, and interoperability is minimal. Given those considerations, the employer is likely to place a high value on internalizing
the gains from its R&D investment and therefore should be willing to pay a relatively high price for achieving that objective
through restrictions on departing employees. Moreover, the potential costs to a biopharmaceutical employee from a noncompete
are presumably lower than in the software industry given longer
product development cycles, which—in view of the importance of
project-specific knowledge to biopharmaceutical development—
tend to ensure longer employee tenures and diminish the number
of potential opportunities at competing firms. Consistent with
this expectation, empirical evidence shows low levels of employee
movement in the Canadian biotechnology industry as compared
to the free flow of human capital associated with the semiconductor and other IT industries in Silicon Valley. 343 This observed

342 See Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen, and Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of
Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J Health Econ 151, 180–81
(2003). The development cost estimate includes the costs of failed projects previously
funded by the pharmaceutical firm. See id.
343 See Hugh P. Gunz, Martin G. Evans, and R. Michael Jalland, Career Boundaries
in a “Boundaryless” World, in Maury A. Peiperl, et al, eds, Career Frontiers: New Conceptions of Working Lives 24–53 (Oxford 2000).
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pattern in human capital flows may be in part a function of institutional design: empirical evidence shows that California biotechnology firms issue stock options with long vesting periods and employees of those firms hold large percentages of firm equity, 344
suggesting that, even when firms operate in a jurisdiction in
which noncompetes are unenforceable, they adopt alternative
tools to constrain the outflow of human capital.
E. Error Costs and Noncompete Policy
Economically informed policymaking on noncompetes, and
other constraints on employee mobility in innovation markets,
must recognize the fundamental uncertainty that attends the selection of any particular point on the policy continuum ranging
from full enforcement (equivalent to Option I) to zero enforcement
(equivalent to Option III). This is akin to the concept of error cost
that occupies a central place in antitrust law and policy: the policymaker recognizes the inevitability of erroneous decisions in
general and then selects a legal standard that minimizes the sum
of error costs less the administrative costs of implementing any
particular standard.345 Hence, antitrust law reserves per se illegal
standards, which have low administrative costs, for practices that
usually, or almost always, are expected to result in net social
harms (principally, horizontal price-fixing), while retaining rule
of reason standards, which have high administrative costs, for
practices that do not usually result in net social harms (for example, below-cost predatory pricing).346 In the case of noncompetes,
each option on the policy continuum raises the risks of both under- and over-enforcement relative to the socially optimal level of
noncompete enforcement that would be costlessly and perfectly
implemented by a hypothetical omniscient regulator. In the case
of a per se legal policy (Option I), the market is immune from the
risk of underuse of noncompetes but may be exposed to overuse,
resulting in suppressed knowledge spillovers and a slowdown in
innovation, not to mention concerns regarding personal autonomy
and distributive justice. In the case of a per se illegal policy (Option III), the market is immune to the risk of overuse of noncompetes but may be exposed to underuse, resulting in reduced employer incentives to invest in employee training and certain types
344 See Julia Porter Liebeskind, Ownership, Incentives, and Control in New Biotechnology Firms, in Margaret M. Blair and Thomas A. Kochan, eds, The New Relationship:
Human Capital in the American Corporation 299, 306 (Brookings Institution 2000).
345 See note 38 (listing the leading sources).
346 See Easterbrook, 63 Tex L Rev at 3 (cited in note 38).
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of R&D projects. The intermediate range of policy options (Option II), which correspond to the real-world variants of the
common-law reasonableness standard, result in some mix of aggregate overuse or underuse of noncompetes relative to the social
optimum.
It is important to appreciate that the error-cost approach contemplates that courts and other policymakers may make mistakes with respect to any individual enforcement action, but, in
the aggregate, courts and other policymakers will maximize net
social gains over time relative to any other enforcement methodology, taking into account legal transaction costs. Following this
long-term net-welfare-maximization standard, the efficient legal
regime with respect to noncompetes maximizes over time (i) the
gains generated by net-welfare-increasing noncompetes, less
(ii) the losses generated by net-welfare-decreasing noncompetes,
less (iii) the legal transaction costs incurred to distinguish between “good” and “bad” noncompetes. The selection of any option
on the noncompete policy continuum inherently involves the task
of distinguishing between net-welfare-increasing and netwelfare-decreasing noncompetes, subject to some positive administrative cost and taking into account some positive probability
that any legal rule will sometimes make errors in individual cases
in distinguishing between good and bad noncompetes. Options I
(per se legal) and III (per se illegal) both have the advantage of
low administrative costs as compared to Option II (some version
of the reasonableness standard), but take extreme views with respect to the likely distribution of good and bad noncompetes and
therefore run the risk of significant error costs in the form of overuse or underuse of noncompetes. Option I (“per se legal”) is predicated on the view that noncompetes are always or typically efficient market choices, in which case it is not worthwhile to incur
the administrative costs of case-specific adjunction and occasional
erroneous enforcement of a “bad” noncompete would be immaterial in the long term. Option III (per se illegal) takes the opposite
view with respect to each parameter, except that it agrees that it
is not worthwhile to incur the administrative costs of case-specific
adjudication. By contrast, Option II takes the intermediate position that the distribution of “good” and “bad” noncompetes may
vary sufficiently across industries, employee populations and
even individual transactions, so that it is worthwhile to incur the
administrative costs required to engage in case-specific adjudication and thereby reduce erroneous enforcement and invalidation
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of noncompete clauses. This option is also best in our view for taking account of personal autonomy and distributive justice concerns, which vary depending on the specific circumstances of the
employer, employee, and industry.
The earlier generation of law-and-economics scholarship had
essentially expressed agnosticism as to the appropriate policy options, on the reasonable ground that available evidence did not
provide any firm ground on which to make a choice.347 Today, we
are in a position to take an incrementally firmer view on the efficient legal treatment of noncompetes, grounded in the accumulated body of theoretical and empirical analysis of noncompetes,
as well as the larger literature on human capital and agglomeration economies.
An error-cost approach to noncompete policy favors the pliable reasonableness standard set forth several centuries ago in
Mitchel v Reynolds.348 While it carries a higher administrativecost burden compared to Options I and III, the range of more and
less generous reasonableness standards encompassed by Option II exhibits a close fit with our best theoretical and empirical
understanding—which is to say, our self-acknowledged limited
understanding—of the complex efficiency trade-offs involved in
enforcing noncompete clauses in any particular case. Moreover,
we note that courts’ application of the common-law reasonableness standard may not be especially costly given that that inquiry
has historically been limited to a defined set of factors, usually
limited to duration, geography, and industry scope.349 Relatedly,
we note that the administrative costs under Option III (per se illegality) may in practice be appreciably greater than zero insofar
as an absolute ban on noncompetes may lead parties to challenge
legal arrangements that arguably mimic the effect of noncompetes but serve legitimate economic functions. This contingency
has already been realized in California, where a lower court recently applied the statutory prohibition of noncompetes to an exclusivity clause in a business-to-business agreement, which has
never been considered to fall within the purview of that statute.350
In sum, the reasonableness limitations that the common law
places on the durational, geographic, and industry scope of noncompete obligations may be interpreted as an indirect instrument

347
348
349
350

See Part I.B.5.
24 Eng Rep 347, 347 (KB 1711).
See note 150 and accompanying text.
See notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
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for limiting error costs under conditions of uncertainty with respect to the socially optimal enforcement policy in the case of any
particular noncompete. By tolerating noncompetes subject to
fairly strict limitations on duration, geographic reach, and industry scope, courts may effectively minimize the expected error costs
inherent to the enforcement or nonenforcement of the total population of noncompetes over time, as compared to a regime in which
noncompetes were either flatly enforced or prohibited in all cases
without qualification. Additionally, if and when evidence concerning the net welfare effects of noncompetes achieves greater certainty, a reasonableness approach provides policymakers with
latitude to adjust the permitted scope of noncompetes, an option
that is unavailable under either the full-enforcement or
zero-enforcement options. While the extreme poles of the policy
continuum largely eliminate administrative costs, each is likely
to result in significantly higher error costs over time absent extreme and, based on a close reading of the empirical evidence, factually unjustified assumptions with respect to the likely distribution of efficient and inefficient noncompetes in the marketplace.
CONCLUSION
Much of current scholarly and policy commentary asserts, often with little qualification, that prohibiting enforcement of noncompetes and other contractual limitations on employee mobility
promotes innovation. As one scholar has stated: “[T]here remain
no persuasive arguments in favor of enforcing [noncompete]
agreements.”351 Based on these types of unqualified statements in
the scholarly literature, US senators have proposed—and
multiple state legislatures have already taken or are actively
considering—actions to substantially limit or even prohibit
noncompetes.352
We respectfully dissent. The case against noncompetes is typically illustrated by reference to the standard narrative of the rise
of Silicon Valley and the decline of Route 128. A close review
shows that this historical episode is substantially more complex
than has been commonly understood. Technological and economic
fundamentals, rather than fine differences in state contract law,
most likely account for each region’s different innovation trajectories—which, in the medium to long term, has been positive in

351
352

See Moffat, 52 Wm & Mary L Rev at 879 (cited in note 9).
See notes 19–28 and accompanying text.
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both cases.353 The most widely cited empirical studies of a broader
sample of jurisdictions suffer from material limitations and, contrary to repeated characterizations in the policy debate, do not
provide compelling support for the view that noncompetes inhibit
innovation.354 Moreover, more recent empirical work has uncovered evidence supporting theoretical claims that noncompetes
sometimes induce firms to invest in cultivating employees’ human capital.355
The current state of our empirical understanding thus continues to track the most refined theoretical analysis of the complex economics of human capital markets, which suggests that
the net efficiency effects of noncompetes—and other constraints
on employee mobility—in innovation markets will vary across industry types, employee types, and other market parameters. 356
Some market segments may benefit from a high incidence of noncompetes, while others may suffer. Contrary to the direction of
recent scholarship, popular commentary, and policy activity,
there is little certainty concerning the net efficiency effects of noncompetes in general and reasonable grounds to believe they have
a net positive effect in certain innovation environments. If that is
the case, then, from an economic point of view, the common law’s
admittedly uncertain reasonableness standard likely represents
the best available approach for balancing the complex trade-offs
raised by noncompetes and other constraints on the mobility of
human capital in innovation markets.
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See Part II.A.
See Part II.B.
See notes 310–13 and accompanying text.
See Part II.B.3.
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APPENDIX
Changes to State Laws Affecting Noncompetes (2014–2019)357
State (Year)
Delaware
(2014)
New
Hampshire
(2014)
Arkansas
(2015)
Hawaii
(2015)
Alabama
(2016)
Connecticut
(2016)
Idaho (2016)
(repealed
2018)
Illinois
(2016)
Oregon
(2016)
Utah
(2016)

Change
Bars noncompetes for home
inspector trainees.
Employee must agree to
noncompete prior to start of
employment.
Specifically authorizes
noncompetes in certain
circumstances.
Prohibits enforcement of noncompetes by “technology
businesses.”
Specifically authorizes
noncompetes in certain
circumstances.
Limits enforceable geographic
scope and duration of noncompetes involving physicians.
Specifically authorizes
noncompetes in certain
circumstances.
Bars noncompetes for “lowwage” employees.
Maximum term of noncompete
limited to eighteen months.
Maximum term of noncompete
limited to twelve months.

Reduces
Enforceability?
Y
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
Y
Y

357 Note that this Table does not cover judicial decisions that may have effectively
changed an individual state’s treatment of noncompetes. Relevant statutes (with the exception of the 2018 Idaho and Utah amendments) are as follows (corresponding to states
listed above from top to bottom): 28 Del Code Ann § 4109; NH Rev Stat Ann § 275:70; Ark
Code Ann § 4-75-101 (2015); Hawaii Rev Stat Ann § 480-4; Ala Code § 8-1-190; Conn Gen
Stat § 20-14p; Idaho Code § 44-2704(6); 820 ILCS 90/10; Or Rev Stat § 653.295; Utah Code
Ann § 34-51-201; Cal Labor Code § 925; Nev Rev Stat § 613.195; Colo Rev Stat § 8-2-113;
Neb Rev Stat § 87-404(2); Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 149, § 24L; Washington Substitute HB
1450, Washington House of Representatives, 66th Regular Legislative Sess (Mar 12,
2019); Connecticut Bill No 7424, Connecticut General Assembly, Jan Sess (2019); 26 Me
Rev Stat Ann § 599-A(1); Md Labor & Empl Code Ann § 3-716 (as amended); NH Rev Stat
Ann § 275-70-a (as amended); North Dakota HB 1351, North Dakota Legislative Assembly, 66th Sess (Jan 9, 2019), codified as amended at ND Cent Code § 9-08-06; RI Gen Laws
§ 28-58-1 et seq.
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(2017)

Nevada
(2017)

Colorado
(2018)
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(2018)
Utah
(2018)
Massachusetts
(2018)
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Change
Limits ability of employers to
require employees to litigate
disputes outside of California
or under the laws of another
state.
Limits noncompetes to terms
that are “no greater than is
required for the protection of
the employer.” Authorizes
courts to reform noncompetes
that are unreasonable.
Bars noncompetes for
physicians.
Repeals Idaho 2016 statute
relating to noncompetes.
Provides that arbitrator or
court may “reform” noncompete provisions in a franchise
agreement.
Curtails enforcement of noncompetes in the broadcasting
industry.
Prohibits noncompetes for employees subject to the Fair
Labor Standards Act and all
other employees terminated
without cause.

Reduces
Enforceability?
Y

Y, N358

Y
Y
N359

Y
Y360

358 While the limitations on the enforceability of noncompetes would appear to moderately reduce enforceability relative to the existing reasonableness standard, the specific
authorization of courts to reform noncompetes that have excessive duration, scope, or
other unreasonable terms tends to enhance enforceability.
359 This change increases enforceability because it specifically authorizes a court to
“blue pencil” a noncompete provision if it is found to be unreasonable in its existing form,
rather than ruling the provision to be unenforceable in its entirety.
360 Note that, while the Massachusetts statute reduced the enforceability of noncompetes in certain cases, it also codified the inevitable disclosure doctrine (which Massachusetts
courts have historically resisted), which enables employers to partially mimic the effect of
a noncompete. See note 149 and accompanying text.

2020]
State (Year)
Washington
(2019)

Connecticut
(2019)
Maine
(2019)

Maryland
(2019)
New
Hampshire
(2019)
North Dakota
(2019)

Rhode Island
(2019)

1049

The Case for Noncompetes
Change
Imposes high salary and compensation minimums on employees and contractors who
may be subject to noncompetes;
sets presumptive eighteenmonth limit on term; requires
agreement at time of
acceptance of employment or
additional compensation;
requires additional payment
to employees terminated
without cause.
Bars noncompetes in home
health services industry.
Bars noncompetes for certain
lower-wage workers and, in
all cases, requires that employers disclose noncompete
prior to offer of employment.
Bars noncompetes for certain
lower-wage workers.
Bars noncompetes for certain
lower-wage workers.
Clarifies that “goodwill sale”
exception to ban on noncompetes can extend to firm’s
partners, members, or
shareholders.
Bars noncompetes for certain
lower-wage workers, employees subject to the Fair Labor
Standards Act, students, and
workers age eighteen or
younger.

Reduces
Enforceability?
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y
N

Y

